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One of the most intense debates in contemporary America involves conflicts between religious 
liberty and other key values like civil rights.  To shed light on such problems, courts and scholars 
often look to the historical background of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.  But 
that inquiry turns out to be no less controversial.  In recent years, a growing number of scholars 
have challenged the traditional account that focuses on the roles of Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison in the movement to protect religious liberty in late eighteenth-century America.  These 
scholars emphasize that most of the political energy behind the movement came from Evangelical 
Christians.  On this revisionist account, we should not understand the Free Exercise Clause and 
corresponding state provisions in terms of the Enlightenment views of Jefferson and Madison, 
which these scholars characterize as secular, rationalist, and skeptical—if not hostile—toward 
religion.  Instead, those protections were adopted for essentially religious reasons: to protect the 
liberty of individuals to respond to God’s will and to allow the church to carry out its mission to 
spread the Gospel.   
This Article offers a different understanding of the intellectual foundations of the Free Exercise 
Clause.  The most basic view that supported religious liberty was neither secular rationalism nor 
Christian Evangelicalism but what contemporaries called natural religion.  This view held that 
human beings were capable of using reason to discern the basic principles of religion, including 
the duties they owed to God and one another.  Because religion was founded on reason, 
individuals had an inalienable natural right to develop their own beliefs and to worship in accord 
with them.  At the same time, that right was limited by the law of nature and reason, which 
required people to respect the rights of others.  In this way, the concept of natural religion 
established both the foundations and the limits of religious liberty.  This view enabled people 
with different religious and philosophical perspectives to find common ground.  It provided the 
basis for a political coalition between Evangelicals, rationalist Christians, and Enlightenment 
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liberals that secured the adoption of state and federal constitutional guarantees for religious 
freedom. 
The Article begins by demonstrating that natural religion and its associated ideas of natural law 
and natural rights were central to the intellectual world of eighteenth-century Americans.  Those 
ideas played a vital part in many areas of thought, including political and moral philosophy, 
natural jurisprudence, English law, Christian and Deist theology, and even Newtonian natural 
science—intellectual strands that came together in the Radical Whig ideology that animated the 
American Revolution.  Next, I explain how those ideas can enhance our understanding of the 
religious-liberty provisions of the first state declarations of rights; the political controversy that 
culminated in the passage of Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom in Virginia; and 
the debates surrounding the adoption of the Federal Constitution and the Free Exercise Clause 
itself.  Finally, I explore the founders’ views on the problem of religious exemptions from civil 
laws, and discuss the implications of this history for our current debates over civil rights and 
religious liberty—a subject that the Supreme Court recently grappled with in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, and that is before the Court again this 
Term in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia. 
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Religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of 
discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or 
violence; and, therefore, all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of 
religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and . . . it is the mutual duty 
of all to practise Christian forbearance, love, and charity, towards each other. 




In contemporary America, no subject is more controversial than religious 
liberty and its relationship to other important values such as civil rights.  This 
subject lies at the heart of recent cases such as Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission,2 in which the Supreme Court considered 
whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
3
 should be 
interpreted to exempt businesses that have religious objections to same-sex 
 
 1 VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, Bill of Rights, 
document 2, at 3 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987), http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss2.html [https://perma.cc/44P8-J77U] 
[hereinafter VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS]. 
 2 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018). 
 3 The First Amendment’s Religion Clauses declare that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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marriage from state civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination based on 
sexual orientation. 
To shed light on the meaning of religious liberty and its place in our 
constitutional order, courts and scholars often seek to determine how that right 
was understood at the time of the founding.  But this too turns out to be 
controversial.  Although freedom of religion stands at the head of the Bill of 
Rights, discussions of that right during the ratification of the Constitution and 
the drafting of the First Amendment are sparse.
4
  For this reason, it is common 
to look to the earlier historical background.  In particular, courts and scholars 
traditionally have focused on one of the most important debates over church 
and state in Revolutionary America:  the dispute that took place during the 
mid-1780s over Patrick Henry’s proposal to institute a tax for the support of 
Christian teaching and worship in Virginia. The opposition to this bill was led 
by James Madison, whose Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments presented a forceful and wide-ranging defense of religious liberty.  
After defeating this bill, Madison and his allies secured the passage of Thomas 
Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom.  The traditional account 
holds that this bill, like Madison’s Memorial, was based on the Enlightenment 
view that individuals had a natural right to use their reason to pursue truth in 
the religious realm and that this realm lay beyond the legitimate scope of state 
authority, which was confined to such secular concerns as the protection of 
life, liberty, and property.  A few years later, the same view led Madison to 
champion the adoption of the Free Exercise Clause as an essential part of the 
Bill of Rights.  On this traditional account, the Clause should be understood 
to reflect the outlook of Madison and Jefferson.
5
  In recent decades, an 
increasing number of scholars have challenged this understanding of the Free 
Exercise Clause.
6
  Although they agree that we can gain crucial insight from 
the debate in Virginia, they interpret that debate very differently.  These 
 
 4 For an exploration of these debates, see infra Part V.B. 
 5 For classic examples of this account, see Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1947); 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163–64 (1878). 
6
  See, e.g., THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA, 1776-1787 
(1977) [hereinafter BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA]; JOHN A. RAGOSTA, WELLSPRING OF LIBERTY: HOW 
VIRGINIA’S RELIGIOUS DISSENTERS HELPED WIN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND SECURED 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 4–7 (2010); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical 
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1437–43 (1990). 
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scholars observe that most of the political energy for the defeat of the 
Assessment Bill and the passage of Jefferson’s statute came from Evangelical 
Christians who were motivated by religious principles.  Evangelicals held that 
the exercise of state power in this area corrupted religion, usurped God’s 
sovereign authority, interfered with the relationship between God and 
individual believers, and impeded the church’s ability to spread the Gospel.
7
  
On this revisionist account, the founding-era protections for religion should 
not be understood in terms of the Enlightenment principles of Jefferson and 
others, which these scholars characterize as secular, rationalist, and skeptical—
if not hostile—toward religion.
8
  Instead, those protections were adopted for 
essentially “religious reasons”:  to protect the freedom of individuals “to 
respond to God’s will” and to enable the church to “fulfill its mission 
uncontaminated by civil government.”
9
 
Other scholars emphasize that the protections for religious liberty reflected 
both Enlightenment and Evangelical ideals.
10
  Yet it is not always clear how the 
two different perspectives were related to each other. 
In this Article, I propose a different way of understanding the intellectual 
foundations of the Free Exercise Clause and its state counterparts.  The most 
basic view that supported religious liberty was neither secular rationalism nor 
Christian Evangelicalism, but what contemporaries called natural religion.  As 
I shall show, natural religion—together with the associated ideas of natural law 
and natural rights—played a vital role in many areas of eighteenth-century 
thought, from political theory and jurisprudence to theology and science. 
The concept of natural religion was based on a particular understanding of 
human beings and their relationship with God.  According to this view, 
humans are inherently rational beings.  Reason enables them to recognize that 
 
7
  See, e.g., BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 178–81. 
8
  See, e.g., id. at 4, 179–81; McConnell, supra note 6, at 1416, 1449–52. 
9
  BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 3, 176, 180–81.  For another insightful work that challenges 
the traditional account and argues that the origins of the Religion Clauses are better understood in 
terms of Christian principles, see STEVEN D. SMITH, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2014). 
 10 See, e.g., MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND 
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1965); SIDNEY E. MEAD, THE LIVELY 
EXPERIMENT: THE SHAPING OF CHRISTIANITY IN AMERICA (1963); NICHOLAS P. MILLER, THE 
RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT: DISSENTING PROTESTANTS AND THE 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2012); JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION 
AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT ch. 2 (4th ed. 2016). 
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they were created by a supreme being and that they should love, worship, and 
obey him.  In addition to these duties to God, natural religion embraces the 
duties that one owes to oneself and to others.  Taken together, these three 
kinds of duties constitute the law of nature. 
The law of nature requires individuals to respect the inherent rights of 
other people—rights that arise from their own nature as rational creatures.  
Among the most important of those rights is religious liberty.  Because reason 
is central to religion, individuals must be free to pursue spiritual truth and to 
worship in accord with their own consciences and understandings.  As 
intelligent beings with the capacity for self-determination, they also are entitled 
to direct their own actions and to dispose of their persons and properties as 
they see fit.  This is the basis of the natural rights to life, liberty, and property.  
Because these rights would be insecure in a state of nature, individuals would 
enter into civil society and establish a government with the force necessary to 
protect them.  But force has no place in the realm of religion, which must be 
determined solely by reason and conscience.  It follows that religious liberty is 
an inalienable right that is limited only by the inherent duty to respect the rights 
of other individuals and the community.  In this way, the interlocking concepts 
of natural religion, natural law, and natural rights provided a powerful rationale 
for protecting freedom of conscience.   
During the eighteenth century, the idea of natural religion took two 
different forms.
11
  The first was Deism.  In its pure form, this view held that 
religion should be based on reason alone and therefore rejected all forms of 
religion that were based on a belief in divine revelation, including traditional 
Christianity.  This version of natural religion, which was advocated by radicals 
like Thomas Paine, sparked intense discussion around the end of the 
eighteenth century, but it had a limited following in America before that time.
12
 
Instead, the most common form of natural religion held that there was no 
necessary conflict between reason and revelation.  This view maintained that 
the basic principles of religion and morality were founded in reason, but left 
open the possibility that God had chosen to reinforce those principles and 
disclose additional truths through revelation.  This view had the potential to 
 
 11 See William Warren Sweet, Natural Religion and Religious Liberty in America, 25 J. RELIGION 45, 
51 (1945). 
 12 See E. BROOKS HOLIFIELD, THEOLOGY IN AMERICA: CHRISTIAN THOUGHT FROM THE AGE OF 
THE PURITANS TO THE CIVIL WAR 6–7, 159–72 (2003). 
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establish common ground among people who held a wide variety of religious 
perspectives. 
It was this form of natural religion that formed the basis for Jefferson’s Bill 
for Establishing Religious Freedom.  Although his private views were Deistic, 
his bill used the language of reason and natural rights in a way that appealed 
not only to Deists but also to many Christians.  The same was true of 
Madison’s Memorial.  Nor were Jefferson and Madison the only ones who 
used such language:  the ideas of natural rights and reason also appeared in 
several of the leading Evangelical petitions against Henry’s Assessment Bill.
13
  
In the end, that bill was rejected, and Jefferson’s Bill adopted, by a political 
coalition of Evangelicals, rationalist Episcopalians, and Enlightenment liberals 
that was led by Madison. 
In this way, the ideas of natural religion and natural rights were central to 
the struggle for religious liberty in Virginia.  This is not to diminish the 
importance of Evangelical ideas, which also played a vital role.  But to the 
extent that there was a consensus among the different groups that fought for 
religious freedom in that state, it was to be found in their support for 
Jefferson’s Bill, with its affirmation that “the natural rights of mankind” 
included the inalienable freedom to use one’s own mind to form and express 
religious opinions and to worship in accord with them.
14
  There is good reason 
to believe that the Free Exercise Clause was understood to reflect the same 




 13 See infra text accompanying notes 458–64 (discussing Presbyterian petition of August 13, 1785); infra 
text accompanying notes 522–24 (discussing Westmoreland County petition of November 2, 1784); 
infra note 531 (discussing General Baptist Association petition of August 13, 1785). 
 14 Virginia, Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 
1, Amendment I (Religion), document 44, http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions44.html [https://perma.cc/7D6E-4N38] 
[hereinafter Virginia Act]. 
 15 In the legal literature, most discussions of rational religion during the founding period focus on 
Deism.  See, e.g., William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free 
Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357, 377 (1989-90) (asserting that “the governing 
intellectual climate of the late eighteenth century was that of deism, or natural law”); Noah Feldman, 
The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 391–93 (2002). Among 
the few law review articles to discuss “natural religion” in the broader sense is Steven D. Smith, The 
Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 158–62, 
193–96 (1991).  Other thoughtful explorations of rational religion during this period include 
Kathleen A. Brady, Fostering Harmony Among the Justices: How Contemporary Debates in 
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This Article proceeds in six Parts.  The first two demonstrate that natural 
religion and its related ideas of natural law and natural rights held a central 
place in the intellectual world of eighteenth-century Americans and were 
integrally connected with their understanding of religious liberty.  Part I 
highlights the role that these ideas played in the works of John Locke, the 
philosopher who had the deepest impact on America.  Part II shows that these 
ideas also were essential to many other forms of thought during this period, 
including leading treatises on the law of nature and nations; the English 
jurisprudence of Blackstone and Mansfield; the moral philosophies of British 
rationalism and the Scottish Enlightenment; Deist and Christian theology; and 
even Newtonian natural science.  All these strands of thought came together 
in the Radical Whig ideology that shaped the political consciousness of 
colonial Americans.  Part III shows how natural religion and its cognate ideas 
provided the justification for the American Revolution and were enshrined in 
the first state constitutions and declarations of rights.  Part IV explains the vital 
part that these ideas played in the struggle over religious liberty in mid-1780s 
Virginia.  Part V discusses the light they can shed on the founding-era debates 
over the protections for religious freedom in the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights. 
Finally, in Part VI, I explore what this history can tell us about the problem 
of religious exemptions from civil laws.  Contrary to the position taken by 
revisionist scholars, there is no persuasive evidence that eighteenth-century 
Americans espoused a general principle that individuals were entitled to 
 
Theology Can Help to Reconcile the Divisions on the Court Regarding Religious Expression by the 
State, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 433, 440–477 (1999), and Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The 
Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 
36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 874–960 (1995).  For valuable discussions of eighteenth-century 
natural religion by historians, political scientists, and philosophers, see PETER BYRNE, NATURAL 
RELIGION AND THE NATURE OF RELIGION: THE LEGACY OF DEISM chs. 1–5 (Routledge 2013) 
(1989); MICHAEL J. LEE, THE EROSION OF BIBLICAL CERTAINTY: BATTLES OVER AUTHORITY 
AND INTERPRETATION IN AMERICA chs. 1–3 (2013); HENRY F. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN 
AMERICA (1976); MILLER, supra note 10; CLAUDE M. NEWLIN, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION IN 
COLONIAL AMERICA ch. 7 (1962; PROTESTANTISM AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING (Thomas S. 
Engeman & Michael P. Zuckert eds., 2004); MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, THE NATURAL RIGHTS 
REPUBLIC: STUDIES IN THE FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1997); B. 
A. Gerrish, Natural and Revealed Religion, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY PHILOSOPHY 641, 648–60 (Knud Haakonssen ed., 2000); Sweet, supra note 11. 
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exemptions from laws that regulated conduct in a way that conflicted with their 
religious beliefs.  As a non-originalist, I do not believe that this history 
necessarily should be controlling.  It is an open question whether the Supreme 
Court should overrule Employment Division v. Smith16 and subject such laws 
to some form of heightened review.  The Court is currently considering this 
question in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia,17 a free exercise challenge to a city’s 
decision to terminate its foster-care contract with a Catholic social service 
agency which refused on religious grounds to vet same-sex couples to serve as 
foster parents.  However, if the Court decides to adopt heightened scrutiny for 
general laws that burden religious exercise, it ought not to employ this 
approach to curtail the application of civil rights laws, such as the ones involved 
in Fulton and Masterpiece Cakeshop.  Instead, as I shall show, one of the most 
important lessons that emerges from the history is that the right to religious 
liberty does not take precedence over the civil rights of other people. 
I. JOHN LOCKE ON RELIGION, TOLERATION, AND THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 
A. Locke on Natural Religion 
1. The Concept of Natural Religion 
Locke’s religious, moral, and political theory is founded on the notion that 
human beings are rational creatures.
18
  Because they are endowed with reason, 
individuals are free, self-determining beings who are capable of directing their 
own thoughts and actions and pursuing their own happiness or good.
19
  To 
know what that good is, they must pursue knowledge about themselves and 
the world. 
 
 16 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 17 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (Feb. 24, 2020) (No. 19-123). 
 18 For a fuller exploration of Locke’s views on religion and toleration, see Steven J. Heyman, The Light 
of Nature: John Locke, Natural Rights, and the Origins of American Religious 
Liberty, 101 MARQUETTE L. REV. 705 (2018) [hereinafter Heyman, Light of Nature]. 
 19 See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. II, ch. XXI, §§ 1–73, at 
233–87 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1689) [hereinafter LOCKE, HUMAN 
UNDERSTANDING].  
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Locke explores the foundations of that knowledge in An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, one of the landmark philosophical works of the 
Enlightenment.  According to Locke, most of our knowledge is quite limited 
because it is derived from sense experience.
20
  But there are two key exceptions 
to this generalization.  First, following Descartes, Locke holds that we have 
intuitive knowledge of our own existence.
21
  And second, he maintains that we 
are capable of knowing some truths through deductive reason.
22
  The most 
important of these truths concern our relationship with God.  They form the 




The first principle of natural religion is that God exists.
24
  In the Essay, 
Locke presents two arguments for this proposition.  First, in a version of the 
traditional cosmological argument, he contends that all beings can be traced 
to a first cause that must have existed from eternity, and that is the source of 
all the qualities they have.
25
  Because we are aware of our own existence as 
“knowing intelligent Being[s],” we can conclude that we ultimately must have 
received our existence and intelligence from another being that is “eternal, 
most powerful, and most knowing.”26  This is what we “call GOD.”27  Second, 
Locke offers a version of the traditional argument from design: that only an 
intelligent being could have “produce[d] that order, harmony, and beauty 
which is to be found in Nature.”
28
 
A second truth of natural religion concerns the relationship between 
people and God.  Because humans are “Inferior [and] Finite” beings, who are 
created by and dependent upon another being who is infinite, “omnipotent, 




 20 See id. bk. IV, ch. IX, § 3, at 618–19; ch. XI, §§ 2–3, 9, at 630–32, 635–36; chs. XV–XVI, at 654–
68. 
 21 See id. ch. IX, § 3, at 618. 
 22 See id. ch. II, §§ 2–3, at 531–32. 
 23 Id. bk. III, ch. IX, § 23, at 490. 
 24 See id. 
 25 See id. bk. IV, ch. X, §§ 3–5, at 620. 
 26 Id. §§ 5–6, at 620–21. 
 27 Id. § 6, at 621. 
 28 Id. § 10, at 624. 
 29 Id. ch. XIII, § 3, at 651. 
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Third, reason enables individuals to discern the moral rules that God has 
established to govern their conduct.  These rules, which Locke calls “the Law 
of Nature and Reason,” are rooted in our nature as “rational Creatures.”
30
  In 
the Essay, Locke suggests that by reflecting upon the nature of God and human 
beings and the relationship between them, reason is capable of developing 




Although Locke never attempted to fully work out the content of natural 
law, his writings contain important indications of what it includes.  Following 
the Christian natural law tradition, he makes a three-fold division between the 
duties that one owes to God, to oneself, and to others.
32
  The first category of 
duties requires individuals not only to “obey” but also to “honour” and 
“worship[]” God.33 The second category embraces an obligation to preserve 




Locke’s Second Treatise of Government contains an important discussion 
of the law of nature as it applies to the third category—duties to others.  As 
rational, self-determining beings, individuals are naturally free “to order their 
Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they see fit.”
35
  In 
other words, they have natural rights to life, liberty, and property.  This natural 
state of freedom is also a state of equality, in which no one is inherently 
superior or subordinate to anyone else.
36
  Locke then uses these ideas to 
establish the duties that individuals owe one another: the law of nature holds 
 
 30 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk. II, §§ 96, 124, at 332, 351 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (student ed. 1988) (3d ed. 1698) [hereinafter LOCKE, GOVERNMENT]. 
 31 See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 19, bk. IV, ch. III, § 18, at 549. 
 32 See JOHN LOCKE, QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE LAW OF NATURE 167–69 (Robert Horwitz, 
Jenny Strauss Clay, & Diskin Clay eds. & trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1990).  As the editors explain, 
this work was composed in Latin “no later than 1664” and was first published, with an English 
translation, in 1954.  Id. at 29–31. 
 33 LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 19, bk. I, ch. IV, § 7, at 87; bk. IV, ch. XIII, § 3, at 
651. 
 34 See, e.g., LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 30, bk. II, §§ 6, 23–24, 135, at 270–71, 283–85, 357. 
 35 Id. § 4, at 269. 
 36 See id. 
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that because everyone is “equal and independent, no one ought to harm 
another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions.”
37
 
For Locke, the three propositions we have just discussed—that God exists, 
that people have a duty to worship and obey him, and that he has prescribed 
a law for them to follow—make up the substance of “Natural Religion.”
38
  
Natural religion lies at the heart of all reasonable religion.  In contrast to 
ancient texts that may be difficult to interpret and that may generate sectarian 
controversy, “the Precepts of Natural Religion are plain, and very intelligible 
to all Mankind” by the “light of Reason.”
39
  This religion teaches that “the best 
worship” of God lies not in elaborate “ceremonies and outward 
performances,” but rather in “a good life” that is characterized by piety toward 
God and virtue in relation to oneself and others.
40
  Such a life is not only 
pleasing to God but also promotes the wellbeing of the society and its 
members.
41
  Moreover, because the principles of natural religion can be 
discerned by “the common light of nature,” they are matters that the adherents 
of different religions can agree upon.
42
  For all these reasons, Locke maintains 
that natural religion should have a central place in religious life.
43
 
2. The Limits of Natural Religion and the Need for Revealed Religion 
At the same time, Locke concedes that some matters are beyond the scope 
of human reason and natural religion.  With regard to worship, for example, 
while reason teaches that one should approach God with “a pure heart,” there 
is no way to know what “outward modes of worship” he desires other than 
 
 37 Id. § 6, at 271. 
 38 LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 19, bk. III, ch. IX, § 23, at 490. 
 39 Id. 
 40 JOHN LOCKE, A THIRD LETTER FOR TOLERATION ch. 1 (1692), reprinted in 5 THE WORKS OF 
JOHN LOCKE 139, 156–157 (London, Rivington, 12th ed. 1824), 
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/locke-the-works-vol-5-four-letters-concerning-toleration 
[https://perma.cc/Z3M6-DG5K] [hereinafter LOCKE, THIRD LETTER].   
 41 See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (William Popple trans., 2d ed. 
1690), reprinted in A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 45 (Mark 
Goldie ed., Liberty Fund 2010), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/locke-a-letter-concerning-toleration-
and-other-writings [https://perma.cc/DKR2-MQRX] [hereinafter LOCKE, TOLERATION]. 
 42 LOCKE, THIRD LETTER, supra note 40, ch. 1, at 156. 
 43 See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 19, bk. III, ch. IX, § 23, at 490. 





  Likewise, because Locke holds that human 
knowledge can come only from ideas derived from sensation and from 
reflection upon those ideas, reason can tell people nothing about the spiritual 
world (other than the existence and attributes of God), which again can be 
known only through revelation.
45
 
The most significant limitation on the scope of reason has to do with what 
can be known about an afterlife, a subject that is crucial to Locke’s view of 
religion and morality.  Locke maintains that, as rational creatures, individuals 
are impelled to pursue their own good.
46
  Although the interests of different 
people do not inherently conflict with one another, there are situations in 
which they do.  In such cases, it may be rational for one person to pursue her 
own good by inflicting harm on another.  The law of nature is meant to restrain 
such conduct.  But laws are useless if they are not backed by sanctions.
47
  It is 
evident that those who violate natural law are not always punished in this life.
48
  
It follows that if that law is to be effective, it must be enforced in a future state 
where individuals will be requited for their deeds in this world.
49
  In the Essay, 
Locke offers some grounds to believe that such a future state exists, but he 
does not contend that its existence actually can be demonstrated by reason.
50
  
This poses a serious problem for his whole account of morality and religion. 
Difficulties like these lead Locke to conclude that human life must be 
directed not only by natural religion, which is based on reason, but also by 
revealed religion, which is based on faith.
51
  In the Essay, Locke defines faith 
as assent to a proposition not because it has been “made out by the Deductions 
of Reason,” but rather because one trusts in the veracity of God, who has 




 44 LOCKE, THIRD LETTER, supra note 40, ch. 1, at 156–57. 
 45 See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 19, bk. IV, ch. III, §§ 26–27, at 557–58. 
 46 See id. bk. II, ch. XXI, §§ 36–71, at 254–84; id. bk. IV, ch. XXI, §§ 1, 5, at 720–21. 
 47 See, e.g., id. bk. II, ch. XXVIII, §§ 5–6, at 351–52 (“It would be in vain for one intelligent Being, to 
set a Rule to the Actions of another, if he had it not in his Power, to reward the compliance with, and 
punish deviation from his Rule . . . .”). 
 48 See, e.g., id. bk. I, ch. III, § 12, at 74. 
 49 See, e.g., id. bk. II, ch. XXI, § 70, at 281. 
 50 See, e.g., id. at 281–82 (presenting a version of Pascal’s wager). 
 
51
  See Heyman, Light of Nature, supra note 18, at 740–47. 
 52 Id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, § 2, at 689. 
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When Locke speaks of revelation, he is thinking primarily of the Bible 
and especially the New Testament.  That revelation makes clear that there is 
a future state in which human beings will be rewarded or punished under the 
law of nature for their conduct on earth.
53
  In this way, revealed religion is able 
to overcome the difficulty encountered by natural religion, which is incapable 
of demonstrating the existence of a future state upon which morality ultimately 
depends. 
3. The Relationship Between Faith and Reason 
For Locke, however, this does not mean that faith and revelation 
supersede reason and natural religion.  Instead, he insists that even with regard 
to revelation, reason plays an essential role.  To begin with, one must use 
reason to decide whether something should be regarded as a divine revelation 
in the first place.
54
  In the case of the New Testament, Locke maintains that its 
authenticity is attested by the miracles that Jesus performed.
55
 
According to Locke, we must also use our reason to assess the content of 
a purported revelation.  In this connection, he draws a key distinction between 
propositions that are (1) “According to Reason,” (2) “Above Reason,” and (3) 
“Contrary to Reason.”
56
  Although revelation can teach the first sort of truths 
(such as the idea that God exists), it is not requisite for the knowledge of such 
truths because they can be demonstrated by reason.
57
  Instead, the principal 
function of revelation is to disclose truths that are “above Reason,” such as the 
existence of a future state.
58
  This is the legitimate province “of Faith.”59 
By contrast, Locke insists that revelation can never teach truths that are 
“Contrary to Reason,” in the sense that they conflict with the clear knowledge 
that we attain either directly or “by evident deductions of Reason”—a term that 
 
 53 See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY AS DELIVERED IN THE 
SCRIPTURES ch. XIV, at 154, 162–63 (John C. Higgins-Biddle ed., Clarendon Press 2000) (1695) 
[hereinafter LOCKE, REASONABLENESS]. 
 54 See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 19, bk. IV, ch. XVIII, §§ 6, 8, 10, at 693–695. 
 55 See LOCKE, REASONABLENESS, supra note 53, ch. XIV, at 142–43, 146–47, 153. 
 56 See LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 19, bk. IV, ch. XVII, § 23, at 687. 
 57 See id. bk. IV, ch. XVIII, §§ 4–5, at 690–91. 
 58 Id. § 7, at 694. 
 59 Id. 
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appears to include the law of nature.
60
  As rational beings, we cannot accept as 
divine revelation anything that conflicts with reason, because we can never 
have more confidence that it truly is a revelation than we have in our own 
rational faculties, which are “the most excellent Part” of the nature that God 
has bestowed upon us.
61
  By the same token, we must interpret the words of a 
revelation so that it does not conflict with reason.
62
  Thus, even in determining 
the authenticity and meaning of revelation, “Reason must be our 
last Judge and Guide in every Thing.”63 
On these grounds, Locke rejects what he takes to be the common view 
that faith and reason are opposed to one another.  Properly understood, faith 
is “nothing else but an Assent founded on the highest Reason.”64  Rather than 
undermining reason, faith “assist[s] and improve[s]” it by giving us “new 
Discoveries of Truth, coming from [God, who is] the Eternal Fountain of all 
Knowledge.”
65
  On this view faith and reason are complementary, as are the 
forms of religion that arise from them.  Natural religion lays the foundations 
of religion by teaching human beings everything that can be known about God 
and morality through reason.  Revealed religion builds on these foundations 




 60 Id. § 5, at 691–93. 
 61 Id. at 692–93. 
 62 See id.; id. § 8, at 694–695. 
 63 Id. ch. XIX, § 14, at 704. 
 64 Id. ch. XVI, § 14, at 668. 
 65 Id. ch. XVIII, § 10, at 695. 
 66 In contrast to the Essay, which sharply criticized those traditionalists who elevated faith above reason, 
Locke’s Reasonableness of Christianity was directed against Deists who sought to base religion on 
reason alone.  See, e.g., LOCKE, REASONABLENESS, supra note 53, ch. I, at 5 & n.2.  The work 
therefore lays more stress than the Essay on the limits of natural reason and the need for revelation.  
Although reason is sufficient to understand the part of natural law that is needed to govern external 
interaction between individuals and to ensure the peace and prosperity of civil society (which is the 
part of natural law that Locke focuses on in the Essay and the Two Treatises), reason has not led 
people to comprehend the full range of that law, which also requires individuals to be inwardly 
virtuous and to treat one another with charity and good will.  See id. ch. IX, at 58; ch. XII, at 122–
23; ch. XIV, at 147–55.  This leads Locke to make the paradoxical remark that “Natural Reason” 
seems to be incapable of establishing “Natural Religion in its full extent.”  Id. ch. XIV, at 148.  Instead, 
he maintains that our first full and clear knowledge of the moral law came from revelation.  See id. 
at 149, 155–57.  When we consider the teachings of that law, however, we immediately recognize 
that they are “agreeable” and “conformable” to reason.  Id. at 149, 151, 153, 156, 159.  The law 
revealed in the Gospels is substantially the same as the law of nature and reason.  See id. ch. II, at 
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B. Locke on Religious Liberty and the Separation of Church and State 
1. Religious Liberty 
Let us now turn to the role that reason plays in Locke’s defense of religious 
freedom.  His most comprehensive discussion appears in A Letter 
Concerning Toleration (1689).67  The Letter begins by advocating for religious 
toleration in specifically Christian terms.
68
  True Christianity is concerned not 
with “the Pomp of . . . Outward Worship” nor with disputes over doctrinal 
purity but with “the regulating of Mens Lives according to the Rules of Vertue 
and Piety.”
69
  Instead of seeking “Ecclesiastical Dominion” over other people 
or forcing them to embrace a particular form of worship or belief, Christians 
are called to show “Charity, Meekness, and Good-will in general towards all 
Mankind; even to those that are not Christians.”
70
 
For these reasons, Locke maintains that “Toleration [is] the chief 
Characteristical Mark of the True Church.”
71
  As he soon makes clear, 
however, his goal is to show that toleration is required not only by “the Gospel 
 
13–14; id. ch. III, at 19–21; id. ch. XIV, at 159.  On this view, revelation does not supplant or 
invalidate natural religion, but instead leads human beings to a clear and comprehensive knowledge 
of it.  Moreover, while the Reasonableness stresses the advantages of Christianity for salvation, see 
id. ch. XIV, at 140–64, it also suggests that, at least in some circumstances, salvation can be attained 
through natural religion alone, see id. ch. XIV, at 139–40; Heyman, Light of Nature, supra note 18, 
at 767–69.  In short, while the Essay and the Reasonableness engage with different opponents and 
approach the relationship between faith and reason from different angles—the former from a 
naturalistic standpoint and the latter from the perspective of Christian theology––the two works 
converge on a view that affirms the essential harmony of natural and revealed religion. 
 67 The Letter was published in Latin in April 1689.  See Mark Goldie, Notes on the Texts in LOCKE, 
TOLERATION, supra note 41, at xxix.  That fall saw the publication of an English translation by 
Locke’s friend William Popple, which was made with the author’s knowledge but without his 
involvement.  See id. at xxix–xxx.  In this Article, I quote from Popple’s translation, which is the one 
that has been used in the English-speaking world from Locke’s day to our own.  For a more recent 
and literal translation, see JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (Michael 
Silverthorne trans. 2010) (1689), in LOCKE ON TOLERATION 3 (Richard Vernon ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2010). 
 68 See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 7–11. 
 69 Id. at 7–8. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 7.  For some readings of Locke’s argument that emphasize its Christian dimension, see MILLER, 
supra note 10, at 75–79; SMITH, supra note 9, at 39–40. 
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of Jesus Christ” but also by “the genuine Reason of Mankind.”
72
  In other 
words, his argument is founded upon reason and natural religion as well as 
upon revelation.  As with the Two Treatises of Government, it is the fusion of 
these two modes of discourse that gives Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration 
the unique power it had for eighteenth-century British and American readers. 
The Letter’s argument begins with the premise that human beings are 
inherently free.  The philosophical rationale for this premise may be found in 
the Two Treatises and the Essay.  In those works, Locke argues that our 
freedom is grounded in our capacity for reason, which enables us to think for 
ourselves, to direct our own actions, and to pursue well-being.
73
 
In the Letter, Locke takes this conception of inherent human liberty for 
granted.  In addition, he distinguishes two sorts of well-being that humans are 
concerned with: their temporal happiness and their happiness in the world to 
come.
74
  To support their life in this world, individuals need to acquire external 
goods through labor.
75
  But their possession of these goods is vulnerable to 
fraud and violence by others.
76
  As in the Second Treatise, the solution lies in 
the social contract.
77
  To protect their properties as well as their lives and 
liberties, individuals would agree to form a civil society and to entrust the rulers 
with the force necessary to prevent individual wrongdoing and foreign 
aggression.
78
  To secure this protection, individuals would agree to give up 




By contrast, Locke insists that when individuals enter the social contract, 
they would not give up their liberty to form their own religious beliefs or to 
worship God in the manner they believe is required to attain eternal happiness 
and salvation.
80
  In the Letter, he offers four arguments for this proposition.  
 
 72 LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 11. 
 73 See supra text accompanying notes 18–19, 35. 
 74 See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 45–48. 
 75 See id. at 46. 
 76 See id. at 46–47. 
 77 For Locke’s account of the social contract in the Second Treatise, see LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra 
note 30, bk. II, §§ 87–89, 95, 99. 
 78 See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 46–47. 
 79 See id. at 33–35, 46–48. 
 80 See id. at 12–15, 45–46. 
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First, he contends that religious liberty is inalienable in the sense that 
individuals cannot relinquish it when they enter society: 
[N]o man can so far abandon the care of his own Salvation, as blindly to leave 
it to the choice of any other, whether Prince or Subject, to prescribe to him 
what Faith or Worship he shall embrace.  For no Man can, if he would, 
conform his Faith to the Dictates, of another.  All the Life and Power of true 
Religion consists in the inward and full perswasion of the mind: And Faith is 
not Faith without believing.
81
 
As this passage indicates, Locke’s defense of religious liberty rests on the 
same understanding of religion that we explored earlier—an understanding that 
seeks to harmonize faith and reason.  In maintaining that “Salvation” depends 
upon “Faith,” he invokes a doctrine that is central to Christianity and especially 
to Protestantism.  At the same time, his assertion that “All the Life and Power 
of true Religion consists in the inward and full perswasion of the mind” makes 
clear that he sees religious belief as an exercise of our intellectual faculties. 
The same is true of the other arguments that Locke advances for religious 
liberty.  His second contention is that “[t]he care of souls cannot belong to the 
Civil Magistrate, because his Power consists only in outward force: But true 
and saving Religion consists in the inward perswasion of the Mind; without 
which nothing can be acceptable to God.”
82
  Outward force has no power to 
convince “the Understanding.”
83
  To be sure, the magistrate has the same right 
that everyone has to “draw [others] into the way of Truth” by means of 
“Arguments.”
84
  But he may not use penalties for this purpose, for “[i]t is only 
Light and Evidence that can work a change in Mens Opinions.”
85
  In short, 
religion should be a matter not of coercion but of “reason, and conviction.”
86
 
Third, Locke argues that even if coercion were capable of changing 
people’s minds, this would do nothing to promote the salvation of souls, 
because rulers have no privileged access to religious truth.  The interests of 
true religion would only be harmed if subjects were compelled “to quit the 
 
 81 Id. at 13. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 13–14. 
 85 Id. at 14. 
 86 JOHN LOCKE, A SECOND LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1690), in 5 THE WORKS OF JOHN 
LOCKE, supra note 40, at 59, 73. 
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Light of their own Reason; to oppose the Dictates of their own Consciences; 
and blindly to resign up themselves to the Will of their Governors” in such 
matters.
87
  Finally, there is no call for individuals to give up their religious 
liberty when they enter society because the beliefs and forms of worship they 
embrace do not injure others or violate their rights.
88
  It follows that, in matters 




2. Separation of Church and State 
For all these reasons, Locke maintains that when individuals enter civil 
society, they would fully retain their liberty of religious belief and worship and 
would grant the society and government no power whatever in this area.  This 
brings us to another distinctive feature of Locke’s view—his argument for a 
strict separation of church and state.  On this view, the state is a community 
that is concerned solely with its members’ temporal welfare, an interest that it 
promotes by securing their “natural” and “civil rights” to life, liberty, and 
property.
90
  The state has no power to either impose or forbid particular beliefs 
or modes of worship.
91
  These matters lie purely within the province of the 
“Religious Societies” or “Churches” that individuals voluntarily form to 
promote their own salvation.
92
  Conversely, a church is properly concerned 
only with spiritual matters and may not exercise temporal power over 
individuals, regardless of whether they belong to its communion.
93
 
3. The Limits of Religious Liberty and Toleration 
As the previous section indicates, Locke understands religious liberty in 
jurisdictional terms.
94
  Religious belief and practice are matters to be decided 
solely by individuals and the religious societies they voluntarily form, and the 
 
 87 LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 14–15. 
 88 See id. at 45–46. 
 89 Id. at 46. 
 90 Id. at 12, 23, 44–48, 58–60. 
 91 See id. at 32–33, 37, 44–45. 
 92 See id. at 15, 32–34, 37. 
 93 See id. at 18–23. 
 94 See id. at 11–12. 
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state has no authority to meddle in such affairs.  By the same token, however, 
churches and believers cannot legitimately invoke religion as a basis for 
depriving individuals of civil rights such as life, liberty, or property, for these 
rights fall within the province and protection of the political community.
95
  This 
limitation on the scope of religious conduct arises from the fundamental 
division between religion and state that results from Locke’s theory of natural 
law and the social contract. 
This theory also imposes another important limitation on religious liberty.  
Locke defends this liberty on the ground that religion involves a relationship 
between individuals as rational creatures and God.
96
  The law of nature and 
reason protects this relationship against interference by other individuals, 
churches, or the state.
97
  But just as that law grants individuals a right to religious 
liberty, it forbids them to use that liberty in a way that violates the natural rights 
of others (for example, by performing rituals involving child sacrifice).
98
  In 
these two ways—by separating the spheres of state and religion and by 
grounding religion in reason—Locke uses the theory of natural religion to 
establish the foundations and the limits of religious liberty. 
Finally, Locke also employs that theory to argue that some religious beliefs 
are not entitled to toleration at all.  To begin with, this is true of religions whose 
adherents claim the right to dominate or impose their own beliefs on other 
people.
99
  Because beliefs of this sort deny the equal status and rights of others, 
they are “contrary to human Society, or to those moral Rules which are 
necessary to the preservation of Civil Society.”
100
  Locke also would deny 
toleration to atheists on the ground that they reject even the natural religion 
which he regards as the foundation of morality, including the obligation to 
keep the promises upon which the social contract is based.
101
  On the other 
hand, he makes clear that religious liberty extends to everyone who recognizes 
 
 95 See id. at 19–20. 
 96 See id. at 13–17, 26–29, 31–32, 45–46. 
 97 See id. at 19–32, 60. 
 98 See id. at 20, 37–38, 60. 
 99 See id. at 49–51. 
 100 Id. at 49–50; see also id. at 57 (stating that the fundamental principle of the Letter is “[t]hat every 
Man [should] enjoy the same Rights that are granted to others”). 
 101 See id. at 52–53. 
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“the Being of a God,” including Jews, Muslims, and pagans 102 —a clear 
indication that on his view religious freedom is not based simply on the liberty 
that Christians enjoy under the Gospel,
103
 but also is founded on nature and 





In the political, philosophical, and theological works we have explored, 
Locke places reason at the heart of religion.  According to Locke, reason 
shows human beings that God exists, that they have a duty to worship and obey 
him, and that he has given them the law of nature to guide their conduct.  In 
addition to establishing these principles of natural religion, reason points to 
the need for faith and revelation, which reinforce and perfect those principles.  
Reason also provides a justification for religious liberty.  As rational beings, 
individuals have both a right and a duty to use their minds to seek the truth 
concerning God and what he requires them to believe and to do to attain 
salvation.  At the same time, reason defines the limits of religious liberty, which 
cannot properly be invoked as a justification for denying the equal status and 
rights of others. 
II. NATURAL RELIGION IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY THOUGHT 
Although Locke’s view of natural religion and freedom of conscience had 
a deep impact on eighteenth-century Americans,
105
 his view was far from alone.  
 
 102 Id. at 39–40, 52, 58–59. 
 103 See id. at 36. 
 104 Id. at 53, 60. 
105 See, e.g., STEVEN M. DWORETZ, THE UNVARNISHED DOCTRINE: LOCKE, LIBERALISM, AND THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1990) (discussing Locke’s impact on eighteenth-century Puritan thought 
in America); ZUCKERT, supra note 15 (same); ALAN P.F. SELL, JOHN LOCKE AND THE 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DIVINES (1997) (exploring Locke’s influence in England and America).  
For an important colonial-era work that draws on Locke to defend religious liberty, see ELISHA 
WILLIAMS, THE ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF PROTESTANTS (Boston: S. Kneeland & T. 
Green, 1744), reprinted in 1 POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730-1805, 
at 51 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1990), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/sandoz-political-sermons-of-the-
american-founding-era-1730-1805-2-vols [hereinafter POLITICAL SERMONS].  Permanent citations 
for volume 1 of this collection can be found at https://perma.cc/6MZ4-6J28, and for volume 2 at 
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Those concepts were central features of the intellectual world they inhabited.  
This Part surveys the role that those ideas played in a wide range of fields, 
including natural jurisprudence, English law, moral philosophy, theology, 
natural science, and the Whig ideology that informed the American 
Revolution. 
A. The Law of Nature and Nations 
Although Locke employed the idea of natural law in a powerful way, he 
did not offer a systematic account of its content.  For that, eighteenth-century 
Americans looked to writers on the law of nature and nations such as Hugo 
Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, and Emer de Vattel—
authors who were frequently invoked in the political discourse of this period.
106
 
A leading exposition of natural law could be found in the works of 
Pufendorf, which were an important source for Locke’s own thought on the 
subject.
107
  Pufendorf’s magisterial treatise on The Law of Nature and Nations 
appeared in 1672.
108
  The following year, he published an abridgment for 
students and the public which was soon translated into English as The Whole 
Duty of Man, According to the Law of Nature.109 
Pufendorf’s account of natural law will seem largely familiar to anyone who 
has read Locke’s Two Treatises.  Individuals are rational beings who are 
naturally accountable to no one but God.
110
  The state of nature is a condition 
 
https://perma.cc/9FCF-8ULX.  For discussions of Williams, see MILLER, supra note 10, at 94–101; 
ZUCKERT, supra note 15, at 183–93. 
 106 See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27 
(enlarged ed. 1992). 
 107 See JOHN MARSHALL, JOHN LOCKE 201–04 (1994). (discussing Locke’s complex relationship with 
Pufendorf’s thought). 
 108 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS (photo reprt.) (London, J. Walthoe 
et al. eds., Basil Kennett trans., 4th ed. 1729), https://hdl.handle.net/2027/osu.32437121669218 
[hereinafter PUFENDORF, LAW OF NATURE]. 
 109 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, THE WHOLE DUTY OF MAN, ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF NATURE (Ian 
Hunter & David Saunders eds., Andrew Tooke trans. 1691, Liberty Fund 2003) (1673), 
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/pufendorf-the-whole-duty-of-man-according-to-the-law-of-nature-
1673-2003 [https://perma.cc/U7S6-E2NY] [hereinafter PUFENDORF, DUTY].  For a more recent and 
literal translation, see SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO 
NATURAL LAW (James Tully ed., Michael Silverthorne trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1673). 
 110 See PUFENDORF, DUTY, supra note 109, bk. II, ch. I, § VIII, at 169–70. 
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of natural liberty and equality, in which individuals are free to direct their own 
actions within the law of nature and reason.
111
  Because they would be in danger 
of violence in a state of nature, they would agree to form a civil society and to 
establish government for mutual security.
112
 
Like Locke, Pufendorf  holds that the law of nature is established by God 
and knowable by “the Light of Reason.”113  That law specifies the duties that 
one owes to God, to oneself, and to others.
114
  The first category, or “[t]he Duty 
of Man towards God, so far as can be discover’d by Natural Reason,” is what 
Pufendorf calls “Natural Religion.”
115
  The chapter that he devotes to this 
subject in Whole Duty of Man is the fullest account that can be found in 
contemporary works on the law of nature and nations.
116
 
As Pufendorf explains, the duties of natural religion can be divided into 
two parts.  The “Theoretical” part obliges individuals to use reason to form 
true ideas about God.
117
  These ideas are that God exists, that he created the 
universe, that he “governs the whole World, and particularly Mankind,” and 
that he is infinite in perfection.
118
 
Pufendorf then turns to “[t]he Propositions of Practical Natural Religion,” 
which concern the internal and external worship that human beings should 
render to God.
119
  Internal worship consists of regarding him with love, 
reverence, and honor, while external worship involves public and private 
prayer as well as doing one’s best to obey his commands.
120
 
For Pufendorf, natural religion is an essential part of natural law theory not 
only because it determines the inherent duties that people owe to God, but 
also because religion is essential to social order.
121
  The fear of God is necessary 
 
 111 Id. 
 112 See id. bk. II, chs. IV–V, at 187–98. 
 113 Id. bk. I, ch. III, §§ X–XI, at 56–58; PUFENDORF, LAW OF NATURE, supra note 108, bk. II, ch. III, 
§ XIII, at 132–35. 
 114 PUFENDORF, DUTY, supra note 109, bk. I, ch. III, § XII, at 59–60. 
 115 Id. ch. IV, § 1, at 60. 
 116 See id. ch. IV, at 60–69. 
 117 Id. § I, at 60. 
 118 Id. §§ IV–V, at 62; cf. PUFENDORF, LAW OF NATURE, supra note 108, bk. II, ch. IV, § III, at 155. 
 119 PUFENDORF, DUTY, supra note 109, bk. I, ch. IV, § VI, at 64. 
 120 Id. §§ VI–VII, at 64–66. 
 121 See id. ch. III, § XIII, at 59. 
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to restrain the unruly passions and conduct of individuals, which cannot 
effectively be controlled merely by temporal punishments or a sense of moral 
duty.
122
  For this reason, religion is properly regarded as “the utmost and 
firmest Bond of Human Society.”123 
In a later work, Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion in Reference 
to Civil Society (1687),124 Pufendorf brings his natural law theory to bear on 
the problems of religious toleration and church-state relations.
125
  Like Locke, 
he argues that, as “Rational Creatures,” human beings are inherently free to 
worship God in accord with their “own Opinion[s]” as informed by reason or 
revelation.
126
  Individuals would not surrender this freedom when they submit 
to civil government, which is established not “for Religions sake” but for the 
security “of their Liberty, Life, and Fortunes.”
127
 
Despite what initially appears to be a strong defense of religious liberty and 
church-state separation, Pufendorf contends that sovereigns possess 
substantial authority with regard to religion.  Because religion is essential to 
social order, they not only should take care to promote natural religion among 
their subjects, but they may also prohibit actions that subvert natural religion, 
such as public idolatry, blasphemy, and denial of God’s existence.
128
 
Pufendorf goes considerably further when discussing the authority of 
sovereigns in modern European states.  To maintain public peace and 
tranquility, it is desirable that there be “but one Faith and Religion in a State,” 
especially if it is the true religion of Christ as “contained in the Holy 
Scripture.”
129
  Accordingly, the sovereign has authority, with “the general 
consent of his Subjects,” to establish a “Publick Form of Religion” within the 
society; to require that it “be professed by all,” especially the clergy; and to 
 
 122 See id. ch. IV, § IX, at 67–69. 
 123 Id. at 67. 
 124 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE NATURE AND QUALIFICATION OF RELIGION IN REFERENCE TO 
CIVIL SOCIETY (Simone Zurbuchen ed., Jodocus Crull trans. 1698, Liberty Fund 2002), 
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/pufendorf-of-the-nature-and-qualification-of-religion-in-reference-to-
civil-society [https://perma.cc/ALF3-K58Q] [hereinafter PUFENDORF, RELIGION]. 
 125 See Simone Zurbuchen, Introduction to id., at xi. 
 126 PUFENDORF, RELIGION, supra note 124, §§ 1–3, at 12–15. 
 127 Id. § 5, at 17. 
 128 See id. § 7, at 20. 
 129 Id. § 49, at 104, 106. 
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command that its “Doctrine be Taught both in publick and private.” 
130
  When 
doctrinal disputes arise, the sovereign may convene synods to resolve them.
131
  
Individuals who insist on teaching “erroneous Doctrines” may be “silenced” 
or—if all else fails—“banished.”
132
 The sovereign also has authority to ensure 
that the church has adequate revenues, to erect and maintain church buildings 
and schools, and to play a limited role in the selection of ministers.
133
 
This account of Pufendorf’s views raises a puzzle.  How is it possible to 
reconcile his position that religious liberty is an inalienable aspect of natural 
liberty, and that civil government is established for the sake of security rather 
than religion, with his approval of the establishment of a public religion and 
his view that the government is not necessarily bound to grant toleration to 
religious dissenters?  The answer appears to lie at least partly in his views on 
natural and revealed religion and on the role of religion in society.  In contrast 
to Locke, Pufendorf seems to hold that natural religion has no effect whatever 
in promoting the salvation of souls, which can come about only in the ways 
offered by divine revelation.
134
  From the standpoint of natural law, the function 
of natural religion—and religion in general—is to provide the “Bond” or 
“Cement” of human society, by giving individuals the strongest possible 
incentive to obey the laws and refrain from harming one another.
135
  In a 
society whose members are Christians, the only religion that is capable of 
holding the society together is Christianity.
136
  Thus, in such a society, the 
government should promote not only the principles of natural religion but also 
Christian beliefs and worship, by establishing them as the public religion of 
the commonwealth.
137
  That does not mean that the government is justified in 
imposing a religion on individuals by force, for that would conflict with their 
 
 130 Id. at 106–07. 
 131 See id. § 46, at 99–100. 
 132 Id. § 49, at 107. 
 133 See id. §§ 43, 45, at 95–96, 97–99. 
 134 See PUFENDORF, DUTY, supra note 109, bk. I, at 19–20; bk. I, ch. III, § XII, at 59–60; bk. I, ch. IV, 
§ VIII, at 66; PUFENDORF, LAW OF NATURE, supra note 108, bk. II, ch. IV, § III, at 156; cf. 
PUFENDORF, RELIGION, supra note 124, § 8, at 22 (asserting that salvation cannot be attained 
through natural religion alone). 
 135 PUFENDORF, DUTY, supra note 109, bk. I, ch. IV, § VIII, at 67–69; PUFENDORF, RELIGION, supra 
note 124, § 5, at 17–18. 
 136 See PUFENDORF, RELIGION, supra note 124, § 49, at 106. 
 137 Id. § 48, at 102–03; id. § 49, at 106–07. 
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innate freedom as well as with the very nature of religion, which can be 
apprehended only by reason and faith.
138
  Within limits, it may be appropriate 
to tolerate those who differ from the public religion, especially when they are 
willing to live quietly and peaceably in the society.
139
  But when religious dissent 
threatens to undermine social peace and order, the government has the 
authority to suppress it or, as a last resort, to expel the dissenters.
140
 
In this way, Pufendorf seeks to reconcile the competing values of 
individual liberty and social order in the area of religion.  He does this by 
recognizing a limited right to religious freedom while at the same time 
defending the traditional institution of an established church, now reconceived 
as an institution that promotes social order as much as one that advances true 
religion and the salvation of souls.  The tensions and contradictions that exist 
within this view are obvious, for although Pufendorf insists that civil 
government is not formed for the sake of religion, the powers that he grants 
the government in this area may result in far-reaching limits on religious 
liberty.  In this respect, his position stands in striking contrast to that of Locke, 
who takes the idea of a natural and inalienable right to religious liberty to its 





 138 See id. §§ 1–3, at 12–15. 
 139 See id. §§ 49–50, at 105–08. 
 140 See supra text accompanying note 132. 
 141 See supra text accompanying notes 90–93.  In their own treatises on the law of nature and nations, 
Burlamaqui and Vattel follow Pufendorf in recognizing substantial authority in the sovereign over 
religious teaching and worship, while at the same time affirming that subjects have an inviolable 
natural right to liberty of conscience.  See JEAN-JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF 
NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW vol. 2, pt. III, chs. II–III, at 404–15; pt. IV, ch. II, §§ XXXII–XXXVI, 
at 460–62; ch. VIII, § XVI, at 515 (Petter Korkman ed., Thomas Nugent trans., Liberty Fund 2006) 
(2d ed. 1763), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/burlamaqui-the-principles-of-natural-and-politic-law 
[https://perma.cc/G6HQ-Z3B5]; EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS bk. I, ch. XI, § 114, at 
147–49, id. ch. XII, §§ 125–57, at 155–85 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., Liberty Fund 
2008) (1797), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/vattel-the-law-of-nations-lf-ed [https://perma.cc/4T6B-
N6G9].  By contrast, in his notes on Pufendorf, the great commentator Jean Barbeyrac endorses 
Locke’s views on religious toleration and the separation of church and state.  See PUFENDORF, LAW 
OF NATURE, supra note 108, bk. VII, ch. IV, § XI, n.2, at 665–66 (Barbeyrac’s note).  The concept 
of natural religion also was an important one for all these authors.  See, e.g., BURLAMAQUI, vol. 1, 
pt. II, ch. IV, §§ VII-VIII, at 148–50; VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, bk. I, ch. XII, § 127, at 
157–58; Jean Barbeyrac, An Historical and Critical Account of the Science of Morality, in 
PUFENDORF, LAW OF NATURE, supra note 108, § I, at 1–3; § VI, at 14–16; § 32, at 86–88.  
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We can therefore view Locke and Pufendorf as representing two 
competing models of religious liberty and its relationship to the state.  Both 
thinkers begin with the notion that human beings are rational creatures who 
are inherently free to use their minds to pursue the truth about God.  For 
Locke, this religious liberty amounts to an inviolable natural right and the state 
has no authority with regard to religion.  By contrast, Pufendorf holds that the 
state may limit this liberty for the sake of social order, which he believes is best 
ensured through the traditional means of an established religion.  The history 
of religious freedom in the eighteenth century involves an ongoing conflict 
between these two models.  We now turn to some of the ways this debate 
played out within the English legal tradition. 
B. English Law and the Toleration Act of 1689 
For founding-era Americans, one of the most authoritative articulations of 
natural law could be found in Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the 
Laws of England. 142   In this work, Blackstone not only presents a 
comprehensive account of English law, but also seeks to rationalize and 
defend that law by showing that it is consonant with the law of nature.
143
  
Following the tradition that we are exploring, Blackstone explains that, as 
rational creatures endowed with free will, human beings are necessarily subject 
to the rules of justice that God has established for their conduct—rules that are 
founded in “the nature of things,” that are discoverable by reason, and that are 
intended to direct people toward their own “real happiness.”
144
  In addition to 
duties toward God, including worship and obedience, these rules prescribe 
the duties that one owes to oneself and one’s neighbor.
145
  Taken as a whole, 





 142 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Wilfrid Prest gen. ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2016) (1765-69) [hereinafter BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES]. 
 143 See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 142, introduction § 1, at 32–36 (arguing that 
English law reflects the fundamental laws of nature).  All page references herein are to the first edition 
of the Commentaries. 
 144 Id. § 2, at 39–41. 
 145 Id. at 39, 45, 54. 
 146 Id. at 41, 55. 
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This account of natural law provides the foundation not only for “natural 
duties” but also for “natural rights.”147  Those rights consist of personal security, 
personal liberty, and private property.
148
  After canvassing the ways that they 
are recognized and protected by English law, Blackstone boasts that (as 
Montesquieu put it) England “is the only nation in the world, where political 
or civil liberty is the direct end of its constitution.”
149
 
Yet in many ways Blackstone struggles to reconcile the principles of liberty 
with the needs of social order and the content of English law.  Nowhere is this 
clearer than in his discussion of the criminal law regarding “Offences Against 
God and Religion.”
150
  Blackstone voices the liberal sentiment that all religious 
persecution is “highly unjustifiable upon every principle of natural reason, civil 
liberty, or sound religion.”
151
  But he cautions that this position should not be 
taken “into such extremes, as may endanger the national church,” for “there 
is always a difference to be made between toleration and establishment.”
152
  
“[T]he preservation of christianity, as a national religion” is essential not only 
because of “its own intrinsic truth,” but also because of its importance to “the 
civil state.”
153
  For example, all confidence in oaths and other forms of veracity 
would be undermined if people did not believe in “a future state of rewards 
and punishments”—a belief that is “clearly revealed” and “forcibly inculcated” 
by the teachings of Christ.
154
  The government therefore is justified in 
punishing “all affronts to christianity” or to the established church.
155
  Although 
in the past some measures were excessively harsh,
156
 “[e]very thing is now as it 
should be.”
157
  In particular, Blackstone defends the existing laws against 
apostasy, heresy, blasphemy, and reviling the worship or liturgy of the Church 
 
 147 Id. at 54 (second emphasis added). 
 148 See id. bk. I, ch. 1, at 125. 
 149 Id. at 140–41 (citing 1 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS pt. 2, bk. 11, ch. 5 (Thomas 
Nugent trans., London, J. Nourse & P. Vaillant 1750)). 
 150 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 142, ch. 4, at 41. 
 151 Id. at 51. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 43. 
 154 Id. at 43–44. 
 155 Id. at 44, 49–51. 
 156 See, e.g., id. at 43–44 (rejecting the death penalty that formerly was prescribed for apostasy). 
 157 Id. at 49. 





  He also denounces “the protestant dissenters” whose “spirit” 
and “doctrines” had led them to overthrow the church and the monarchy 
during the Civil War.
159
  Concededly, the Restoration Parliament went too far 
when it criminalized mere nonconformity to, or separation from, the 
established church, however much such conduct might proceed from 
“perverseness,” “weakness of intellect,” or “misguided piety.”
160
  But the 
legislature acted with “a spirit of true magnanimity” when it enacted the 
Toleration Act of 1689, which suspended the penal laws with regard to many 
Protestant dissenters, thereby leaving them “at full liberty to act as their 
conscience shall direct them, in the matter of religious worship.”
161
  At the same 
time, Blackstone praises the Corporation and Test Acts, which reserved all 
civil offices to members of the national church
162
—a policy that he insists is 
inherent in the very “idea of a national establishment.”
163
 
Shortly after its appearance in 1769, Blackstone’s discussion drew a sharp 
rebuke from a leading English nonconformist, Joseph Priestley, who objected 
not only to his narrow view of religious liberty but also to the harsh language 
he directed against Protestant dissenters.
164
  In response, Blackstone explained 
that he had intended that language to refer not to contemporary dissenters but 
to their ancestors, the Puritans who had overthrown the monarchy in the 
1640s.
165
  Conceding that his language was ambiguous, he promised to revise it 
 
 158 See id. at 43–51, 59. 
 159 Id. at 52. 
 160 See id. at 52–53. 
 161 Id. at 53.  By contrast, Blackstone argues that Parliament historically was justified in enacting severe 
penal laws against Catholics because of the threat they posed to the state.  See id. at 54–57.  But he 
expresses hope that as this threat diminishes, the laws against Catholics also will be eased.  See id. at 
57. 
 162 Corporation Act, 13 Car. II Stat. 2 c. 1 (1661); Test Act, 25 Car. II c. 2 (1672). 
 163 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 142, ch. 4, at 52–53, 57–58. 
 164 JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, REMARKS ON SOME PARAGRAPHS IN THE FOURTH VOLUME OF DR. 
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND RELATING TO THE DISSENTERS 
(1769), reprinted in AN INTERESTING APPENDIX TO SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE’S 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 5 (1773), https://ia600207.us.archive.org/31/items/i
nterestingappen05john/interestingappen05john_bw.pdf [https://perma.cc/99K5-UFL2] [hereinafter 
INTERESTING APPENDIX]. 
 165 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, A REPLY TO DR. PRIESTLEY’S REMARKS ON THE FOURTH VOLUME OF 
THE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1769), reprinted in INTERESTING APPENDIX, 
supra note 164, at 35, 39. 
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in the next edition.
166
  He also stressed his commitment to religious liberty.
167
  
At the same time, he insisted that nonconformity was still a crime under 




The controversy continued the following year with the publication of a 
work called Letters to the Honourable Mr. Justice Blackstone by the English 
dissenting minister Philip Furneaux.
169
  As Furneaux read the Commentaries 
and the reply to Priestley, Blackstone maintained that the Toleration Act did 
not abolish the crime of nonconformity even with respect to Protestant 
dissenters, but merely suspended the penalties that the law would have 
imposed on them.
170
  In response, Furneaux contended that religious liberty 
was among the most sacred and valuable “rights to which men are entitled by 
nature,” and that the nation had recognized this when it adopted the 
Toleration Act.
171
  On this view, the Act should be interpreted not merely to 
suspend the penalties for nonconformity but to completely relieve that 
conduct of its criminality.
172
 
As support for this position, Furneaux pointed to a recent judicial decision 
known as the Sheriff’s Case.173  For some years, electors in London had carried 
on a scheme to raise money for a new city hall.  They would elect to office a 
 
 166 See id. at 40. 
 167 See id. at 38–39. 
 168 See id. at 40–41. 
 169 PHILIP FURNEAUX, LETTERS TO THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BLACKSTONE (London, T. 
Cadell 1770).  My references to this work are to the revised edition which appeared the following 
year.  PHILIP FURNEAUX, LETTERS TO THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BLACKSTONE (London, 
T. Cadell, 2d ed. 1771) https://hdl.handle.net/2027/osu.32437121564914 [hereinafter FURNEAUX, 
LETTERS].  
 170 FURNEAUX, LETTERS, supra note 169, Letter I, at 7. 
 171 Id., Letter IV, at 108–09. 
 172 See id., Letter I, at 10–25. 
 173 See id. at 17–22.  This decision unfortunately does not appear in the English Reports.  The fullest 
account of the case, together with two of the leading opinions, may be found in the appendices that 
Furneaux included in the second edition of his Letters.  See id. at 223 (Furneaux’s explanation of the 
background); id. at 235 (Justice Foster’s argument in Court of Judges Delegates (1762)); id. at 249 
(Lord Mansfield’s speech in House of Lords (1767)).  Mansfield’s speech is also printed in Hansard’s 
Debates.  See 16 T.C. HANSARD, THE 
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 316 (1813), https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=E
Zg9AAAAcAAJ&hl=en&pg=GBS.PA315 [https://perma.cc/DRQ4-WAE5]. 
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person who was known to be a Protestant dissenter, and who therefore was 
barred from holding municipal office by the Corporation Act.
174
  Under the 
terms of a London by-law, the person was then subjected to a heavy fine for 
refusing to undertake the office to which he had been elected.
175
  The 
dissenters eventually mounted a legal challenge to this practice.
176
  In 1767, 
they prevailed when the House of Lords ruled in favor of a nonconformist 
named Alan Evans who had been elected sheriff.
177
  In an eloquent opinion, 
William Murray, Baron Mansfield, who was Lord Chief Justice of the Court 
of King’s Bench, declared that nothing is “certainly more unreasonable, more 
inconsistent with the rights of human nature, more contrary to the spirit and 
precepts of the Christian Religion, more iniquitous and unjust, more impolitic, 
than Persecution.  It is against Natural Religion, Revealed Religion, and sound 
Policy.”
178
  This view, he contended, was embodied in the Toleration Act, 
under which “the Dissenters way of worship . . . is not only exempted from 
punishment, but rendered innocent and lawful; it is established: it is put under 




Furneaux’s critique of Blackstone also relied on another leading decision 
called Omichund v. Barker.181  In that case an Indian merchant from Calcutta 
sued an English official for financial fraud.
182
  The defendant responded that 
because the plaintiff was Hindu, his testimony was inadmissible because he 
was “incapable of swearing upon the Gospels.”183  The judges rejected this 
contention.  Invoking Pufendorf and almost “[a]ll other Writers in Divinity, 
Morality, the Law of Nature or Nations, or any other Science relative to this 
Subject,” Lord Chancellor Hardwicke explained that the practice of taking 
 
 174 See FURNEAUX, LETTERS, supra note 169, at 223–34. 
 175 See id. at 223. 
 176 See id. at 224. 
 177 See id. at 224–25. 
 178 Id. at 278 (speech of Lord Mansfield). 
 179 Id. at 265–66. 
 180 See id. at 283–84. 
 181 Of the Sufficiency and Disability of a Witness (Omichund v. Barker) (1744) 22 Eng. Rep. 337; 2 
Equity Cases Abridged 395. 
 182 Id. at 339; 2 Equity Cases Abridged at 397–98. 
 183 Id.; 2 Equity Cases Abridged at 398. 
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oaths was not peculiar to Christianity but “follows from the Principles of 
Natural Religion.”
184
  All that was required was that the oath taker believe in “a 
God, and that he will reward and punish Men for their Actions” if they swear 
falsely.
185
  The judges concluded that individuals were entitled to give evidence 
by swearing in the manner prescribed by their own religions.
186
  In his Letters, 
Furneaux cites Omichund to support his argument that natural religion and 
not revelation is the foundation of judicial oaths, and so there is no justification 
for punishing individuals merely because their regard for oaths is based on 
considerations other than Christian doctrine.
187
 
In response to objections from writers like Priestley and Furneaux, 
Blackstone made certain changes to the Commentaries.188  But while those 
changes softened the tone of his discussion, they were unable to resolve the 
deep contradictions that lay at the heart of his effort to reconcile principles of 
religious liberty with the establishment of religion, at least as the latter was 
embodied in the English law of his day.  
In addition to criticizing Blackstone’s position, Priestley and Furneaux 
published affirmative arguments for religious liberty.  In An Essay on the First 
Principles of Government, Priestley argued that “the best interests of 
mankind” would be promoted by “unbounded liberty, in matters of 
religion.”189  Furneaux’s Essay on Toleration made a Lockean case for religious 
freedom based on “the nature of religion” as well as “the origin, and the ends, 
of civil government.”
190
  As we shall see, Furneaux’s writings made a strong 
 
 184 Id. at 347; 2 Equity Cases Abridged at 408 (opinion of Hardwicke, C.). 
 185 Id. at 344; 2 Equity Cases Abridged at 404 (opinion of Willes, C.J.); see also id. at 345; 2 Equity 
Cases Abridged at 405–06 (opinion of Lee, C.J.). 
 186 See id. at 350; 2 Equity Cases Abridged at 412 (opinion of Hardwicke, C.). 
 187 FURNEAUX, LETTERS, supra note 169, Letter III, at 67–69 & 69 n.*. 
 188 For a comprehensive account of these changes, see 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 
142, at 294–300 (Varia to Chapter 4). 
 189 JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, AN ESSAY ON THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT, AND ON THE 
NATURE OF POLITICAL, CIVIL, AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 115 (London, J. Johnson, 2d ed. 1771) 
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/priestley-an-essay-on-the-first-principles-of-government 
[https://perma.cc/X8L5-VB74]. 
 190 PHILIP FURNEAUX, AN ESSAY ON TOLERATION §§ I–II, at 8–25 (photo. reprt. n.d.) (London: T. 
Cadell, 1773) [hereinafter FURNEAUX, TOLERATION]. 
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impression on Jefferson and Madison and contributed in important ways to 
their views on religious liberty.
191
 
C. Moral Philosophy 
During the eighteenth century, one strand of British philosophy 
emphasized the role of reason in morality while another stressed the 
importance of emotion.  The concepts of natural law and natural religion held 
an important place in both views. 
1. Sentimentalism and the Scottish Enlightenment 
As many scholars have shown, founding-era Americans were substantially 
influenced by the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment.
192
  That is especially 
true of Francis Hutcheson, a Presbyterian minister who held the chair of moral 
philosophy at the University of Glasgow from 1729 to 1746.
193
  Hutcheson’s 
views were developed in a series of works that culminated in A System of 
Moral Philosophy.194 
Hutcheson holds that the purpose of moral philosophy is to direct human 
beings to the course of action that will “promote their greatest happiness and 
perfection,” insofar as this can be discerned through observations “from the 
constitution of nature” without the assistance of “supernatural revelation.”
195
  
The resulting rules of conduct are “called the LAW OF NATURE.”
196
 
In contrast to theorists like Locke and Pufendorf, however, Hutcheson 
rejects the notion that morality is primarily based on reason.
197
  Instead, he 
contends that just as human beings have an aesthetic sense that enables them 
 
 191 See infra notes 445, 471, 473 and accompanying text. 
 192 See, e.g., GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA (1978).  For an overview of this school of thought, 
see KNUD HAAKONSSEN, NATURAL LAW AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1996). 
193
  See 28 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 333 (Sidney Lee ed., London, MacMillan & Co. 
1891), https://archive.org/details/dictionaryofnati28stepuoft.  
 194 FRANCIS HUTCHESON, A SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY (photo. reprt.) (Glasgow, R. & A. 
Foulis 1755), https://archive.org/details/systemmoralphilo01hutc/page/n6 [https://perma.cc/XR5L-
9AVE] [hereinafter HUTCHESON, SYSTEM]. 
 195 1 id. bk. I, ch. I, § I, at 1. 
 196 Id. 
 197 See id. bk. I, ch. 4, § III, at 56–57. 
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to perceive the beauty of objects, they have a moral sense that enables them 
to perceive the goodness of intentions and of the actions that follow from 
them.
198




On this view, morality is ultimately a matter of the heart rather than the 
head.
200
  Yet reason does hold an important place in Hutcheson’s scheme.  
Although the moral sense can recognize that goodness consists in universal 
benevolence, reason is needed not only to “corroborate” our moral sense but 
also to determine what actions will in fact promote the good.
201
  The 
conclusions that reason reaches on this subject constitute the laws of nature.
202
 
Following the Christian tradition, Hutcheson maintains that the essence of 
those laws consists in love toward God and neighbor.
203
  Two chapters of the 
System are devoted to duties toward God.204  After reciting the traditional 
arguments for his existence, Hutcheson focuses on what reason can ascertain 
about his moral character.
205
  By reflecting upon the order and harmony of the 
visible world as well as upon their own nature and moral sentiments, human 
beings can recognize that God is benevolent, that he created “rational 
creatures” from “a desire to communicate [his own] perfection and happiness” 
to them, that he “exercises an universal providence” over the world, and that 
his laws are “good and just, adapted to the interest and perfection of the 
whole.”
206
  Indeed, Hutcheson goes so far as to contend that God’s 
benevolence provides good reason to hope in eternal life, a future state in 
which virtuous conduct will be rewarded.
207
  “Th[is] opinion,” he asserts, “is 




 198 See id. § IV, at 58. 
 199 Id. § VII, at 62. 
 200 See id. § VI, at 61. 
 201 See, e.g., id. § X, at 69; id. § XIII, at 78; id. ch. 6, § III, at 106; 2 id. bk. II, ch. 17, § II, at 119. 
 202 See, e.g., 1 id. bk. II, ch. 1, § 1, at 227. 
 203 See id. bk. II, ch. I, § I, at 228. 
 204 See id. bk. I, pt. II, chs. 9–10. 
 205 See id. ch. 9, §§ I–XVI, at 168–208. 
 206 Id. §§ V–XVI, at 174–208 (quotations at 206–08). 
 207 See id. §§ XIV–XV, at 199–204. 
 208 Id. § XIV, at 200. 
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On this view, God himself is “the source of the highest happiness to 
[rational creatures], the noblest object of their contemplation and veneration, 
of their love, esteem, hope, and secure confidence, and the best pattern for 
their imitation.”
209
  This is “the foundation of all piety, and all joy in religion.”
210
  
Hutcheson then elaborates upon the natural duty to worship God both 
internally—“in the sentiments and affections of the soul”—and externally—“in 
the natural expression of these . . . sentiments and affections” though 
instruction, praise, prayer, repentance, and so on.
211
 
In these ways, reason confirms what Hutcheson regards as the natural 
human disposition toward piety and devotion.
212
  “Notions of Deity and some 
sort of worship have in fact as universally obtained among men, as living in 




According to Hutcheson, natural religion is also more fundamental than 
revealed religion.  The “primary way by which God discovers his will 
concerning our conduct” is not by Scripture but by “the constitution of nature, 
and the powers of reason, and moral perception, which he has given to 
mankind.”
214
  Revelation supplements reason, but God does not mean to treat 
human beings as “children” by relieving them of the responsibility to discover 
for themselves how they ought to live.
215
 
Hutcheson’s account of natural religion provides the foundation not only 
for a moral duty of religious worship but also for a right to religious freedom.  
As he explains, it “must always be unjust” to compel people to profess religious 
opinions or to perform religious actions contrary to their beliefs, “as no 
interest of society can require it, and such profession and action must be sinful 
to those who believe it to be so.”
216
  Nor is this “right of private judgment” 
 
 209 Id. § XVI, at 207. 
 210 Id. § V, at 174. 
 211 Id. ch. X, §§ I–IV, at 210–18. 
 212 Id. ch. IV, § VII, at 63. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. bk. II, ch. 3, § VIII, at 268–69 (citing RICHARD CUMBERLAND, A Philosophical Inquiry into the 
Nature of Law, in A TREATISE ON THE LAWS OF NATURE 247–362 (Jon Parkin ed., John Maxwell 
trans., Liberty Fund 2005) (1672), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/cumberland-a-treatise-of-the-laws-
of-nature [https://perma.cc/364E-ZZNJ]). 
 215 2 id. bk. II, ch. 17, § VII, at 131–32. 
216
  1 id. bk. II, ch. 5, § 3, at 296. 
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confined to the religious sphere.
217
  Instead, Hutcheson holds that “every 
intelligent being” has a right to form “his own opinions” on all subjects.
218
  This 
right is an “unalienable” one which “cannot be subjected to the will of 
another.”
219
   
At the same time, Hutcheson observes that few people have both the time 
and the inclination to “exercise this right of private judgment vigorously.”
220
  
Thus, to promote the good of society and to “prevent the influence of 
dangerous enthusiasts or rogues,” it is both the interest and the duty of the 
magistrate to appoint persons to provide moral and religious instruction to the 
people.
221
  But while the government does have a limited role in promoting 
religion, it must do so in a way that does not compel individuals to worship in 
a particular manner and does not impose punishment for religious sentiments, 
so long as “they are not hurtful to society” or used as a pretense for “invading 
the rights or properties of others.”
222
  
Hutcheson’s general approach to morality also can be found in later 




 and Henry 
Home, Lord Kames.
225
  Although they differed with one another in important 
respects, they all maintained that morality was rooted in the senses or feelings, 
and the idea of natural religion held an important place in their thought.  
Smith’s views are particularly interesting.  In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 
he argues that religion is natural to human beings, and he connects it with their 
 
217
  2 id. bk. III, ch. IX, § I, at 311–12. 
218
  1 id. bk. II, ch. 5, § 3, at 295. 
219
  Id.  
 220 2 id. bk. III, ch. IX, § I, at 311–12. 
 221 Id. at 312. 
 222 Id. §§ I–II, at 312–15. 
 223 See infra text accompanying notes 226–27. 
 224 See, e.g., THOMAS REID, ESSAYS ON THE ACTIVE POWERS (1788), reprinted in INQUIRY AND 
ESSAYS 297 (Ronald E. Beanblossom & Keith Lehrer eds., Hackett 1983); THOMAS REID, ON 
PRACTICAL ETHICS: LECTURES AND PAPERS ON NATURAL RELIGION, SELF-GOVERNMENT, 
NATURAL JURISPRUDENCE AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 112, 117–26, 145, 255–58 (Knud 
Haakonssen ed., 1990). 
 225 See HENRY HOME, LORD KAMES, ESSAYS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY AND NATURAL 
RELIGION (Mary Catherine Moran ed., Liberty Fund 2005) (3d ed. 1779), 
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/kames-essays-on-the-principles-of-morality-and-natural-religion 
[https://perma.cc/5D4P-MJ77].  For a discussion of the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers’ influence 
on Jefferson, see WILLS, supra note 192, at 200–05. 
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sense of justice and with belief in an afterlife.
226
  And in The Wealth of Nations, 
he argues that the interests of individual liberty, social peace, and rational 
religion all would be promoted by doing away with establishments that grant 
monopolies to particular sects and by instead allowing many small sects to 




Other British philosophers based morality on reason rather than 
sensation.  A good example is Richard Price, a liberal clergyman who was well-
known to Americans as a strong supporter of their Revolution.
228
 
In A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, Price maintains that 
theorists like Hutcheson undermine the objectivity of morality when they base 
it on the sensations that individuals experience when they perceive actions.
229
  
Instead, Price holds that morality is founded on “self-evident principles” that 
can be discerned through reason and intuition, such as the precepts that it is 
right for intelligent beings to pursue happiness and wrong for them to violate 
the rights of others or to inflict misery on innocent persons.
230
  “Reason is . . . 
the natural and authoritative guide of a rational being,” and the morality that it 
 
 226 See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS pt. II, sec. ii, ch. 3, §§ 11–12, at 91; id. 
pt. III, ch. 2, §§ 3–13, at 163–70 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (6th 
ed. 1790). 
 227 See 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
bk. V, ch. I, pt. III, art. III, at 273–79 (Edwin Cannan ed., London, Methuen 1904), 
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/smith-an-inquiry-into-the-nature-and-causes-of-the-wealth-of-nations-
cannan-ed-vol-2 [https://perma.cc/9JUR-7BXD]. 
 228 See RICHARD PRICE, TWO TRACTS ON CIVIL LIBERTY, THE WAR WITH AMERICA, AND THE 
DEBTS AND FINANCES OF THE KINGDOM (1778), in POLITICAL WRITINGS 14–19 (D.O. Thomas 
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) [hereinafter PRICE, TWO TRACTS]; MAY, supra note 15, at 171.  
For an exploration of Price’s moral philosophy, see J.B. SCHNEEWIND, THE INVENTION OF 
AUTONOMY: A HISTORY OF MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 380–88 (1998).  Some other leading 
treatments of morality and natural religion from a rationalist perspective include those of Samuel 
Clarke, see infra text accompanying notes 280–85, and William Wollaston, see WILLIAM 
WOLLASTON, THE RELIGION OF NATURE DELINEATED (London, S. Palmer 1725), 
https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=H68WAAAAQAAJ&rdid=book-
H68WAAAAQAAJ&rdot=1 [https://perma.cc/3NT2-E5PR]. 
 229 RICHARD PRICE, A REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS IN MORALS ch. I, § 1, at 13–17 (D.D. 
Raphael ed., London, Clarendon Press 1974) (3d ed. 1787). 
 230 See id. § 3, at 45, 53; ch. VII, at 157–64, 168. 
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dictates is a “universal LAW” that governs not only humans but “[t]he whole 
creation.”
231
  “It is the source and guide of all the actions of the Deity himself, 
and on it his throne and government are founded.”
232
 
As this discussion indicates, Price’s account of reason and morality is 
closely connected to the idea of natural religion.  God is the creator of the 
world, the embodiment of moral perfection, and “the fountain of reason and 
wisdom.”
233
  Human beings depend on him for their existence and well-
being.
234
  For these reasons, it is inherently proper for them to love, honor, and 
worship him as well as to trust in “his all-directing providence.”
235
 
In the book’s final chapter, Price returns to these themes and contends 
that his account of morality can help to explain and prove “some of the 
principal Doctrines of Natural Religion.”236  From the ideas that morality and 
the divine will are founded on reason, one can infer that the Deity is 
benevolent, that he created the world to promote the happiness of his 
creatures, and that he governs it in accord with justice.
237
  Because justice does 
not always prevail in this world, it is reasonable to believe that there is a future 
state in which individuals will be rewarded or punished for their conduct in 
this life.
238
  Yet there are limits to what reason can tell us about an afterlife.
239
  It 
is here that “the Christian revelation” is particularly valuable, for in addition 
to “confirm[ing] to us whatever we can gather from reason on these subjects,” 




Price’s account of natural religion and morality also provides a justification 
for liberty of conscience.  After doing our best to determine whether a course 
of conduct is right or wrong, we have a duty to act according to “the sincere 
 
 231 Id. ch. VI, at 109. 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. at 113. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. ch. VII, at 138–44. 
 236 Id. ch. X, at 232, 236. 
 237 Id. at 236–55. 
 238 Id. at 255–65. 
 239 Id. at 263 n.*. 
 240 Id. at 263–64 n.*; id. at 270. 
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conviction of our minds.”
241
  To be sure, society is entitled to act in “necessary 
self-defense, when the consciences of men lead them to hurt others, to take 
away their liberty, or to subvert the publick.”
242
  In all other cases, however, it 
is not only impious but 
a contradiction to common sense . . . for any men to pretend to a power to 
oblige their fellow men to worship God in any manner different from that 
which is most agreeable to their consciences; that is, in any way but that in 
which alone it is acceptable and right in them to do it.243   
In his writings on the American Revolution, Price expands on this view, 
describing “religious liberty” as one of “the unalienable rights of human 
nature”
244




3. Uniting Reason and Sentiment 
Although philosophers like Hutcheson and Price differed in their 
methodology, the substance of their teachings on morality and natural religion 
had much in common.  This is an important theme in the lectures on moral 
philosophy delivered later in the century by the Rev. John Witherspoon, the 
president of the College of New Jersey (later Princeton), who was a leader in 
revolutionary politics and a signer of the Declaration of Independence.
246
  
Although he agrees with Hutcheson that moral sense or conscience is an 
essential “principle of our nature,” Witherspoon sees no occasion to reject 
reason as an equally important principle.
247
  Instead, after reviewing these and 
other approaches to morality, he concludes that “we ought to take the rule of 
 
 241 Id. ch. VIII, at 179. 
 242 Id. 
 243 Id. 
 244 PRICE, TWO TRACTS, supra note 228, at 33, 81.  Once again, Price insists that this liberty does not 
entitle one to “encroach on the equal liberty of others,” for it would be contradictory to hold “that 
every one had a right to enjoy what every one had a right to destroy.”  Id. at 81. 
 245 RICHARD PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1785), 
in POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 228, at 116, 133 [hereinafter PRICE, OBSERVATIONS]. 
 246 JOHN WITHERSPOON, LECTURES ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY (photo reprt., n.d.) (Varnum 
Lansing Collins ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1912) (1800), https://play.google.com/store/books/details
?id=M2gVAAAAYAAJ&rdid=book-M2gVAAAAYAAJ&rdot=1 [https://perma.cc/7K3P-YM3T].  
On Witherspoon, see J. DAVID HOEVELER, CREATING THE AMERICAN MIND: INTELLECT AND 
POLITICS IN COLONIAL COLLEGES 117–27 (2002); MILLER, supra note 10, at 135–41, 149–51. 
 247 WITHERSPOON, supra note 246, lect. III, at 17. 
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duty from conscience enlightened by reason, experience, and every way by 
which we can be supposed to learn the will of our Maker, and his intention in 
creating us such as we are.”
248
 
After reviewing the main proofs for the existence of God, Witherspoon 
turns to the substance of natural religion.
249
  Our internal duties to God require 
us to love, venerate, and trust him, while our external duties involve the natural 
expression of these sentiments through worship and prayer.
250
  Witherspoon 
maintains that “not only private, but public and social worship is a duty of 
natural religion.”
251
  Moreover, he agrees with those who contend that “the 
magistrate ought to make public provision for the worship of God, in such 
manner as is agreeable to the great body of society.”
252
  At the same time, 
Witherspoon insists that “all who dissent from [this public worship must be] 
fully tolerated,” for every individual has an “unalienable” “right to judge for 
himself in all matters of religion,” as well as in “matters of opinion” more 
broadly.
253
  Like all other rights, however, religious liberty must not be 
exercised in a way that violates the rights of others.
254
  These are the doctrines 
of natural religion and moral philosophy in which James Madison was 
instructed when he attended Witherspoon’s lectures as a Princeton 




Remarkably, the concept of natural religion played an essential role not 
only in disciplines like natural jurisprudence, moral philosophy, and political 
theory, which were founded on natural reason, but also in much of the 
theology of the period. 
 
 248 Id. at 23–30. 
 249 See id. lect. VI, at 36–43; lect. VII, at 43–45. 
 250 See id. lect. VII, at 47–52. 
 251 Id. at 49. 
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 253 Id.; id. lect. VIII, at 56; lect. X, at 69. 
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 255 See RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 41–44 (1971). 




Of course, this is true of Deism, which may be defined (in Locke’s words) 
as “pure Natural Religion” or religion based on natural reason.
256
  In De 
Veritate (1624), a work that is often regarded as the founding text of modern 
Deism, the English aristocrat Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, maintained 
that all true religion is founded upon five basic truths that are accessible to 
everyone through reason.
257
  These truths are that God exists, that he is to be 
worshipped, that religion should focus on virtue and piety rather than on 
doctrine or ceremony, that one can atone for misconduct through repentance 
and amendment of life, and that there is a future state of rewards and 
punishments.
258
  Herbert did not foreclose the possibility of special revelation 
from God, but he insisted that individuals must think for themselves and use 
reason to determine whether something is a revelation or not.
259
 
Deism was an increasing topic of discussion in late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth-century Britain.  Some Deists claimed to remain within the 
Christian tradition in an effort to reform it.
260
  A prominent example was 
Matthew Tindal, a fellow of All Souls College, Oxford.  In Christianity as Old 
as the Creation, Tindal maintained that the will of God was identical with the 
“Law of Nature, or Reason; . . . which is common . . . to all rational 
Creatures.”
261
  “[T]he Design of the Gospel” was not to alter this law but rather 
to restore it by “free[ing] Men from that Load of Superstition which had been 
mix’d with it” over the ages.
262
 
Tindal’s emphasis on reason led him to strongly defend liberty of 
conscience.  Echoing Locke, he wrote that “no Man can any more discern the 
objects of his own Understanding . . . by the Faculties of another, than he can 
 
256
  LOCKE, REASONABLENESS, supra note 53, ch. I, at 5. 
 257 EDWARD, LORD HERBERT OF CHERBURY, DE VERITATE 5, 292–300 (Meyrick H. Carré trans., 
J.W. Arrowsmith 1937) (1624).  For a valuable discussion of Herbert on which I have relied in this 
paragraph, see SCHNEEWIND, supra note 228, at 384, 396–99. 
 258 See SCHNEEWIND, supra note 228, at 396–99. 
 259 See id. at 401. 
 260 See HOLIFIELD, supra note 12, at 160. 
 261 MATTHEW TINDAL, CHRISTIANITY AS OLD AS THE CREATION 7 (London, 2d ed. 1732), 
https://archive.org/details/christianityasol00tind/mode/2up [https://perma.cc/M5P5-TTH7].
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see with another Man’s Eyes.”
263
  It follows that anyone “who demands a Man’s 
Assent to any thing” without conveying reasons adequate to support it “erects 
a Tyranny over his Understanding.”
264
 
In this way, Tindal and other “Christian Deists” 265  sought to reform 
Christianity by showing that it contained nothing that could not be known 
through natural reason.
266
  Other Deists took a more critical stance toward 
Christianity or at least toward the texts on which it claimed to be based.
267
 
As E. Brooks Holifield has observed, Deism in eighteenth-century 
America displayed a similar diversity.
268
  Moderate Deists like Benjamin 
Franklin and Thomas Jefferson rejected what they regarded as the dogmatism 
of traditional Christianity and the abuses of clericalism, but supported a form 
of natural religion and morality which they sometimes associated with Jesus.
269
  
By contrast, the end of the eighteenth century saw the rise of more radical 
thinkers such as Ethan Allen, Thomas Paine, and Elihu Palmer.
270
  This group 
“was aggressive, populist, polemical, disdainful of a Bible riddled with 
contradiction and immorality, eager to debunk the gospel stories, and hopeful 
that a religion of nature would altogether replace an effete Christianity.”
271
 
Although Deism attracted considerable attention in late eighteenth-century 
America, it remained a distinctly minority viewpoint.  Yet it was not the only 
form of religious thought that embraced the concept of natural theology.  That 
concept had a long history in the Christian tradition,
272
 and it took on increasing 
 
 263 Id. at 168. 
 264 Id. 
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importance during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  The remainder 
of this section discusses its role in the Anglicanism which prevailed in the 
southern states and the Congregationalism which dominated New England. 
2. Anglicanism 
American Anglican thought was rooted in that of the mother country.  In 
the 1640s, that nation was torn apart by the religious and political struggles that 
led to the Civil War.  After the monarchy was restored in 1660, many Anglican 
theologians reacted to these bitter conflicts by adopting a more latitudinarian 
approach which sought to promote religious peace and unity and which 




A major figure in this movement was the Rev. John Tillotson, who served 
as Archbishop of Canterbury from 1691 until his death in 1694.  In a sermon 
entitled “Of the Great Duties of Natural Religion,” he asserted that religion is 
much more concerned with “the real Virtues of a Good Life” than with 
external devotion.
274
  The moral duties that God requires of human beings are 
known not solely or even primarily through “External Revelation”; they are 
also known by “a kind of natural instinct,” by “Natural Reason,” and by the 
consensus of mankind.
275
  The duties enjoined by revelation are “the same in 
Substance with the Law of Nature.”
276
  “[T]he Gospel teacheth us the very same 
things which Nature dictated to Men before,” but it makes those duties more 
“certain and plain” and offers more powerful motives as well as “a greater 




the early modern period).  The idea ultimately can be traced back to classical thought.  See Stephen 
R.L. Clark, The Classical Origins of Natural Theology, in id. ch. 1 (describing the notion’s 
development from the pre-Socratics through Plato and Aristotle to Stoicism and Neoplatonism). 
 273 See, e.g., MARTIN I.J. GRIFFIN, JR., LATITUDINARIANISM IN THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY 
CHURCH OF ENGLAND (1992). 
 274 JOHN TILLOTSON, Of the Great Duties of Natural Religion, with the Ways and Means of Knowing 
Them, in SEVERAL DISCOURSES sermon I, at 8 (Ralph Barker ed., London, Ri. Chiswell 1697), 
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A62632.0001.001 [https://perma.cc/5UUN-F2M4]. 
 275 Id. at 16, 20–33. 
 276 Id. at 32–33. 
 277 Id. 
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In a companion sermon, Tillotson maintained that “Natural Religion is the 
Foundation of all Instituted and Revealed Religion,” and that “the great Design 
of the Christian Religion, was to restore and reinforce the practice of 
the natural Law.” 278   Finally, he used this view of the centrality of natural 
religion to argue that it can never be legitimate to persecute individuals “for 
not understanding and believing” doctrines that come from revealed religion, 
for “[n]o Zeal for any positive Institution in Religion, can justifie the Violation 
of the natural Law,” which requires people to treat one another humanely.279 
The leading Anglican spokesman for rational Christianity during the 
eighteenth century was the Rev. Samuel Clarke.
280
  In 1704 and 1705, he 
delivered two sets of lectures in the series that had been endowed by the 
eminent scientist Robert Boyle to promote natural religion.
281
  In the first set 
Clarke sought to demonstrate the existence and attributes of God, while in the 
second he argued for “The Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion and 
the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation.”282  Natural religion holds 
“that there is one eternal, infinite, intelligent, all-powerful, and wise being, the 
creator, preserver, and governor of all things”; that human beings are bound 
to worship and obey him; that people have a duty to promote the happiness 
and good of all through a “universal benevolence”; and that they will be subject 
to “rewards and punishments” in “a future state” for their deeds in this life.
283
 
For Clarke, these principles of natural religion and morality can be 
discerned through reason and should govern every rational being, since they 
 
 278 JOHN TILLOTSON, Instituted Religion Not Intended to Undermine Natural, in SEVERAL 
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280 For a valuable discussion of Clarke’s philosophy and theology, see Timothy Yenter & Ezio Vailati, 
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reflect the inherent and “eternal . . . relations that different things bear one to 
another,” such as the relationship that human beings have to God and each 
other.
284
  But because people are often blinded by carelessness, prejudice, false 
ideas, bad customs, and unruly desires, God has undertaken to confirm and 




The rationalism represented by Clarke and Tillotson was one of two major 
strands of Anglican thought in eighteenth-century America.
286
  It was promoted 
by such figures as the Rev. William Smith, provost of the College of 
Philadelphia (which later became the University of Pennsylvania); the Rev. 
William White, first Episcopal Bishop of Pennsylvania and first Presiding 
Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States; the Rev. 
Samuel Provoost, first Episcopal Bishop of New York; and the Rev. James 
Madison, who was cousin to the statesman, president of the (Anglican) College 
of William and Mary, and first Episcopal Bishop of Virginia.
287
 
A good statement of this rationalist position may be found in a pamphlet 
published by the Rev. James Maury, a clergyman and professor at William 
and Mary who “was the first real teacher” of the Rev. James Madison and 
Thomas Jefferson.
288
  According to Maury, God addresses humans as 
“creatures endowed with reason” who are capable of distinguishing “between 
good and evil, right and wrong, truth and falsehood.”
289
  “Reason and revelation 
are alike the gifts of GOD,” and while unassisted reason “could never have 
formed that perfect . . . rule of religious faith and practice, we are now happily 
 
 284 Id. at 156. 
 285 See id. at 248–49, 278, 293, 306, 336–37. 
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21, 38, 350 (discussing the influence of Tillotson and Clarke in colonial America). 
 287 See NOLL, supra note 286, at 120–21; Charles Crowe, Bishop James Madison and the Republic of 
Virtue, 30 J.S. HIST. 58 (1964).  The other main school of American Anglicanism during this period 
was the High Church theology associated with the Rev. Samuel Johnson, the first president of King’s 
College (later Columbia University), and Samuel Seabury, the first Episcopal Bishop of Connecticut.  
See NOLL, supra note 286, at 120–21. 
 288 THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 43 (2013) [hereinafter BUCKLEY, 
ESTABLISHING]; JAMES MAURY, TO CHRISTIANS OF EVERY DENOMINATION AMONG US, 
ESPECIALLY THOSE OF THE ESTABLISHED CHURCH, AN ADDRESS 3 (Annapolis, Anne Catharine 
Green 1771). 
289 MAURY, supra note 288, at 8. 
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blessed with; yet we contend the God of nature never designed revelation 
entirely to supersede the use of, but only to be, as it were, supplemental to our 
natural reason.”
290
  In line with these views, Maury condemned “that narrow 
and uncharitable, that merciless and antichristian spirit, which presumes to 
limit the divine favour only to some few,” and which would consign “all the 




3. New England Congregationalism 
The Puritans who settled New England brought with them a strong form 
of Calvinist theology.  The most authoritative statement of their views appears 
in the Westminster Confession of Faith,
292
 which was adopted by an assembly 
of divines in England in 1646 and endorsed two years later by a convention of 
clergy in Massachusetts Bay.
293
  In line with natural religion, the confession 
opens by affirming that “the Light of Nature, and the works of Creation and 
Providence . . . manifest the Goodness, Wisdom, and Power of God.”294  After 
the Fall of Adam, however, human nature is so deeply “corrupted” that people 
are imbued with original sin, naturally inclined to evil, and subject to “the wrath 
of God.”
295
  Thus, mere natural religion is utterly incapable of bringing about 
salvation, which can only come through grace and faith in Christ.
296
  Likewise, 
 
290 Id. at 9. 
291 Id. at 11. 
292 THE HUMBLE ADVICE OF THE ASSEMBLY OF DIVINES, NOW BY AUTHORITY OF PARLIAMENT 
SITTING AT WESTMINSTER, CONCERNING A CONFESSION OF FAITH (London, Evan Tyler 1647), 
https://ia802700.us.archive.org/11/items/humbleadviceofas00west/humbleadviceofas00west.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NV9M-H3X7] [hereinafter WESTMINSTER CONFESSION]. 
293 See THE CAMBRIDGE PLATFORM OF CHURCH DISCIPLINE, ADOPTED IN 1648, AND THE 
CONFESSION OF FAITH, ADOPTED IN 1680, at 90–91 (Boston, Congregational Bd. of Publ’n 
1855), https://ia802300.us.archive.org/3/items/cambridgeplatfo00goog/cambridgeplatfo00goog.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H358-57RP]. 
 294 WESTMINSTER CONFESSION, supra note 292, ch. I, § I, at 1.  For other traces of natural religion, 
see id. ch. IV, § 2, at 9 (describing how God created human beings “with reasonable and immortal 
souls . . . after his own Image.”); ch. XXI, § I, at 37 (arguing that “the light of Nature” shows that 
God exists, that he is good, and that he is to be worshipped and served).  For a brief discussion of 
the role of natural theology in John Calvin’s own thought, see Russell Re Manning, Protestant 
Perspectives on Natural Theology, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 272, at 201–04. 
295 WESTMINSTER CONFESSION, supra note 292, ch. VI, at 12–13. 
296 See id. ch. X, at 21–22. 
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knowledge of God must be sought through the revelation that he made in the 
Holy Scriptures.
297
  In these ways, reason and natural theology did play a role 
in New England Puritan theology, but a role that was firmly subordinate to that 
of faith and revelation.
298
 
By the middle of the eighteenth century, the old Calvinist consensus was 
breaking down.  Some theologians began to take a more rationalist approach 
to religion.  One of the best known figures was the Rev. Jonathan Mayhew, the 
pastor of Boston’s West Church.
299
  In a series of sermons delivered in 1748, 
Mayhew maintained that “the dignity of our nature” is founded upon our 
intellectual capacities: “It is principally on account of our reason, that we are 
said to have been created in the image of God.”300  Like Clarke, Mayhew holds 
that morality consists of objective truths that arise from “the nature of God, 
[and] our relation to him, and one another.”
301
  Mayhew also follows the 
Scottish Enlightenment philosophers in contending that humans have “a 
moral sense” that leads them to feel pleasure from seeing good actions and 
pain from bad ones.
302
  He concedes that “our rational faculties [are] limited, 
[and so] there is room for our being instructed by revelation.” 303  But he 
forcefully rejects the position that our minds are so darkened by the Fall that 
we are incapable of discerning religious and moral truths.
304
 
Because Mayhew regards revelation as essential to Christianity, he cannot 
accept Tindal’s view that it is merely “a re-publication of the law of nature.”
305
  
As Mayhew makes clear, however, he sees natural religion as lying at the core 
of Christianity.  The most important duties of the Christian religion are the 
same as those “dictated by the light of nature”: they “are natural moral duties 
 
297 Id. ch. I, § I, at 1. 
298
  See HOLIFIELD, supra note 12, at 25. 
299 See BAILYN, supra note 106, at 96–99, 255–57 (describing Mayhew’s role in the struggle against 
Britain). 
300 JONATHAN MAYHEW, Sermon II, in SEVEN SERMONS UPON THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS 39 
(photo. reprt. 2015) (Boston, Rogers & Fowle 1749), http://name.umdl.umich.edu/N05074.0001.00
1 [https://perma.cc/K4X8-622Z] [hereinafter SEVEN SERMONS]. 
301 Id., Sermon VII, at 150; see also id., Sermon I, at 5. 
302 Id., Sermon V, at 97. 
303 Id., Sermon II, at 35. 
304 See id. at 38–39. 
305 Id., Sermon VII, at 150. 
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[that are] inforced with revealed and supernatural motives.”
306
  He concludes 
that although “[m]odes and ceremonies of religion” may differ, “the substance 
of true religion must necessarily be the same . . . in all countries, to all rational 
creatures, in all parts of the universe, in all periods of time.”
307
 
Mayhew also sees an integral connection between the concept of natural 
religion and “right of private judgment,” or “freedom of thought and inquiry 
in religious matters.”
308
  The Westminster Confession had declared that 
Christians were entitled to “Liberty of Conscience,” but it justified that liberty 
largely on the ground that “God alone is Lord of the Conscience, and hath left 
it free from the Doctrines and Commandments of men, which are in any thing 
contrary to his Word.”
309
  Consistent with this limitation, the Confession held 
that both the church and the civil magistrate had authority to restrain the 
“publishing of such Opinions . . . as are contrary to the light of Nature, or to 
the known principles of Christianity.”
310
 
By contrast, Mayhew’s defense of private judgment is based squarely on 
reason and natural religion.  The freedom to judge for ourselves in religious 
matters and “to worship God according to our consciences” is rooted in our 
very nature as rational beings.
311
  This freedom “is absolutely unalienable in its 
own nature,” because it is not only a right but also an “indispensable duty” 
which is enjoined by “God and nature and the gospel of Christ.”
312
  Those who 
institute “human tests of orthodoxy” and “punish dissenters” invade “the 
natural rights of mankind” and act “in opposition to [the authority] of almighty 
God.”
313
  Jesus and his followers were themselves “dissenters from the 
established religion” of the time.
314




308 Id., Sermon III, at 42, 57. 
309 WESTMINSTER CONFESSION, supra note 292, ch. XX, § II, at 35. 
310 Id. § IV, at 36. 
311
     MAYHEW, Sermon IV, in SEVEN SERMONS, supra note 300, at 86; see also id., Sermon III, at 46–
47. 
312
      Id., Sermon IV, at 86.  
313 Id., Sermon III, at 57–63. 
314 Id., Sermon IV, at 83. 
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established by law” is no less absurd than that of “mathematicks established 
by law.”315 
Although Mayhew and other liberal theologians were the foremost 
advocates of the idea of natural religion among New England 
Congregationalists at this time, they were not alone.  The idea also played a 
vital role in works of the other two major schools of Congregationalist thought: 
traditional Calvinism and the New Divinity of the followers of Jonathan 
Edwards.
316
  The former category included Peter Clark’s sermon on Man’s 
Dignity and Duty as a Reasonable Creature, while the latter included 
Nathanael Emmons’s discourse on The Dignity of Man.317  To be sure, there 
were important differences between these three authors: Clark placed a greater 
emphasis on the insufficiency of reason and the need for revelation than did 
Mayhew or Emmons.
318
  But each of them stressed the importance of reason 
and its harmony with revelation. These themes were also central to the 
Dudleian lectures on natural religion that were delivered at Harvard College 





315 Id. at 84. 
316 See HOLIFIELD, supra note 12, at 128 (discussing these three views). 
317 PETER CLARK, MAN’S DIGNITY AND DUTY AS A REASONABLE CREATURE; AND HIS 
INSUFFICIENCY AS A FALLEN CREATURE (Boston, Richard & Samuel Draper 1763), 
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/N07331.0001.001 [https://perma.cc/7VX2-KE23]; NATHANAEL 
EMMONS, THE DIGNITY OF MAN (1787), reprinted in 1 POLITICAL SERMONS, supra note 105, at 
883. 
 318 See CLARK, supra note 317, at 26–33. 
319 Endowed by a bequest from the prominent judge Paul Dudley, these lectures were modeled on the 
Boyle lectures in England, see supra text accompanying note 281, and were devoted to natural and 
revealed religion as well as other topics.  For studies, see LEE, supra note 15, ch. 3; Leslee K. Gilbert, 
The Altar of Liberty: Enlightened Dissent and the Dudleian Lectures, 1755–1765, 31 HIST. J. MASS. 
(Summer 2003), http://www.westfield.ma.edu/historical-journal/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/gilbert-
summer-2003-combined.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ECY-4BK2].  The Dudleian lectures are still being 
given over 250 years later.  For a comprehensive list, see Dudleian Lectures, ANDOVER-HARV. 
THEOLOGICAL LIBR., https://guides.library.harvard.edu/hds/named-lecture-series/dudleian 
[https://perma.cc/HB5G-Z9VP]. 
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E. Natural Science 
It is “a commonplace” among historians that “natural religion took 
enormous support from the developments in seventeenth century science.”
320
  
Here I shall sketch the position of Sir Isaac Newton, the most celebrated 
scientist of the age.
321
  A summary of his views can be found in key passages of 
the Principia and Opticks.322  According to Newton, “Natural Philosophy” or 
science proceeds inductively by observing phenomena and then proceeding 
“from Effects to their Causes, and from particular Causes to more general 
ones,” until it reaches the first cause from which all things began.
323
  When we 
observe “[t]his most beautiful System of the Sun, Planets and Comets,” we 
recognize that it could not have come about through “mere mechanical 
causes,” but only “from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and 
powerful being.”
324
  This being, whom we call God, is “Eternal and Infinite, 
Omnipotent and Omniscient.”
325
  “[B]y existing always and every where,” he 
constitutes time and space.
326
  In the beginning, he created matter and 
established the “general Laws of Nature” such as gravitation.
327
  His creative 
intelligence and choice can be seen in natural phenomena ranging from the 
 
320 G.A.J. Rogers, Nature, Man and God in the English Enlightenment, in RELIGION, REASON AND 
NATURE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 152 (Robert Crocker ed., 2001). 
321    For valuable discussions of religion in Newton’s thought, see ROB ILIFFE, PRIEST OF NATURE: THE 
RELIGIOUS WORLDS OF ISAAC NEWTON (2017); Robert Iliffe, Newton’s Religious Life and 
Work (2013), http://www.newtonproject.ox.ac.uk/view/texts/normalized/CNTX00001 [https://perm
a.cc/5KCC-USL2]; Rogers, supra note 320, at 152-56. 
322 2 ISAAC NEWTON, General Scholium, in THE MATHEMATICAL 
PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 387, 387– 93 (London, 1729), http://www.newtonproject.o
x.ac.uk/view/texts/normalized/NATP00056 [https://perma.cc/JKF3-HFZV] [hereinafter NEWTON, 
PRINCIPLES]; ISAAC NEWTON, The Third Book of Opticks, in OPTICKS (London, W. 
& J. Innys, 2d ed. 1718) (1704), http://www.newtonproject.ox.ac.uk/view/texts/normalized/NATP00
051 [https://perma.cc/93NA-GCNF] [hereinafter NEWTON, OPTICKS].  My citations are to the 
website of Oxford University’s Newton Project, which is producing a definitive edition of his works. 
 323 NEWTON, OPTICKS, supra note 322, at 380–81. 
324 NEWTON, PRINCIPLES, supra note 322, at 388–89. 
325 Id. at 389. 
326 Id. at 390. 
327 NEWTON, OPTICKS, supra note 322, at 375–78. 
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solar system to “the Bodies of Animals.”
328
  He perceives, understands, and 
“governs all things” through his “providence.”
329
 
For Newton, these conclusions of scientific inquiry have vital implications 
for “moral Philosophy”:  
For so far as we can know by natural Philosophy [i.e., science] what is the first 
Cause, what Power he has over us, and what Benefits we receive from him, so 
far our Duty towards him, as well as that towards one another, will appear to 
us by the Light of Nature.
330
   
In an unpublished manuscript, Newton expanded on this concept of “natural 
religion.”
331
  In addition to requiring individuals “to give thanks & honour & 
glory” to God for their existence and well-being, this religion enjoined them to 
love their neighbors as themselves.
332
  This “moral part of religion” was of “an 
eternal immutable nature”; it was “binding to all nations” at all times and lay 
at the core of both Judaism and Christianity.
333
 
Thus, Newton did not view science as merely compatible with religion.  
Instead, as Rob Iliffe has explained, “he believed that natural philosophy was 
to a large extent a religious enterprise through which one could come to an 
understanding of the way God had created the world.”
334
  For Newton, science 
laid the foundation for a rational approach to religion.
335
  At the same time, he 
accepted the legitimacy of revelation and sought to use reason to determine 
the true meaning of Scripture.
336
  In line with this devotion to reason, he was 




328 Id. at 378. 
329 NEWTON, PRINCIPLES, supra note 322, at 389–91. 
330 NEWTON, OPTICKS, supra note 322, at 381. 




333 Id. at 1r–1v; see also Isaac Newton, Irenicum, or Ecclesiastical Polyty Tending to Peace 35 (n.d.), 
http://www.newtonproject.ox.ac.uk/view/texts/normalized/THEM00003 [https://perma.cc/A855-
WYJ8]. 
 334 ILIFFE, supra note 321, at 16. 
 335 See id. at 19–21. 
 336 See id. at 16, 20–21. 
 337 See id. at 17–19.  For accounts of Newtonianism and natural theology in the eighteenth century, see 
JONATHAN ISRAEL, ENLIGHTENMENT CONTESTED 201–222 (2006); JEFFREY R. WIGELSWORTH, 
DEISM IN ENLIGHTENMENT ENGLAND: THEOLOGY, POLITICS, AND NEWTONIAN PUBLIC 
SCIENCE (2009). 
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F. The Radical Whig Tradition 
Finally, a commitment to rational religion and the rights of conscience was 
integral to the Commonwealth or Real Whig tradition—a body of eighteenth-
century thought that identified with the struggles against the Stuarts that 
culminated in the overthrow of Charles I in the Civil War and of James II in 
the Glorious Revolution of 1688.
338
  As Caroline Robbins explains in her 
classic study, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman, this tradition 
encompassed politicians, clergymen, and lawyers; popular writers and 
academics; Deists, Protestant dissenters, and liberal Anglicans.
339
  It included 
Hutcheson, Mayhew, Price, and Priestley and drew inspiration from Locke, 
Newton, Tillotson, and Clarke.
340
  In these ways, the Radical Whig tradition 
combined the various strands of thought that we have canvassed in this Part.  
As Bernard Bailyn and Gordon S. Wood demonstrate, although this tradition 
had a limited following in Great Britain and Ireland, it deeply shaped the 




The eighteenth-century Commonwealthmen defended what they regarded 
as the traditional rights of British subjects and the natural rights of mankind.
342
  
They advocated for freedom of thought and expression; constitutional 
government in which the people were adequately represented; education that 
reflected modern philosophy and science; the promotion of moral and civic 
virtue; and a limited measure of social equality.
343
  They were also committed 
to the protection of religious liberty as an inalienable right.
344
  This position 




 338 See CAROLINE ROBBINS, THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY COMMONWEALTHMAN (Atheneum 1968) 
(1959). 
 339 See id. at 3–21. 
 340 See id. at 3–21, 76. 
 341 BAILYN, supra note 106; GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–
1787 (2d ed. 1998). 
 342 See ROBBINS, supra note 338, at 7–8. 
 343 See id. at 5–14. 
 344 See id. at 8–12, 115, 160–71, 236, 328–30. 
 345 See JOHN MARSHALL, JOHN LOCKE, TOLERATION AND EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT CULTURE 329 
(2006). 
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further developed by Protestant dissenters during the Restoration.
346
  At that 
time, the dissenters were subjected to severe persecution
347
 as well as to harsh 
attacks from some leaders of the re-established Church of England, who 
argued that the corruption of human nature after the Fall made individuals 
incapable of properly using their own judgment in religious matters.
348
  As 
Richard Ashcraft explains, the dissenters responded that this position in effect 
denied that humans were reasonable creatures.
349
  By contrast, the dissenters 
presented a picture of rational individuals having been created in a state of 
equality and freedom. . . . These individuals constituted a natural moral 
community, since they existed under an established framework of moral 
obligations owed to each other and to God.  Through the use of their reason, 
they were capable of discovering these obligations embodied in the Law of 
Nature.  This law not only imposed duties, but it also confirmed the rights of 




This position became the standard Radical Whig view.  A good example 
may be found in the essays of John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon that 
appeared in The Independent Whig and Cato’s Letters, works that were 
widely known in eighteenth-century Britain and America.
351
  According to 
Trenchard and Gordon, human beings are said to be created in God’s image 
because they are endowed with reason.
352
  By using this faculty, they discover 
that there is “a First Cause” that made and preserves all things, and they learn 
 
 346 See RICHARD ASHCRAFT, REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS & LOCKE’S TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT 51–62 (1986). 
 347 See JOHN COFFEY, PERSECUTION AND TOLERATION IN PROTESTANT ENGLAND, 1558–1689, at 
167–79 (2000). 
 348 See ASHCRAFT, supra note 346, at 52–53. 
 349 See id. at 52. 
 350 Id. at 66–67. 
 351 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, THE INDEPENDENT WHIG (London, J. Peele, 7th ed. 
1743), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/gordon-the-independent-whig-4-vols-1720-1743 [hereinafter 
INDEPENDENT WHIG]; JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO’S LETTERS (Ronald 
Hamowy ed., Liberty Fund 1995) (6th ed. 1755), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/trenchard-catos-
letters-4-vols-in-2-lf-ed [hereinafter CATO’S LETTERS].  Permanent citations for the Independent 
Whig may be found at the following locations: volume 1, https://perma.cc/XST5-GHTF; volume 2, 
https://perma.cc/543Z-BHN3.  Permanent citations for Cato’s Letters may be found here: volume 2, 
https://perma.cc/AZC9-X9BP; volume 3, https://perma.cc/2C2S-A9BH; volume 4, 
https://perma.cc/L2JC-83X6. 
 352 2 INDEPENDENT WHIG, supra note 351, NO. XXXV, at 24, 26–27. 
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their “Duty in relation to God” and to “one another.”
353
  These duties of 
morality constitute “Natural Religion,” which aims to “promote[] unlimited 
and universal Happiness to the whole World.”
354
 
For Trenchard and Gordon, our intellectual capacities are also vital for 
responding to revelation, which “presupposes Reason, and addresses itself to 
Reason.”355  Only reason can determine whether the Scriptures are the Word 
of God and how they should be interpreted.
356
  Nor is it possible to make new 
converts other than by “an Appeal to their Reason, by which they are to judge 
for themselves of the Reasonableness of our Religion.”357 
Up to this point, Trenchard and Gordon express views that would be 
accepted by every rationalist Christian.  In some essays, they go further and 
maintain that Christianity is essentially “natural Religion restored and 
improved,” and that it contains nothing that is “mysterious” or “above 
reason.”
358
  In this respect, they side with Christian Deists like Tindal and 
Toland and against other rationalist Christians like Locke and Clarke.
359
  They 
also differ with Locke in that they accept the idea of an established church, 
although they reject the notion that civil offices should be reserved for its 
members.
360
  In common with all Radical Whigs, however, Trenchard and 
Gordon hold that the “Devotion which [God] requires must be free, rational, 
and willing,”361 and they condemn all forms of persecution—a practice that is 
“incompatible with true Religion, whether Natural or Revealed,”
362
 and that 
invades the core of human liberty by infringing the inherent “right of every 
 
 353 Id. at 24, 29. 
 354 1 id. at xlii–xliii; 2 id. NO. LIII, at 209, 218; 4 CATO’S LETTERS, supra note 351, NO. 109, at 767, 
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 355 2 INDEPENDENT WHIG, supra note 351, NO. XXXV, at 24, 27. 
 356 Id. at 28. 
 357 Id. at 29. 
 358 2 id. NO. LIII, at 218; id. NO. LIV, at 222–24; 4 CATO’S LETTERS, supra note 351, NO. 109, at 767, 
770; id. NO. 120, at 831, 834. 
 359 See supra text accompanying notes 44–66 (discussing Locke), 261–66 (discussing Tindal and 
Toland), 282–85 (discussing Clarke). 
 360 See 3 CATO’S LETTERS, supra note 351, NO. 81, at 588. 
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Parts I and II have explored the place of natural religion, natural law, 
and natural rights in the intellectual world of eighteenth-century 
Americans.  These ideas held that humans are capable of using reason 
to discern the principles that govern the natural and moral realms, 
including the duties that they owe to God and one another.  This 
conception of reason provided a foundation for religious belief as well 
as religious liberty.  This set of ideas was present in one form or another 
in the natural law theories of Locke and Pufendorf, the English 
jurisprudence of Blackstone and Mansfield, the moral philosophy of 
Hutcheson and Price, the works of theologians from Herbert to 
Mayhew, the natural science of Newton, and the Radical Whig tradition 
of Trenchard and Gordon.  In the rest of this Article, I show how this 
account of natural religion and related ideas can help us to understand 
what Americans in the founding era meant when they incorporated 
protections for religious freedom into the state and federal 
constitutions. 
III. THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE FIRST STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 
A. The Revolution 
In late 1772, a public meeting in Boston issued a statement to the people 
of Massachusetts.
364
  As Gordon Wood explains, this statement—which 
became known as the Boston pamphlet—“was one of the most important in 
[this] period” because of the powerful manner in which it articulated the 
 
 363 Id. NO. 59, at 405, 406–07; id. NO. 60, at 413, 414; id. NO. 62, at 426, 428–29; 1 INDEPENDENT 
WHIG, supra note 351, NO. XXII, at 188, 190; id. NO. XXIV, at 207. 
 364 THE VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FREEHOLDERS AND OTHER INHABITANTS OF THE 
TOWN OF BOSTON (1772), in 1 THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: WRITINGS FROM THE PAMPHLET 
DEBATE 759 (Gordon S. Wood ed., 2015). 
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colonists’ ideology and inspired the growing resistance to Great Britain.
365
  The 
pamphlet began with an account of the “Natural Rights of the Colonists as 
Men” that was drawn from Locke.
366
  In addition to life, liberty, and property, 
the Bostonians declared that “by the eternal and immutable Laws of GOD and 
Nature” everyone “has a Right peaceably and quietly to worship God, 
according to the Dictates of his Conscience.”
367
  As Locke’s Letters on 
Toleration demonstrated, this “Spirit of Toleration” was also “‘the chief 
charactistical Mark of the true Church.’”
368
  In a subsequent section on “The 
Rights of the Colonists as Christians,” the pamphlet maintained that this 
inherent right to religious liberty had been “restored” to “every Subject in 
England” by the Toleration Act of 1689.
369
  After enumerating a long list of 
other grievances against the British government, the Bostonians recounted that 
their ancestors had come to the new world to escape the “cruel persecut[ion 
of] all who differed from the established Church,” and went on to express 
concern about the efforts that were then being made to extend the Anglican 
hierarchy’s power to America—a development that would endanger “that 
Liberty with which CHRIST hath made us free.”
370
  In these ways, the 
Bostonians advanced an argument for religious liberty that was rooted in both 
natural religion and Protestant Christianity. 
In this litany of “rights and grievances,” the Boston pamphlet “anticipate[d] 
the Declaration of Independence.”
371
  Of course, that Declaration also 
embodies the ideas we have discussed.  Jefferson bases the American case for 
independence on “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God”
372
—terms that 
often appear in accounts of natural religion.
373
  The idea that human beings 
 
 365 Id. at 759 (editor’s introduction). 
 366 Id. at 764–67 (citing LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 30, and Locke’s Letters on Toleration). 
 367 Id. at 764–65. 
 368 Id. at 765 (quoting LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 7). 
 369 Id. at 767. 
 370 Id. at 778–79. 
 371 Id. at 759 (editor’s introduction). 
 372 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 1, at 4, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch1s5.html 
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“are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights” also sounds in 
natural religion and can be found in various forms in Locke, Hutcheson, and 
others in the Radical Whig tradition.
374
  Finally, the Americans’ concluding 
“appeal[]to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our 
intentions”
375
 recalls Locke’s discussion of the rights of resistance and 
revolution in the Second Treatise, where he explains that when the people 
become convinced that the government has become oppressive, they have no 
alternative but to defend their rights by force, while “appeal[ing] to Heaven” 
for the justice of their cause.
376
 
B. The First State Constitutions and Declarations of Rights 
1. Virginia 
On the eve of independence, representatives of the people of Virginia met 
in convention to establish a constitutional framework for their new state.  The 
Declaration of Rights, which was drafted by George Mason, began by 
proclaiming that 
all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent 
rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any 
compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and 
liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and 





[https://perma.cc/L2H9-LB3S]; RICHARD HOOKER, OF THE LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY 
bk. I, ch. 3, § 4, at 62 (Arthur Stephen McGrade ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989); and 1 
HUTCHESON, SYSTEM, supra note 194, bk. II, ch. 3, § VII, at 265; as well as in Dudleian lectures 
such as CLARK, supra note 317, at 13, and EBENEZER GAY, NATURAL RELIGION, AS 
DISTINGUISH’D FROM REVEALED 10 (Boston, John Draper 1759), 
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/N06583.0001.001 [https://perma.cc/4UX3-NYD2]. 
 374 See, e.g., LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 30, bk. II, § 6, at 271 (attributing rights of life, liberty, 
and property to creation by God); 1 HUTCHESON, SYSTEM, supra note 194, bk. II, ch. 5, at 293–
304 (discussing rights that are secured to individuals “by all the laws of God and nature”) (quotation 
at 299). 
375
  DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 372. 
 376 LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 30, bk. II, §§ 168, 242, at 379–80, 427. 
 377 VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 1. 
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After articulating many other principles of Radical Whig ideology, the 
Declaration turned to religion.  In Mason’s draft, the sixteenth and final article 
asserted that 
Religion, or the Duty which we owe to our divine and omnipotent Creator, 
and the Manner of discharging it, can be governed only by Reason and 
Conviction, not by Force or Violence; and therefore that all Men shou’d enjoy 
the fullest Toleration in the Exercise of Religion, according to the Dictates of 
Conscience, unpunished and unrestrained by the Magistrate, unless, under 
Colour of Religion, any Man disturb the Peace, the Happiness, or Safety of 
Society, or of Individuals.  And that it is the mutual Duty of all, to practice 
Christian Forbearance, Love and Charity towards Each other.
378
 
In both phraseology and substance, this draft clearly owes much to Locke’s 
Letters on Toleration.  The last sentence echoes his contention that “Charity” 
enjoins “the mutual Toleration of Christians in their different Professions of 
Religion.”
379
  Like Locke, however, this draft does not limit toleration to 
Christians but extends it to “all Men” as beings endowed with “Reason.”
380
  To 
express this point in the words of article 1, religious liberty is one of the 
“inherent rights” that all individuals possess “by nature” and that they do not 
abandon when they enter civil society.
381
  This point was made even clearer 
when the convention adopted James Madison’s proposal to amend Mason’s 
language to speak in terms of rights rather than of “Toleration.”
382
  In its final 
form, article 16 read: 
That Religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of 
discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or 
violence; and, therefore, all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of 
religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty 
of all to practise Christian forbearance, love, and charity, towards each other.
383
 
Finally, we should observe that this provision bases religious liberty on the 
core idea of natural religion: that “Religion . . . can be directed only by reason 
and conviction.”  Of course, that does not mean that the provision was 
intended to denigrate revealed religion in any way; the concluding reference 
 
 378 George Mason’s Proposed Declaration of Rights, [ca. 20–25 May 1776], NAT’L ARCHIVES: 
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-01-02-0054-0001 
[https://perma.cc/X53Y-HKP3]. 
 379 LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 7–12. 
 380 See supra text accompanying notes 72, 80–89. 
 381 VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 1. 
 382 See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 18. 
 383 VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 16, at 3–4. 
60 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 23:1 
 
 
to Christianity suffices to make that clear.  But it is equally clear that the 
Convention’s basic assertion is that individuals must be free from compulsion 
regarding religion because it inherently involves the use of reason to discern 
one’s duties to God. 
Article 16 condemned the legal penalties and restrictions that had often 
been imposed on dissenters from Anglicanism, which was the established 
religion of the colony.  Another amendment that Madison drafted would have 
had the effect of abolishing the establishment altogether.
384
  Although this effort 
failed in 1776, it succeeded a decade later when he secured the passage of 
Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom—a development that, as 
Part IV will show, also was based on ideas of natural rights and natural religion. 
2. Pennsylvania 
Unlike Virginia, the Pennsylvania colony gave religious liberty broad 
protection from the beginning.  The rationale for this approach can be found 
in The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience and other writings by its founder, 
the Quaker William Penn.
385
  Some of Penn’s arguments were based on “the 
Authority of . . . Scripture,” such as the contention that religious persecution 
violated biblical teachings by “enthron[ing] Man [rather than God] as King 
over Conscience.” 386   Other arguments were based on “the Authority of 
Reason.” 387   Penn maintained that individuals have an innate “Instinct of 
a Deity” which is essential to their very nature. 388   Efforts to restrict their 
religious liberty are “destructive of the great Priviledge of Nature and Principle 
of Reason,” for “[t]he Understanding can never be convinc’d” by “any external 
Violence,” but only “by such Arguments, as are Rational, Perswasive, and 
 
384 See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 18-19. 
 385 WILLIAM PENN, THE GREAT CASE OF LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE (1670), reprinted in THE 
POLITICAL WRITINGS OF WILLIAM PENN 79 (Andrew R. Murphy ed., 2002), 
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/penn-the-political-writings-of-william-penn [https://perma.cc/99AA-
32DC].  On Penn, see ANDREW R. MURPHY, LIBERTY, CONSCIENCE, AND TOLERATION: THE 
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF WILLIAM PENN (2016). 
 386 PENN, supra note 385, at 79, 86–87. 
 387 Id. at 79.  On Penn’s use of natural theology, see MILLER, supra note 10, at 56–60. 
 388 PENN, supra note 385, at 92. 
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suitable to its own Nature.”389  It follows that “Liberty of Conscience is every 
Man’s natural Right.”390 
A similar fusion of rationalist and Christian justifications can be found in 
the first chapter of the Great Law that was enacted by Penn and the colonial 
assembly in 1682.
391
  This law guaranteed religious freedom to all believers in 
God on the ground that he alone was “Lord of Conscience Father of Lights & 
Spirits an[d] the Author as well as Object of all divine Knowledge Faith and 
Worship who only can Enlighten the Mind and perswade and Convince the 
Understanding of People.”
392
  As J. William Frost observes, this provision was 
drafted in such a way that Quakers could interpret “enlightening the mind and 
convincing the understanding as referring to the experience of the Inward 
Light of Christ,” while Anglicans and Deists could interpret it in more 
rationalist terms.
393
  At the same time, the Great Law reserved civil office-
holding to Christians.
394
  Yet in contrast to the Anglican establishments in the 
southern colonies and the Congregationalist establishments in New England, 
Pennsylvania and its sister mid-Atlantic colonies established no church.
395
  For 




This libertarian approach was embodied in the new state constitution that 
was adopted by a convention in September 1776.
397
  That document draws on 
the language of natural religion and Radical Whig political theory.  It opens 
by declaring that “all government ought to be instituted . . . for the security and 
protection of the community as such, and to enable the individuals who 
compose it to enjoy their natural rights, and the other blessings which the 
 
 389 Id. at 92–95. 
 390 Id. at 110. 
 391 The “Great Law” ch. 1 (1682), http://www.phmc.state.pa.us/portal/communities/documents/1681-
1776/great-law.html [https://perma.cc/X5VY-6AFR]. 
 392 Id. 
 393 J. WILLIAM FROST, A PERFECT FREEDOM: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN PENNSYLVANIA 13–14 (1990). 
 394 See The “Great Law,” supra note 391, ch. 2 (requiring that “all Officers & Persons Commissionated 
and Imployed in the Service of the Government . . . shall be Such as profess and Declare they Believe 
in Jesus Christ to be the Son of God the Savior of the World”). 
 395 See FROST, supra note 393, at 1–3. 
 396 See id. 
397 PA. CONST. of 1776, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/pa08.asp [https://perma.cc/RQ9V-
7JP8]. 
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Author of existence has bestowed upon man,” and by thanking him for 
permitting the people to deliberately and consensually adopt rules for their 
own governance.
398
  The Constitution then sets forth a Declaration of Rights.  
After affirming the inherent liberty and equality of mankind, it asserts: 
That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God 
according to the dictates of their own consciences and understanding: And 
that no man ought or of right can be compelled to attend any religious 
worship, or erect or support any place of worship, or maintain any ministry, 
contrary to, or against, his own free will and consent: Nor can any man, who 
acknowledges the being of a God, be justly deprived or abridged of any civil 
right as a citizen, on account of his religious sentiments or peculiar mode of 
religious worship: And that no authority can or ought to be vested in, or 
assumed by any power whatever, that shall in any case interfere with, or in any 




As for the right to hold civil office, the convention initially proposed to 
extend it to everyone who acknowledged the being of a God and a future state 
of rewards and punishments.
400
  After this proposal encountered opposition 
from the Philadelphia clergy, it was amended to restrict office holding to 
Christians.
401
  But the state reverted to the convention’s original view when a 




Perhaps the most fully developed exposition of Radical Whig ideology in 
the first state constitutions may be found in the one that was drafted by John 
Adams and adopted by Massachusetts in 1780.
403
  The preamble characterizes 
the body politic as a “social compact” which the people make to protect “their 
 
 398 Id. pmbl. 
 399 Id. arts. I–II. 
 400 FROST, supra note 393, at 65. 
 401 See id.; PA. CONST. of 1776, supra note 397, ch. II, § 10. 
 402 See FROST, supra note 393, at 74–75; PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 4, 
https://www.paconstitution.org/texts-of-the-constitution/1790-2/ [https://perma.cc/5PDN-LSAH] 
(stating that a person who “acknowledges the being of God and a future state of rewards and 
punishments” shall not be disqualified from holding office).  The new Constitution’s protection for 
the “natural and indefeasible right” to religious liberty appears in id. § 3. 
 403 MASS. CONST. of 1780, in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 11–23, https://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/print_documents/v1ch1s6.html [https://perma.cc/5JRW-2D4F]. 
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natural rights” and to promote “their safety, prosperity and happiness.”
404
  
After thanking “the Great Legislator of the Universe” for the opportunity to 
establish this compact, the document gives a comprehensive account of the 
fundamental rights of individuals and the community as a whole.
405
  Like its 
counterparts in Virginia and Pennsylvania, the Massachusetts convention 
describes religious liberty in accord with ideas of natural rights and natural 
religion.  Article II of the Declaration of Rights asserts that “[i]t is the right as 
well as the duty of all men in society, publicly, and at stated seasons, to worship 
the SUPREME BEING, the great creator and preserver of the universe.”406  
For this reason, “no subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his 
person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping GOD in the manner and season 
most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; or for his religious 
profession or sentiments,” so long as he does not “disturb the public peace, or 
obstruct others in their religious worship.”
407
  
Although this provision was uncontroversial, that was not true of the next 
one, which reflected the state’s Puritan heritage.  From the founding of the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony, Congregationalism had effectively been the 
established religion.
408
  The 1780 Constitution modified this position but did 
not eradicate it.  As Article III explained, “the happiness of a people, and the 
good order and preservation of civil government, essentially depend upon 
piety, religion and morality,” which could be maintained only by means of 
public worship and religious instruction.
409
  The towns therefore should be 
required to provide “for the institution of the public worship of GOD, and for 
the support and maintenance of public protestant teachers of piety, religion 
and morality” to be elected by the people of each town.
410
  All individuals 
should be required to attend the instruction of such teachers or ministers if 
they could “conscientiously and conveniently” do so.
411
  This public teaching 
 
 404 Id. pmbl. 
 405 Id. pmbl. & pt. 1 (Declaration of Rights). 
 406 Id. pt. 1, art. II. 
 407 Id. 
 408 See THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE 
PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 89, 107–12, 119–20, 131–32, 172–74 (1986). 
 409 MASS. CONST. of 1780, supra note 403, pt. 1, art. III. 
 410 Id. 
 411 Id. 
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and worship was to be supported by taxation, although each individual would 
have the right to require that the money he paid be “applied to the support of 
the public teacher or teachers of his own religious sect or denomination, 
provided there be any on whose instructions he attends.”
412
 
Although this framework theoretically allowed towns to elect ministers 
from any Christian denomination, most towns were likely to choose 
Congregationalists.
413
  In addition, while individuals had a right to direct their 
taxes to their own denominations, they sometimes encountered legal and 
practical obstacles to doing so.
414
  Moreover, some denominations, such as 
Baptists, held beliefs that forbade them to accept coerced payments.
415
  The 
upshot was that Article III was likely to maintain the dominance of the 
Congregational churches.  The provision was vigorously opposed by Baptists 
and others as an infringement of religious liberty, but it was ratified by the 




4. Conclusion  
Although the Revolutionary-era state constitutions took a range of 
positions on the relation between religion and state, they were nearly 
unanimous on one point: that all individuals have a natural and inalienable 
right to form their own religious beliefs and to worship God in accord with 




 412 Id. 
 413 See, e.g., ISAAC BACKUS, AN APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE (1780), reprinted in ISAAC BACKUS ON 
CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM: PAMPHLETS, 1754–1789, at 386–87 (William G. McLoughlin 
ed., 1968) (editor’s introduction) [hereinafter BACKUS PAMPHLETS]. 
 414 See id. at 387. 
 415 See id. at 392. 
 416 See WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, ISAAC BACKUS AND THE AMERICAN PIETISTIC TRADITION 144–
57 (1967). 
 417 DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 2, reprinted in THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 1, Bill of Rights, document 4, at 5, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of
_rightss4.html [https://perma.cc/6JZD-N2U2] (“[A]ll men have a natural and unalienable right to 
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences and understandings.”); GA. 
CONST. of 1777, art. LVI, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ga02.asp 
[https://perma.cc/X7NC-W3S2] (“All persons whatever shall have the free exercise of their religion; 
provided it be not repugnant to the peace and safety of the State; and shall not, unless by consent, 




support any teacher or teachers except those of their own profession.”); GA. CONST. of 1789, art. 
IV, § 5, https://georgiainfo.galileo.usg.edu/topics/government/related_article/constitutions/georgia-
constitution-of-1789 [https://perma.cc/7GZU-GSQZ] (“All persons shall have the free exercise of 
religion, without being obliged to contribute to the support of any religious profession but their 
own.”); MASS. CONST. of 1780, supra note 403, pt. 1, art. II, at 11 (describing religious liberty as “the 
right . . . of all men in society”); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, arts. IV–V, 
https://lonang.com/library/organic/1784-nhr/ [https://perma.cc/MYH8-234X] (“Every individual has 
a natural and unalienable right to worship GOD according to the dictates of his own conscience, and 
reason . . . .”); N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XVIII, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nj15.asp 
[https://perma.cc/KR2B-CN32] (“[N]o person shall ever . . . be deprived of the inestimable privilege 
of worshipping Almighty God in a manner, agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience  . . . .”); 
N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXVIII, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ny01.asp 
[https://perma.cc/WZ94-XDVY] (declaring that “we are required, by the benevolent principles of 
rational liberty, not only to expel civil tyranny, but also to guard against . . . spiritual oppression and 
intolerance,” and providing “that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, 
without discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed, within this State, to all 
mankind”); N.C. CONST. of 1776, A Declaration of Rights, § XIX, 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nc07.asp [https://perma.cc/95DY-6RSW] (“[A]ll men have 
a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own 
consciences.”); PA. CONST. of 1776, , supra note 397, A Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants 
of the Commonwealth or State of Pennsylvania, art. II (“[A]ll men have a natural and unalienable 
right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences and 
understanding . . . .”); VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 16, quoted supra text 
accompanying note 1. 
 
  The clearest exception is the South Carolina Constitution of 1778, which confined toleration to those 
“persons and religious societies who acknowledge that there is one God, and a future state of rewards 
and punishments, and that God is publicly to be worshipped.”  S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXXVIII, 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/sc02.asp [https://perma.cc/SRP7-6QR5].  In 1790, 
however, the state acceded to the consensus by providing that “[t]he free exercise and enjoyment of 
religious profession [and] worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be 




  Another arguable exception is the Maryland declaration, which provided that “all persons, professing 
the Christian religion, are equally entitled to protection in their religious liberty.”  MD. CONST. of 
1776, A Declaration of Rights, &c, art. XXXIII, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/ma02.asp 
[https://perma.cc/X7ES-B7CR] (emphasis added).  In virtually the same breath, however, the 
Declaration asserted that “it is the duty of every man to worship God in such manner as he thinks 
most acceptable to him” and that “no person ought by any law to be molested . . . on account of his 
religious persuasion . . . ; unless, under colour of religion, any man shall disturb the good order, peace 
or safety of the State, or shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure others, in their natural, civil, or 
religious rights.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Thus, while hardly a model of clarity, the Maryland provision 
does not appear to have been meant to limit religious freedom to Christians or to have diverged from 
the prevailing view that this right belongs to all. 
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that resonate with natural religion.  Of course, this is not to deny the 
importance of revelation.  Many people considered the teachings of reason 
and revelation to be in harmony with one another.  But as this section has 
shown, when the state declarations granted protection to religious liberty, they 
primarily used the language of natural rights and reason rather than of 
explicitly Christian theology.  One can offer several explanations for this 
choice.  First, the question of religious toleration historically was controversial 
within Christianity, and that controversy had not ceased by the late eighteenth 
century.  By adopting the language they did, the states were able to bypass such 
theological disputes.  Second, the language of natural rights reflected the view 
that religious liberty is a right that belongs not only to Christians (with all the 
problems that would have been involved in determining who qualified and in 
excluding others) but to all human beings.  And third, the use of such language 
allowed the declarations to ground the right to religious liberty in the same 
principles as the other rights that they protected, such as life, liberty, property, 
and freedom of speech. 
Accordingly, the state constitutions treated religious liberty as a natural 
right of mankind.  At the same time, many states limited civil equality or the 
right to hold office to Christians or even to Protestants,
418
 and some states also 
retained their religious establishments.
419
  As we have seen, contemporary 
theorists of natural religion were not of one mind concerning the idea of 
religious establishments—some like Locke and Price rejected this notion
420
 
while others like Pufendorf, Hutcheson, and Witherspoon accepted it in some 
form.
421
  Yet there clearly is some tension between the idea that religious liberty 
 
 418 See, e.g., DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, supra note 417, § 3 (guaranteeing “equal rights 
and privileges” to “all persons professing the Christian religion”); MASS. CONST. OF 1780, supra note 
403, pt. I, art. III, at 12 (establishing a system of public teaching and worship and providing that 
“every denomination of christians, demeaning themselves peaceably, and as good subjects of the 
Commonwealth, shall be equally under the protection of the law”); N.H. CONST. of 1784, supra note 
417, pt. I, art. VI (following Massachusetts in these respects); N.J. CONST. of 1776, supra note 417, 
art. XIX (protecting the civil and office-holding rights of Protestants). 
 419 See, e.g., supra notes 408–16 and accompanying text (noting that Congregationalism was effectively 
the established religion of Massachusetts). 
 420 See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text (Locke); PRICE, OBSERVATIONS, supra note 245, at 
240–44. 
 421 See supra notes 129-33 (Pufendorf), 220-22 (Hutcheson), 251-53 (Witherspoon) and accompanying 
text. 
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is an inalienable right that belongs to all alike and the notion that the state may 
establish a religion and thereby inevitably favor some over others.
422
  And there 
is an even greater conflict between the principle of religious liberty and the 
idea that individuals may be denied equal civil or political rights because of 
their religious views. 
IV. THE BATTLE OVER RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN 1780S VIRGINIA 
These conflicts came to a head in the battle over religious freedom and 
disestablishment that occurred in Virginia during the mid-1780s.  This 
controversy produced one of the era’s fullest debates over the meaning of this 
freedom, and it has long been regarded as providing vital insight into the ideas 
that underlie the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 
A. The Controversies of the Mid-1780s 
1. The General Assessment Bill 
Anglicanism was the established religion of Virginia throughout the 
colonial period.
423
  All inhabitants were required to attend weekly services in 
their parish churches and to pay taxes for their support.
424
  During the 
eighteenth century, a limited degree of toleration was afforded to dissenting 
Protestant sects, provided that they paid these taxes and complied with strict 
regulations regarding worship.
425
  Members of groups like the Separate Baptists 




In 1776, this approach to dissent was repudiated by article 16 of state 
Declaration of Rights, which proclaimed that all individuals were equally 
entitled to the free exercise of religion.
427
  The debate then turned to the status 
of the Anglican Church.  The dissenting sects and liberal allies such as 
 
 422 See, e.g., BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 18–19. 
 423 See BUCKLEY, ESTABLISHING, supra note 288, at 1. 
 424 See id. 
 425 See id. at 12–32. 
 426 See id. at 39–42. 
 427 See supra text accompanying notes 378–84. 
68 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 23:1 
 
 
Madison fought to disestablish it.
428
  Although these efforts fell short in 1776, 
the legislature relieved dissenters of the obligation to pay taxes to support the 
church.
429
  The legislature also suspended, and eventually abolished, the duty 
of all citizens to pay such taxes.
430
  Due to lack of revenue and other factors, 
the church found itself in increasingly dire straits.
431
 
In 1784, Patrick Henry spearheaded an effort to pass a bill to combat what 
he and others regarded as the decline of religion and morality in Virginia.
432
  
Rather than declaring Christianity to be “the true Religion,” as an earlier bill 
would have done,
433
 Henry’s bill was premised on the notion that the spread 
of “Christian knowledge” was the best way to promote individual morality and 
preserve social peace.
434
 This proposal, which became known as the General 
Assessment Bill, effectively would have made Christianity in general the 
established religion by imposing a state-wide tax for the support of Christian 
ministers, teachers, and places of worship.
435
  Each individual would have been 
permitted to designate the “society of Christians” to which his taxes should 
go.
436
  In this way, the bill sought to promote Christianity “without 
counteracting the liberal principle heretofore adopted and intended to be 
preserved by abolishing all distinctions of preeminence amongst the different 
societies or communities of Christians.”
437
 
In December 1784, Henry’s bill came close to passage, only to be blocked 
when the House of Delegates agreed to Madison’s motion for a delay to allow 
 
 428 See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 19–37. 
 429 See CURRY, supra note 408, at 136. 
 430 Id.  
 431 See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 43–45 (noting factors such as a decreasing clergy, the 
absence of a bishop, and the suspension of clerical salaries). 
 432 See id. ch. 3; CURRY, supra note 408, at 140–41. 
 433 BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 56–57, 185–88 (quoting and reprinting a bill considered by the 
House of Delegates in 1779). 
 434 A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion, Virginia (1784), in THE 
SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE 252, 252 (Daniel L. Dreisbach & Mark David Hall eds., 2009) 
[hereinafter Assessment Bill]. 
 435 See id. at 252–53. 
 436 Id. at 253. 
 437 Id. at 252. 
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for consideration by the people.
438
  Extensive public campaigns were then 
launched to mobilize support or opposition to the bill.
439
 
Among the most important petitions against the bill was the Memorial and 
Remonstrance against Religious Assessments
440 which was written by Madison 
at the urging of several other prominent liberals.
441
  This document offered the 
most comprehensive and intellectually powerful defense of religious liberty in 
eighteenth-century America. 
Madison’s leading arguments are grounded in the principles of natural 
rights and natural religion enshrined in the Declaration of Rights.  Quoting 
article 16, he asserts that it is “a fundamental and undeniable truth, ‘that 
Religion . . . can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or 
violence.’”
442
  It follows that individuals have a right to exercise religion in the 
way that their own reason and conscience dictate.  Drawing on arguments 
developed by Locke and other writers we have discussed, Madison offers two 
reasons for regarding this right as an “unalienable” one.
443
  The first is that “the 
opinions of men, depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own 
minds cannot follow the dictates of other men.”
444
  Second, “what is here a 
right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator,” for “every man [has a duty] 
to render to the Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be 
acceptable to him.”
445
  For these reasons, Madison concludes that individuals 
 
 438 See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 108–09. 
 439 See id. ch. 4. 
 440 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, [ca. 20 June] 1785, 
NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-
0163 [https://perma.cc/THW5-WP3B] [hereinafter Madison, Memorial]. 
 441 See id.  For an insightful discussion of Madison’s views on religion, see Brady, supra note 15, at 456–
60. 
 442 Madison, Memorial, supra note 440, § 1. 
 443 Id. 
 444 Id. 
 445 Id.  The first of these arguments finds classic expression in Locke’s writings.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 81–86.  The second echoes Philip Furneaux’s Essay on Toleration.  See 
FURNEAUX, TOLERATION, supra note 190, at 12 (arguing that just as the ability to exercise religion 
is “a right” that every individual has “with respect to his fellow men, . . . so, with respect to God, it is 
a duty which he owes to him”).  For Furneaux’s influence on Madison, see KETCHAM, supra note 
255, at 66. 
 
70 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 23:1 
 
 
do not surrender their right to free exercise when they enter civil society, and 
that the state has no jurisdiction whatever over religion.
446
 
Expanding this critique, Madison contends that the Assessment Bill also 
violates the principle of natural equality.  Quoting from the Declaration, he 
reasons that 
[i]f “all men are by nature equally free and independent,” all men are to be 
considered as entering into Society on equal conditions; as relinquishing no 
more, and therefore retaining no less, . . . of their natural rights.  Above all are 
they to be considered as retaining an “equal title to the free exercise of 
Religion according to the dictates of Conscience.”
447
 
Relying once more on the idea that religion can be directed only by reason, 
he continues: “Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace . . . the 
Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny an equal 
freedom to those whose minds have not yet yielded to the evidence which has 
convinced us.”
448
  The Assessment Bill violates this equality by imposing a tax 
for the support of Christianity, thereby discriminating against non-Christians 
as well as against those Christian sects who reject the idea of compulsory 
support for religion.
449
  Instead of “degrad[ing] from the equal rank of Citizens 
all those whose opinions in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative 
authority,” a “just Government” should secure the rights of all “by protecting 
every Citizen in the enjoyment of his Religion with the same equal hand which 
protects his person and his property; by neither invading the equal rights of 
any Sect, nor suffering any Sect to invade those of another.”
450
  
Like Locke, Madison argues for a strict separation of church and state and 
warns of the dangers that arise from their union.  Drawing on the Radical Whig 
view of history, he observes that “[i]n some instances [ecclesiastical 
 
  Nicholas Miller suggests that, in his second argument, “Madison shifted his emphasis from the 
Enlightenment’s focus on reason to more of a religious view of man’s duty toward God.”  MILLER, 
supra note 10, at 146.  By contrast, I would say that both of Madison’s arguments are best understood 
in terms of natural religion—a view that regards religious duty as founded on reason. 
 446 See Madison, Memorial, supra note 440, § 1 (stating that religion “is wholly exempt from [the] 
cognizance” of “Civil Society”). 
 447 Id. § 4 (quoting VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, arts. 1, 16, supra note 1) (emphasis added by 
Madison). 
 448 Id. 
 449 See id. §§ 3–4. 
 450 Id. §§ 8–9. 
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establishments] have been seen to erect a spiritual tyranny on the ruins of the 
Civil authority; in many instances they have been seen upholding the thrones 
of political tyranny: in no instance have they been seen the guardians of the 
liberties of the people.”
451
 
Madison’s defense of religious freedom, like that of article 16, appeals not 
only to natural religion and natural rights but also to a particular conception of 
Christianity.
452
  For civil rulers to use religion to promote their own ends is “an 
unhallowed perversion of the means of salvation.”
453
  An establishment is not 
needed to support the Christian religion, which historically has been advanced 
by divine providence without support from—and indeed in opposition to—civil 
authorities.
454
  Far from maintaining the purity of Christianity, establishment 
tends to corrupt it by promoting “superstition, bigotry and persecution.”
455
  
Instead of social peace, governmental intrusions into the religious realm 
generate sectarian conflict and undermine the “Christian forbearance, love 
and charity” that the Declaration of Rights calls for.
456
  Finally, those who enjoy 
“the light of revelation” should desire that it spread to “the whole race of 
mankind”—a goal that is undermined by laws that discourage non-Christians 
from immigrating to the state.
457
 
The great logical and rhetorical force of Madison’s Memorial comes from 
the ways that it draws on both natural religion and Christianity.  His central 
thesis is that the state is devoid of authority in the religious sphere because 
individuals have an inalienable right to exercise religion in accord with reason 
and conscience.  But he also maintains that religious freedom and 
nonestablishment are the best ways to promote the Christian religion.  This 
 
 451 Id. § 8.  Many of the same themes can be found in Madison’s notes for a speech he gave during the 
Assembly’s consideration of the Assessment Bill in December 1784.  In that speech, he also argued 
that establishments are unnecessary because human beings have a natural “propensity . . . to 
Religion.”  James Madison, Madison’s Notes for Debates on the General Assessment Bill, [Outline 
B], [23–24 December 1784], NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0104-0003 [https://perma.cc/ZQ82-
EG6P]. 
 452 See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 133–34; MILLER, supra note 10, at 148. 
 453 Madison, Memorial, supra note 440, § 5. 
 454 Id. § 6. 
 455 Id. § 7. 
 456 Id. § 11 (quoting VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 16). 
 457 Id. § 12. 
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broad approach allows him to appeal to a wide range of groups, from Deists 
to liberal Anglicans to many Evangelical Protestants. 
Madison’s was not the only leading petition that highlighted ideas of 
natural rights and natural religion.  The same was true of a memorial that the 
Assembly received from the Presbyterians,
458
 one of the largest and most 
influential dissenting groups in the commonwealth.
459
  Some of the petition’s 
arguments are made in specifically Christian terms, including the assertions 
that it would be “an invasion of the Divine prerogative” for civil rulers to 
meddle in spiritual affairs, and that the progress of Christianity should be left 
to “the all directing providence of God.”
460
  But the petition’s most 
fundamental claims are that “[r]eligion is altogether personal” and that 
individuals have an “unalienable” right to exercise it “agreeably to the 
convictions of reason and conscience.”
461
  The Assessment Bill would infringe 
the religious liberty of all, including those “who may be good citizens, but who 
have not embraced our common faith.”
462
  The measure therefore “is a direct 
violation of [the sixteenth article of] the Declaration of Rights.”
463
  The 




Thus, two of the major petitions against the Assessment Bill relied on 
arguments drawn from natural rights and natural religion as well as from the 
dissenting Protestant tradition.  This was also true of a third set of petitions, 
which denounced the bill as “contrary to the spirit of the Gospel and the Bill 
 
 458 Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover, Virginia (Aug. 13, 1785), in SACRED RIGHTS OF 
CONSCIENCE, supra note 434, at 304 [hereinafter Presbyterian Memorial (1785)]. 
 459 See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 13; see also Rhys Isaac, “The Rage of Malice of the Old 
Serpent Devil”: The Dissenters and the Making and Remaking of the Virginia Statute for Religious 
Freedom, in THE VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 139, 149–50 (Merrill D. Peterson 
& Robert C. Vaughan eds., 2003) (discussing the Presbyterians’ use of natural religion). 
 460 Presbyterian Memorial (1785), supra note 458, at 305–06. 
 461 Id. at 304-05. 
 462 Id. at 305. 
 463 Id. 
 464 See id. at 306. 





  These petitions, which were signed by thousands of Evangelicals, 
are discussed in depth below.
466
 
2. Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom 
In response to this surge of political opposition, the Assembly quietly 
allowed the Assessment Bill to die.
467
  With Madison’s leadership, the 
legislature then adopted an amended version of Jefferson’s Bill for 
Establishing Religious Freedom.
468
  This bill, which was first published in 1779, 
declared: 
that no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, 
place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or 
burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer, on account of his 
religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by 
argument to maintain, their opinions in matters of religion, and that the same 
shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.
469
 
In an extensive preamble, the Bill articulated a rationale that was cast 
largely in terms of natural religion and natural rights.  The Bill asserted “that 
Almighty God hath created the mind free” and made it incapable of external 
restraint; that he intended for religion to be promoted “by its influence on 
reason alone”; “that the opinions and belief of men depend not on their own 
will, but follow involuntarily the evidence proposed to their minds”; that 
opinions “are not the object of civil government, nor under its jurisdiction”; 
and that government should not interfere with “principles on supposition of 
their ill tendency,” but only when they “break out into overt acts against peace 
and good order.”
470
  The “civil rights” we enjoy as members of society “have 
no dependance on our religious opinions,” and therefore for the law to deny 
any individual the capacity to hold civil office “unless he profess or renounce 
 
 465 Petition Against the Bill [from Westmoreland County, Virginia] (Nov. 2, 1784), in SACRED RIGHTS 
OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 434, at 307 [hereinafter Westmoreland Petition]. 
 466 See infra text accompanying notes 514-25. 
 467 See BUCKLEY, ESTABLISHING, supra note 288, at 79–80. 
 468 See id. at 155–63. 
 469 A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, 18 June 1779, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-0132-0004-0082 
[https://perma.cc/54XJ-Q86A] [hereinafter Jefferson Bill] (setting forth the Bill as Jefferson drafted 
it); see also Virginia Act, supra note 14 (the final version of the Bill).  
 470 Jefferson Bill, supra note 469. 
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this or that religious opinion, is depriving him injuriously of those privileges 
and advantages to which, in common with his fellow citizens, he has a natural 
right.”
471
  Finally, the preamble affirms “that truth is great and will prevail if left 
to herself; that she is the proper and sufficient antagonist to error, and has 
nothing to fear from the conflict unless by human interposition disarmed of 
her natural weapons, free argument and debate.”
472
  The Bill concludes by 
declaring “that the rights hereby asserted are of the natural rights of mankind, 
and that if any act shall be hereafter passed to repeal the present or to narrow 
its operation, such act will be an infringement of natural right.”
473
  
The views expressed in Jefferson’s Bill emerged in part from his reflections 
on Locke, Furneaux, and other writers we have explored.
474
  Like those writers 
 
 471 Id.  At first glance, this assertion seems problematic: because civil offices do not exist in a state of 
nature, the right to hold them cannot properly be described as “a natural right.”  See Philip A. 
Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-Century Debate about Equal Protection and 
Equal Civil Rights, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 350–51 (1992).  The logic behind Jefferson’s assertion 
becomes somewhat clearer if we consider the passage in Furneaux that evidently inspired it.  As 
Furneaux explains, although one does not have an inherent right to actually hold civil offices, “a 
capacity of being elected or appointed to them, is the right of every good subject; and being deprived 
of that capacity is plainly an injury; and every injury done to a man merely for his religion, and not 
on a civil account,” is a form of religious “persecution” which is “contrary to the law of nature.”  
FURNEAUX, LETTERS, supra note 169, Letter VI, at 164–65 (emphasis added).  It follows that 
imposing such a disability on dissenters prevents them from “enjoying those privileges and advantages 
to which, in common with their fellow subjects, they have a natural claim.”  Id. at 167 n.*.  For other 
passages in Furneaux’s Letters that anticipate the language of Jefferson’s preamble, see id. Letter III, 
at 59 (asserting that “human laws have nothing to do with mere principles, but only with those overt 
acts arising from them, which are contrary to the peace and good order of society”); id. at 60 (stating 
that the magistrate exceeds his authority when he punishes individuals “on account of the supposed 
ill tendency of their principles”); id. Letter VI, at 201 (observing that “though they are criminal who 
do not resist [the temptation to hypocritically change their religious practice in order to satisfy a legal 
test for civil office]; yet, neither are they innocent, who lay the snare in their way”).  
 472 Jefferson Bill, supra note 469. 
 473 Id.  A few years after drafting the Bill, Jefferson presented a similar defense of religious liberty, which 
also cited Furneaux.  THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, QUERY XVII 
(1782), reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 123, 284–85 & n.* (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 
1984). 
 474 See supra note 471 (discussing Furneaux’s influence on Jefferson’s Bill).  For some passages in Locke 
that are echoed in Jefferson’s writings, see LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 14 (“It is only 
Light and Evidence that can work a change in Mens Opinions.  And that Light can in no manner 
proceed from corporal Sufferings, or any other outward Penalties.”); id. at 44 (asserting that the 
“Speculative Opinions” that individuals hold “have no manner of relation to the Civil Rights of the 
Subjects”); id. at 44–45 (maintaining that the expression of such opinions “does no injury” to others 
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and Madison’s Memorial, Jefferson’s Bill blended the language of natural 
rights and natural religion with that of the Christian tradition.  For example, 
the Bill’s assertion that it was not only “tyrannical” but “sinful” to “compel a 
man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which 
he disbelieves and abhors” had powerful appeal to Protestant dissenters and 
was incorporated into the Baptist petitions against the Assessment Bill.
475
  
Christian overtones also could be heard in Jefferson’s assertion that all 
attempts to influence the mind by civil incapacitations or punishments “are a 
departure from the plan of the holy author of our religion, who being lord 
both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either, 
as was in his Almighty power to do, but to extend it by its influence on reason 
alone.”
476
  Jefferson’s language here seems designedly ambiguous.  Christians 
naturally would take “the holy author of our religion” to be a reference to 
Christ, and indeed this phrase was inspired by a passage in Locke’s Letter that 
clearly related to him.
477
  At the same time, the phrase was vague enough that 
it might refer simply to the “Almighty God” who was mentioned earlier in the 
preamble.  Many years later, Jefferson recalled that the assembly had 
overwhelmingly rejected a proposal to amend the preamble to specify that “the 
holy author of our religion” was “Jesus Christ”—a decision that Jefferson 
regarded as proving that the Act’s “protection of opinion was meant to be 
 
and that “the business of Laws is not to provide for the Truth of Opinions, but for the Safety and 
Security of the Commonwealth, and of every particular mans Goods and Person”); id. at 45 
(suggesting that “Truth certainly would do well enough, if she were once left to shift for her Self”); 
see also infra text accompanying note 477 (describing how Jefferson drew on another passage from 
Locke’s Letter).  For further discussion, see Sanford Kessler, Locke’s Influence on Jefferson’s “Bill 
for Establishing Religious Freedom,” 25 J. CHURCH & ST. 231 (1983). 
 475 Jefferson Bill, supra note 469; see Westmoreland Petition, supra note 465, at 308. 
 476 Jefferson Bill, supra note 469. 
477
  After observing that Christ sought to bring people into the church not by “Instruments of Force” but 
by “the Gospel of Peace,” Locke added, “Tho’ if Infidels were to be converted by force, . . . we know 
very well that it was much more easie for Him to do it, with Armies of Heavenly Legions, than for 
any Son of the Church . . . with all his Dragoons.”  LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 11.  In 
the notes Jefferson took while reading this passage, he wrote that “our Saviour chose not to propagate 
his religion by temporal punmts or civil incapacitation, if he had it was in his almighty power. but he 
chose to <enforce> extend it by it’s influence on reason, thereby shewing to others how [they] should 
proceed.”  Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Locke and Shaftesbury, 11 October–9 
December 1776, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/J
efferson/01-01-02-0222-0007 [https://perma.cc/LQ5S-PLBN]. 
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universal” and to “comprehend . . . the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and 
Mahometan, the Hindoo and infidel of every denomination.”
478
 
Before enacting Jefferson’s Bill, the Assembly deleted some of the 
preamble’s most rationalistic language, such as the propositions that “the 
opinions and belief of men . . . follow involuntarily the evidence proposed to 
their minds” and that religion should progress “by its influence on reason 
alone.”
479
  Yet most of the key language survived, from the declaration that 
“Almighty God hath created the mind free” to the closing assertion that 
religious liberty is among “the natural rights of mankind.”
480
  Moreover, the 
most serious effort to amend the Bill simply would have replaced Jefferson’s 
preamble with the language of article 16 of the Declaration of Rights, with its 
contention that “Religion . . . can be directed only by reason and conviction, 
not by force or violence.”
481
  Thus, while the Assembly moderated Jefferson’s 
articulation of natural religion, it clearly did not reject that notion, and the core 
of his position remained intact.  As Madison wrote to him shortly afterwards, 
the changes to the preamble “somewhat defaced the composition,” but they 
“did not affect the substance” of a statute that the two men believed would “in 
this Country [i.e., Virginia] extinguish[] for ever the ambitious hope of making 
laws for the human mind.”
482
 
B. Interpreting the Virginia Controversy 
It is agreed on all sides that the events that culminated in the Virginia Act 
for Establishing Religious Freedom shed crucial light on the meaning of the 
First Amendment, which was adopted only a few years later.  But there is acute 
 
 478 Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson: Autobiography, 6 Jan.–29 July 1821, 6 January 1821, NAT’L 
ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-1756 
[https://perma.cc/52AW-755F].  While the Assembly’s journals contain no record of this 
amendment, it might have been considered in the Committee of the Whole.  See BUCKLEY, 
VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 158 n.45. 
 479 Jefferson Bill, supra note 469.  For the deleted propositions, see the language marked in italics. 
 480 See id.  
 481 VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 16; see BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 158, 
162–63. 
 482 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 22, 1786), NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS 
ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0249 
[https://perma.cc/FA4U-XWDJ]. 
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disagreement over how those events should be understood.  Traditionally, 
courts and historians have focused on the contributions made by Jefferson, 
who drafted the statute, and by Madison, who shepherded it through the 




In recent decades, however, a growing number of scholars have stressed 
that it was the Evangelicals who provided most of the political momentum that 
led to the establishment of religious freedom in Virginia.
484
  For example, while 
Madison’s Memorial received about 1,700 signatures—an impressive number 
for the time—the petitions circulated by Evangelicals garnered many more.
485
  
Moreover, it was the Presbyterians’ decision to drop their previous support 
for an assessment and to instead endorse Jefferson’s Bill that turned the tide, 
first in the popular debate and then in the legislature.
486
  It follows that “[t]he 
key to understanding the nature of the religious settlement in Virginia rests 




This revisionist interpretation draws much of its force from the notion that 
the supporters of religious freedom held two sharply different views—an 
Evangelical view that was rooted in orthodox Christianity and a rationalist view 
that was secular or at most Deistic.
488
  During the 1780s, those who espoused 
these views came together to promote religious liberty, but they did so for 
 
 483 See supra text accompanying notes 6–9. 
 484 See, e.g., BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 143, 175–82; MILLER, supra note 10, at 109–11; 
RAGOSTA, supra note 6; McConnell, supra note 6, at 1437–41. 
 485 See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 147, 175; McConnell, supra note 6, at 1440. 
 486 See, e.g., BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 136–39, 143, 147–49; McConnell, supra note 6, at 
1440. 
 487 BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 175; see also, e.g., McConnell, supra note 6, at 1446.  
Departing from the common understanding, McConnell argues that while Jefferson took an 
Enlightenment rationalist approach to religious freedom, Madison took a very different approach 
which “echoed evangelical convictions” and exalted “the claims of religious freedom” over those of 
civil society.  See id. at 1446, 1452–55.  As I shall show, however, whatever their private views may 
have been, Madison and Jefferson took the same public stance toward religion—an approach that was 
rooted in the ideas of natural religion and natural rights.  See supra text accompanying notes 440–57, 
468–78; infra text accompanying notes 494–96. 
 488 See, e.g., BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at ix–x, 3, 6, 148, 164, 178–81; McConnell, supra note 
6, at 1437–41, 1445–46, 1449–53. 





  Evangelicals were motivated by “avowedly 
religious reasons”: they held that “[e]very man had to be free to respond in 
faith and worship as God would draw him,” and that the church had to be free 
to promote “the salvation of a Christian America through the Gospel 
message.”
490
  By contrast, rationalists were indifferent if not hostile toward 
Christianity and other forms of organized religion.
491
  They wished to protect 
intellectual freedom and to liberate social and political life from the 
domination of religion by confining it to the private sphere.
492
  Although the 
two groups joined forces against the religious establishment during this period, 
in the end their views were not merely distinct but “diametrically opposed” to 
one another.
493
  When the two positions are framed in this way, one can make 
a reasonable case that the defeat of the Assessment Bill and the adoption of 
the Act for Religious Freedom are best understood in terms of the conception 
of religious liberty that was held by the Evangelicals, whose political support 
was decisive, rather than in terms of the Deism, skepticism, or irreligion that 
they abhorred. 
The fundamental problem with this revisionist interpretation is that it fails 
to take sufficient account of natural religion and to recognize the way that it 
offered common ground between the rationalist and Evangelical positions.  In 
his private correspondence, Jefferson did articulate Deist views as well as 
strong hostility toward traditional Christianity.
494
  Although Madison’s youthful 
letters breathed with Evangelical fervor,
495
 in later years he “was extremely 
 
 489 See, e.g., BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 178–81. 
 490 Id. at 176, 178, 180–81. 
 491 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 6, at 1449–52 (discussing Jefferson’s views). 
 492 Id. at 1449–50, 1453. 
 493 Id. at 1446. 
 494 See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (May 5, 1817), NAT’L ARCHIVES: 
FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-6753 
[https://perma.cc/AU5P-KHJT] (denouncing the “Monkish darkness” and “Sectarian dogmas” of 
traditional Christianity); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Francis Adrian Van der Kemp (July 30, 
1816), NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-10-02-0167 [https://perma.cc/Z2LV-AJGF] 
(describing orthodox Christian ideas such as “the trinity” as “unintelligible propositions” that are “the 
mere Abracadabra of the mountebanks calling themselves the priests of Jesus”). 
 495 See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Nov. 9, 1772), NAT’L ARCHIVES: 
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-01-02-0015 
[https://perma.cc/7H7L-HWXJ]. 
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reticent about expressing his ideas on matters of faith.”
496
  Yet whatever the two 
leaders’ personal views may have been, the position they took in their public 
writings was based not on an agnostic or antireligious secularism but on an 
affirmation of natural religion.  Moreover, the form of natural religion they 
affirmed was one that was open to the possibility of revelation and that 
recognized the right of all individuals to hold and advocate for their beliefs, 
including traditional Christian ones.  The leading Evangelical defenses of 
religious liberty in Virginia also rested in part on the concepts of natural 
religion and natural rights.  It was these concepts that enabled rationalists and 
Evangelicals to form an alliance to promote religious liberty.  It follows (as I 
shall now argue) that the statute and its adoption are best understood neither 
in terms of secular rationalism nor in terms of Evangelicalism but rather in 
light of natural religion and natural rights. 
At the outset, we should clarify the question we are interested in.  Some 
forms of history would focus on the social and political forces that brought 
about the statute’s adoption or would explore its implications for religion, 
politics, and society in Virginia.  Although these are relevant to our inquiry, 
they are not our principal concern.  Instead, the question is how we should 
understand the normative principle of religious liberty as it was incorporated 
into the fundamental law of the state by the Act for Religious Freedom.  What 
did that statute mean from a legal and constitutional standpoint? 
In pursuing this issue, we should begin with the statute’s language.  
Although its rationalism was toned down as it made its way through the 
legislature, it clearly is based on ideas of natural religion and natural rights.  
The Act declares that God has created the mind free; that human beings are 
capable of reaching “truth” through “free argument and debate”; that they have 
an inherent right to formulate and argue for their beliefs, as well as to be free 
from all compulsion in this sphere; that they are entitled to full and equal “civil 
rights” without regard to their religious opinions; that those opinions lie 
beyond the legitimate authority of civil government; and that the rights asserted 




 496 Ralph L. Ketcham, James Madison and Religion—A New Hypothesis, 38 J. PRESBYTERIAN HIST. 
SOC’Y 65, 65 (1960). 
 497 Virginia Act, supra note 14. 
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At the same time, Jefferson’s statute does not articulate these ideas in a way 
that is antagonistic to revealed religion, for the Act speaks respectfully of “the 
Holy author of our religion,” “the ministry,” and the “faith” of individuals.
498
  
The statute seems to assume that individuals reasonably can hold a variety of 
religious views.  It also incorporates a number of points that would appeal to 
dissenting Protestants, such as a denunciation of rulers who would impose 
their (quite possibly false) opinions on others.
499
  Yet it studiously refrains from 
using explicitly Christian language.  In short, like Madison’s Memorial, the Act 
is a classic instance of a document that is founded on natural religion but open 
to revealed religion, that appeals to both rationalist and pietist defenders of 
religious freedom, and that secures this freedom to everyone under the 
doctrine of natural rights. 
This leads to the next point: the Act’s supporters and their views.  Although 
a wave of Evangelical activity may have ensured the defeat of the Assessment 
Bill, that activity was not sufficient to secure the adoption of a law protecting 
religious liberty.  Instead, that result was achieved by a broader political and 
legislative coalition that also included Anglicans (or Episcopalians, as they 
became known after the Revolution).
500
 
As we have seen, eighteenth-century Anglican thought had both a 
traditionalist and a rationalist strand.
501
  The latter emphasized the importance 
of reason as well as the harmony between natural and revealed religion.
502
  
Some rationalists agreed with traditionalists on the value of an established 
church.
503
  But others strongly supported religious liberty and 
disestablishment.
504
  During the mid-1780s, individuals who took this liberal 




 498 Id.  
 499 Id. 
 500 See, e.g., BUCKLEY, ESTABLISHING, supra note 288, at 80. 
 501 See supra text accompanying notes 286–87. 
 502 See supra text accompanying notes 288–90. 
 503 For example, James Maury’s discourse was written to defend the established church against the 
challenge posed by Separate Baptists.  See MAURY, supra note 288; BUCKLEY, ESTABLISHING, supra 
note 288, at 43. 
 504 See, e.g., BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 124–25, 128, 130–31, 164. 
 505 See id. app. II, at 192–200 (listing a group of delegates who favored a church-state relationship as 
well as a group that opposed one—a category that he subdivides between Episcopalian rationalists and 
predominantly Presbyterian dissenters). 
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Together with a similar number of Evangelicals, they had the strength to block 
the Assessment Bill and to enact Jefferson’s statute.
506
  A few months later, such 
efforts to secure religious liberty and to dissolve the union between church and 
state were hailed as a triumph for rational religion and “the rights of humanity” 
in a sermon preached to the Episcopal Church of Virginia by the Rev. James 
Madison, who was soon to become its first bishop.
507
 
The other main part of the coalition for religious liberty consisted of 
Evangelical dissenters from the established church.  This was not a unified 
group, however, for it consisted of several distinct denominations, the largest 
of which were the Presbyterians and Baptists.  At this time, nearly all the 
Evangelical members of the House of Delegates were Presbyterians.
508
 
Presbyterians had long resented the dominance of the Anglican Church in 
Virginia.
509
  They were committed to religious liberty and equality for all 
Christian sects.
510
  During the fall of 1784, they expressed qualified support for 
an assessment because of religion’s importance for “the existence and welfare” 
of society.
511
  The following summer, however, they changed course and 
denounced Henry’s proposal as an invasion of the religious sphere and “a 
direct violation of the Declaration of Rights.”
512
  As we have seen, their 
memorial to the General Assembly contained strong elements of natural 
 
 506 See id.; BUCKLEY, ESTABLISHING, supra note 288, at 80; supra Part IV.A.  
 507 See JAMES MADISON, A SERMON PREACHED BEFORE THE CONVENTION OF THE PROTESTANT 
EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, ON THE TWENTY SIXTH OF MAY, 1786, at 3–7 
(Richmond, Thomas Nicolson 1786).  In a statement that epitomizes natural religion, Madison 
asserted that “religion, to be profitable to the individual and acceptable to God, must be the result of 
free inquiry and the determination of reason.  This right of free inquiry, and of judging for ourselves 
is a right natural and unalienable.”  Id. at 10.  For Madison, this right was not only “the glory of our 
nature” and “the truest source of joy and triumph to an American,” it was also “the indispensable 
duty of a Christian.”  Id. 
 508 See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, app. II, at 199–200.  
 509 See id. at 137–39. 
 510 See Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover, Virginia (Oct. 24, 1776), in SACRED RIGHTS OF 
CONSCIENCE, supra note 434, at 269, 269– 70, https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/documen
t/the-memorial-of-hanover-presbytery/ [https://perma.cc/J645-83Z6] [hereinafter Presbyterian 
Memorial (1776)]. 
 511 Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover, Virginia (Oct. 28, 1784), in SACRED RIGHTS OF 
CONSCIENCE, supra note 434, at 301, 303. 
 512 See Presbyterian Memorial (1785), supra note 458, at 304–05. 
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religion and urged the adoption of Jefferson’s Bill.
513
  It therefore is fair to say 
that ideas of natural religion and natural rights were affirmed by both of the 
groups—Presbyterians and liberal Episcopalians—that formed the legislative 
coalition that passed the Act for Religious Freedom. 
Much of the revisionist case instead focuses on the Baptists.  The most 
widely subscribed petitions against the Assessment Bill probably were their 
work.
514
  These petitions objected to the bill primarily in Christian terms.  By 
imposing a tax for religious purposes, the legislature would act “contrary to the 
spirit of the Gospel” by disregarding Christ’s “plain directions” that the church 
and its teachers should be supported “by free Contributions.”
515
  Even if the 
bill’s supporters are correct “that Deism with it’s banefull Influence is 
spreading itself over the state,” the proper remedy is not to establish religion.
516
  
Instead, the rulers should promote religion by setting a good example as well 
as by adopting laws to punish immorality.
517
  Ministers should demonstrate to 
the world that they are called to their work by “divine Grace” and not by a 
mere desire to profit from ecclesial employment.
518
  But on no account should 
civil government meddle in the religious realm.
519
 
Several scholars rely on these petitions as important evidence that the 
adoption of the Virginia statute should be regarded as a victory for an 
Evangelical rather than an Enlightenment view of religious liberty.
520
  But this 
evidence does not bear the weight that is placed on it. 
To begin with, we should recall that the specific purpose of these petitions 
was to oppose the Assessment Bill.  In turn, the rationale for that bill was that 
it offered the best way to diffuse “Christian knowledge” throughout the 
community and to thereby promote social peace and morality.
521
  In this 
context, it is perfectly understandable that the petitions should contend that, 
far from promoting true Christianity, the Assessment Bill violated the most 
 
 513 See supra text accompanying notes 461–64. 
 514 See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 148–49 & n.12; Isaac, supra note 459, at 150–51.  For a 
good example of these petitions, see Westmoreland Petition, supra note 465. 
 515 Westmoreland Petition, supra note 465, at 307–08. 
 516 Id. at 308. 
 517 Id. 
 518 Id. 
 519 Id. at 307–08. 
 520 See, e.g., BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 148–49; McConnell, supra note 6, at 1440. 
 521 Assessment Bill, supra note 434, at 252. 
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basic principles of that religion as the Baptists understood it.  Thus, the bill 
could be accused of failing on its own terms by undermining the very goal it 
sought to promote.  The petitions made no effort to articulate a general 
rationale for protecting religious liberty in the new republic.  There is no 
reason to suppose that, if they had, they would have offered a justification that 
focused purely on the idea of Christian liberty to the exclusion of other 
rationales. 
On the contrary, the petitioners took pains to argue not only that the 
Assessment Bill contravened “the spirit of the Gospel,” but also that it 
infringed the natural freedom and equality of non-Christians by granting 
Christians exclusive benefits in violation of “the Bill of Rights.”
522
  In this way 
the petitioners signaled that they accepted the doctrine of natural rights and 
recognized that those rights belonged to everyone regardless of religion. 
Although the natural rights argument did not hold center stage in these 
petitions, it nevertheless was integral to the position they took.  That position 
was based on a sharp distinction between church and state.  The petitions’ first 
argument was that the Assessment Bill violated the doctrines of the Christian 
church as set forth in the Gospel, while the second argument was that the Bill 
violated the principles of the Commonwealth of Virginia as set forth in the 
Declaration of Rights.  The first argument expressed the Baptists’ own 
religious beliefs, while the second appealed to precepts that had been declared 
by the representatives of all the people of Virginia.  In this way, the two 
arguments were perfectly complementary, and from a Baptist perspective each 
would have been lacking without the other. 
It is hardly surprising that the petitioners did not undertake to develop a 
general defense of religious liberty, for they were well aware that a powerful 
one already existed in the form of Jefferson’s Bill.  The Baptists had endorsed 
that bill when it was first published in 1779, and they were among its principal 
supporters.
523
  Some of its key language was incorporated into the Baptist 
petitions of 1785, including the assertion that religious matters “are not the 
object of Civil Government, nor under it’s jurisdiction.”
524
  The Baptists 
 
 522 Id. at 307–08. 
 523 See BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 55; BUCKLEY, ESTABLISHING, supra note 288, at 71–72. 
 524 See Westmoreland Petition, supra note 465, at 308. 
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Some scholars contend that the Baptists supported Jefferson’s statute not 
for what it said but for what it did: the law “served their purposes” by 
disestablishing Anglicanism, protecting religious liberty, and enabling them to 
promote “the salvation of a Christian America through the Gospel message.”
526
  
But some prominent Baptists advocated for religious liberty in ways that 
strongly echoed Locke and Jefferson.  For example, Elder John Leland 
presented such a justification in a sermon entitled The Rights of Conscience 
Inalienable.527  Leland’s views are of particular interest because he not only 
played an important role in Baptist political activity at this time, but also was 
instrumental in securing Madison’s commitment to promote a federal 
constitutional amendment to protect religious liberty.
528
 
According to Leland, the American states have recognized that civil 
government should be based on “compact.”
529
  Individuals enter civil society 
to protect themselves and their property from violence.
530
  The “rights of 
conscience” are “inalienable,” for “religion is a matter between God and 
individuals,” and one’s “mind should always be open to conviction” and willing 
to “receive that doctrine which appears the best demonstrated.”
531
  Truth 
 
 525 See Isaac, supra note 459, at 158–59.  An early official history of the Virginia Baptists lauded not 
only Jefferson’s Bill but also Madison’s Memorial, observing that “[f]or elegance of style, strength of 
reasoning, and purity of principle, [the latter] has . . . never [been] surpassed by any thing in the 
English language.”  ROBERT B. SEMPLE, THE HISTORY OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE 
BAPTISTS IN VIRGINIA 33, 72 (John O’Lynch 1810), [https://perma.cc/6XBF-VTST].  Passages like 
this suggest that contemporaries saw less difference between the Evangelical and Enlightenment 
positions on religious liberty than modern scholars do.  Cf. BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 
148 (asserting that there was a “wide gap” between those two positions but acknowledging that this 
gap may have been “unrecognized at the time”). 
 526 BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 180–81.  Buckley offers this assertion not only about the 
Baptists but also about the Evangelicals in general.  This view fails to capture the position of the 
Presbyterians, who highlighted ideas of natural religion and natural rights in their memorial against 
the Assessment Bill.  See supra text accompanying notes 458–64. 
 527 JOHN LELAND, THE RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE INALIENABLE (1791), reprinted in 2 POLITICAL 
SERMONS, supra note 105, at 1079, 1080 [hereinafter LELAND, CONSCIENCE]. 
 528 See RAGOSTA, supra note 6, at 167–68. 
 529 LELAND, CONSCIENCE, supra note 527, at 1083. 
 530 Id. at 1084. 
 531 Id. at 1084–85.  In a similar vein, a Baptist petition against the Assessment Bill observed that 
“Christianity addresses itself to the understanding and affections of Men, and [seeks] to attach them 
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comes from studying “nature and reason” as well as “the bible,” and is best 
pursued through free and open discussion.
532
  It follows that everyone should 
be allowed to “maintain the principles that he believes [and to] worship 
according to his own faith, either one God, three Gods, no God, or twenty 
Gods.”
533
  Human lawmakers may not compel anyone to pay taxes for religious 
purposes, and compulsion of this sort would be unjust to Deists, Jews, 
Catholics, Muslims, and others who reject Christianity.
534
 
Leland’s views present a paradox.  For six decades, he travelled the 
countryside preaching a traditional Calvinist message “that human powers 
were too degenerate to effect a change of heart by self-exertion” and that 
individuals could be saved only through faith in the atoning power of Christ’s 
death on the cross.
535
  Yet when Leland sought to persuade the public to 
protect religious liberty, he emphasized reason and natural rights.  How can 
these two positions be reconciled? 
In part, the answer seems to be that Baptists like Leland did not see as 
much tension between the two positions as we might today.  God was both the 
creator and the redeemer of the world.  While Leland might believe that 
 
to its Interests only by Arguments adapted to convince them of its native excellence, and its 
importance to their happiness.  If these considerations fail it has no others to propose.” 
Remonstrance and Petition of Committee of General Baptist Association at 2 (Aug. 13, 1785, 
received by General Assembly Nov. 3, 1785), http://www.virginiamemory.com/collections/petitions 
[https://perma.cc/QE4S-UF9L] [hereinafter General Baptist Petition]. 
 532 LELAND, CONSCIENCE, supra note 527, at 1089–90. 
 533 Id. at 1089.  This statement recalls Jefferson’s famous assertion that religion is beyond the state’s 
authority because “it does me no injury for my neighbour to say there are twenty gods, or no god.  It 
neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.”  JEFFERSON, supra note 473, QUERY XVII, at 285. 
 534 LELAND, CONSCIENCE, supra note 527, at 1092–93.  In other writings, Leland articulated these 
themes in equally powerful terms.  See, e.g., JOHN LELAND, The Virginia Chronicle, in THE 
WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND 91, 105-09, 117-19, 121-23 (L.F. Greene ed., New 
York, G.W. Wood 1845), https://ia802605.us.archive.org/11/items/writingsoflateel00lela/writingsofl
ateel00lela.pdf [https://perma.cc/RD6N-U6YJ] [hereinafter LELAND’S WRITINGS]; JOHN LELAND, 
The Yankee Spy (1794), in LELAND’S WRITINGS, supra, at 213, 219–29; JOHN LELAND, Short 
Sayings, in LELAND’S WRITINGS, supra, at 572, 573, 578–81.  Leland was not alone in taking such 
an approach.  For instance, the first election sermon delivered by a Baptist clergyman to the 
Massachusetts legislature also defended civil and religious liberty in Lockean terms.  See SAMUEL 
STILLMAN, A SERMON PREACHED BEFORE THE HONORABLE COUNCIL . . . at 7–9, 11–14, 22 
(Boston, T. & J. Fleet 1779) [https://perma.cc/D9ZT-N4YP]. 
 535 JOHN LELAND, Events in the Life of John Leland, in LELAND’S WRITINGS, supra note 534, at 2, 28, 
39. 
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salvation came only through faith, that did not negate the idea that God was 
also the author of the natural order and of the rights that human beings had 
within it.  One could believe in “nature’s God” as well as in the God of the 
Bible; there was no necessary conflict between understanding life in this world 
in terms of natural rights and believing that revelation offers the only path to 
attaining life in the world to come.
536
  To put it another way, however God may 
have determined to bring about salvation, individuals have an inalienable right 
to liberty of conscience in relation to other human beings.
537
 
Leland’s writings also suggest another (not incompatible) way to resolve 
the paradox.  He is well aware that different forms of discourse are called for 
in different spheres of life.  For example, although it was reasonable for the 
statesmen who drafted the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights to declare 
“that all men came into the world free and independent,” it is equally 
reasonable for parents to regard young children as dependent and in need of 
control.
538
  By the same token, it may be appropriate to describe religious 
liberty as one of the inherent rights of humans as rational creatures when 
advocating for its protection in the constitution of a liberal polity, while 
asserting that all humans are naturally sinful when speaking from an 
Evangelical theological perspective.
539
  These different forms of discourse are 
suited to the contexts in which they are used and to the audiences to whom 
they are addressed.  On this view, there is no necessary contradiction between 
preaching Baptist doctrines regarding salvation, as Leland did throughout his 
ministry, and defending liberty of conscience as a natural right, as he did in 




 536 JOHN LELAND, A Blow at the Root (1801), in LELAND’S WRITINGS, supra note 534, at 233, 255; see 
also JOHN LELAND, Circular Letter of the Shaftsbury Association (1793), in LELAND’S WRITINGS, 
supra note 534, at 196, 196–99 (presenting reasons for holding that the Bible is the word of God); 
JOHN LELAND, An Elective Judiciary (1805), in LELAND’S WRITINGS, supra note 534, at 283, 294 
(stating that the Christian religion involves mysteries that are “not of this world” and that cannot be 
understood through natural reason). 
 537 See, e.g., LELAND, A Blow at the Root, supra note 536, at 239 (discussing the inalienable right to 
freedom of conscience). 
 538 Id. at 235–36 (paraphrasing MASS. CONST. of 1780, supra note 403, pt. 1, art. I). 
 539 See id. at 237, 239. 
 540 See supra text accompanying notes 529–34; JOHN LELAND, Speech Delivered in the House of 
Representatives of Massachusetts, on the Subject of Religious Freedom (1811), in LELAND’S 
WRITINGS, supra note 534, at 353. 
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This distinction between different forms of discourse may also shed some 
light on the views of the Rev. Isaac Backus, the Massachusetts pastor and 
scholar who was perhaps the most influential Baptist leader in late eighteenth-
century America.
541
  Although his writings on religious liberty endorsed 
Locke’s position on the separation of church and state, they generally relied 
not on natural rights theory but on Scripture and Baptist theology.
542
  Yet in 
1779 when a friend asked him to draft a bill of rights in advance of the 
Massachusetts constitutional convention, the document he produced 
emphasized the “natural, inherent, and unalienable rights of mankind.”
543
  The 
article on religion read as follows: 
As God is the only worthy object of all religious worship, and nothing can be 
true religion but a voluntary obedience unto his revealed will, of which each 
rational soul has an equal right to judge for itself, every person has an 
unalienable right to act in all religious affairs according to the full persuasion 
of his own mind, where others are not injured thereby.
544
 
The language of rational religion in this passage is unmistakable.  To be 
sure, the reference to God’s “revealed will” might suggest that “true religion” 
is based on revelation.
545
  During this era, however, it often was said that God 
revealed his will through nature and reason as well as through Scripture.
546
  In 
any event, the passage makes clear that “each rational soul” has a right to use 
“his own mind” to determine religious truth.
547
  Thus, while some of Backus’s 
writings argue for religious freedom as a matter of “Christian liberty” under 
 
 541 On Backus, see MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 416; MILLER, supra note 10, at 101–13, 387. 
 542 See ISAAC BACKUS, A SEASONABLE PLEA FOR LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE 4-5 (Boston, Philip 
Freeman 1770), http://name.umdl.umich.edu/N09053.0001.001 [https://perma.cc/RLF9-8RYH]; 
ISAAC BACKUS, AN APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1773), in BACKUS 
PAMPHLETS, supra note 413, at 303; id. at 40–44 (editor’s introduction). 
 543 Isaac Backus’ Draft for a Bill of Rights for the Massachusetts Constitution, art. I (1779), in BACKUS 
PAMPHLETS, supra note 413, at 487 [hereinafter Backus, Draft]. 
 544 Id. art. II, at 487. 
 545 Id.; see MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 416, at 144. 
 546 See, e.g., Gerrish, supra note 15, at 646–47 (distinguishing between “general revelation” through 
nature and “special revelation” through Scripture).  For example, Locke maintained that “Reason is 
natural Revelation, whereby [GOD] communicates to Mankind that portion of Truth, which he has 
laid within the reach of their natural Faculties,” while “Revelation is natural Reason enlarged by a 
new set of Discoveries communicated by GOD immediately.”  LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, 
supra note 19, bk. IV, ch. XIX, § 4, at 698. 
 547 Backus, Draft, supra note 543, art. II, at 487. 





 his draft bill of rights portrays it as “an unalienable right” of all 
human beings that has no inherent connection with Christianity.
549
  To put the 
point somewhat differently, Backus’s draft resembles both the Virginia 
Declaration and Jefferson’s Bill in using some language that resonates with 
Christianity,
550
 but in ultimately affirming that rational creatures have a natural 





The revisionist scholarship of recent decades has greatly enriched our 
understanding of the theological ideas and political forces that contributed to 
the victory of religious liberty and disestablishment in Virginia.  As I have 
explained in this Part, however, it would be a mistake to conceive of the 
normative constitutional meaning of that victory in terms of the Evangelicals’ 
distinctive theological position.  Instead, that meaning is best understood in 
terms of the principles that provided the basis of their coalition with rationalist 
Christians and Enlightenment liberals and that were articulated in Jefferson’s 
Bill—that because God created the mind free, individuals have an inalienable 
natural right to form and advocate their own opinions regarding religious truth 
and that the state has no legitimate power in this realm.
552
 
The revisionist position also takes another form.  In an important book 
entitled The Religious Roots of the First Amendment, Nicholas P. Miller 
argues that the founding-era conception of religious freedom derived from a 
 
 548 ISAAC BACKUS, A DOOR OPENED FOR CHRISTIAN LIBERTY (1783), in BACKUS PAMPHLETS, supra 
note 413, at 427, 436. 
 549 Backus, Draft, supra note 543, art. II, at 487. 
 550 In addition to the references to God’s “revealed will” and the “soul,” this language includes “the full 
persuasion of his own mind.”  This phrase, which also appears in the English version of Locke’s 
Letter Concerning Toleration, ultimately derives from St. Paul’s Letter to the Romans.  See LOCKE, 
TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 13 (“All the Life and Power of true Religion consists in the inward 
and full perswasion of the mind . . . .”); Romans 14:5 (“Let every man be fully persuaded in his own 
mind.”).  All biblical quotations herein are to the King James Version, which was in general use at 
the time. 
 551 See supra text accompanying notes 378–83 (Virginia Declaration), 468–82 (Jefferson’s Bill).  In 1789, 
Backus praised Virginia for adopting Jefferson’s statute.  See BUCKLEY, ESTABLISHING, supra note 
288, at 40–43. 
552
  See Virginia Act, supra note 14. 
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particular strand of Protestant thought.
553
  At the heart of the Reformation was 
the idea of sola scriptura—the assertion that religious truth was to be found not 
in traditional church teachings but in Holy Scripture alone.
554
  The question 
then became how—and by whom—Scripture was to be interpreted.  The 
jurisdictions that broke from Rome generally established churches that 
asserted their own authority to interpret the Bible and to impose religious 
doctrines with the backing of the state.
555
  Dissenting from this position, other 
Protestant sects such as Baptists and Quakers insisted that every believer 
possessed a “right of private judgment,” that is, a right to interpret Scripture 
for himself with the assistance of the Holy Spirit.
556
 
Miller contends that this notion of a right of private judgment was the 
starting point for the modern conception of religious liberty.  Initially, that right 
related only to biblical interpretation.
557
  Over time, however, dissenting 
Protestants came to conceive of the right as extending to religious truth in 
general.
558
  In the late seventeenth century, the principle of private judgment 
was given philosophical form by Locke.
559
  Eighteenth-century Americans then 
drew on Lockean as well as dissenting Protestant thought when they asserted 
that individuals had an inherent right to religious liberty that was entitled to 
legal and constitutional protection.
560
 
Miller persuasively shows that this Protestant view made an essential 
contribution to the American conception of religious liberty.  At times, he 
 
 553 MILLER, supra note 10. 
 554 See id. at 17, 93. 
 555 See, e.g., id. at 23, 27, 29. 
 556 See id. at 1–3, 23, 31, 37–38. 
 557 See id. at 1–2. 
 558 See id. at 76–78. 
 559 See id. at 78–79, 88–89.  As we have seen, a principal goal of Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration 
was to show that in religious matters “[e]very man . . . has the supreme and absolute Authority of 
judging for himself.”  LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 46.  It should be noted, however, that 
when Locke uses the actual term “private judgment,” it is generally in a pejorative sense.  See, e.g., 
id. at 48 (asserting that “the private Judgment of any Person concerning a Law enacted in Political 
Matters, for the publick Good, does not take away the Obligation of that Law, nor deserve a 
Dispensation”); id. at 48–49 (“[T]he private Judgment of any particular Person, if erroneous, does 
not exempt him from the obligation of Law . . . .”); LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 30, bk. II, §§ 
87–88, at 324-25 (explaining that a basic goal of the social contract is to ensure that disputes are settled 
by the judgment of the community rather than the “private judgement” of individuals). 
 560 See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 10, at 53–54, 85–88, 145–46. 
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describes dissenting Protestantism as a movement that “worked alongside” 
and “converged” with “other ideologies” such as Enlightenment liberalism.
561
  
Yet Miller often seems to make a more far-reaching claim: that the founding-
era conception should be understood primarily in terms of dissenting 
Protestant thought.
562
  On this view, Locke’s writings on toleration merely gave 
“philosophical and political expression [to] what were perceived to be 
Protestant theological principles,” but did not add anything essential to them.
563
  
“It was Locke’s formulation . . . of dissenting Protestantism,” Miller concludes, 
“mediated by Madison, Witherspoon, and other key American thinkers, . . . 
that carried the day in the founding of the American republic.”
564
 
In my view, this broader form of Miller’s position is unconvincing for two 
reasons.  First, we should not focus on dissenting Protestantism at the expense 
of other influences.  Although the right of private judgment was a distinctively 
Protestant idea in origin, the same cannot be said of reason and nature—ideas 
that were no less central to the eighteenth-century American understanding of 
religious liberty.  Among the sources of those ideas were modern natural 
science
565
 and the tradition of natural law and natural right theory which 
stretched back through early modern and medieval Scholasticism to classical 




 561 Id. at 1, 4, 7. 
 562 See, e.g., id. at 3 (asserting that the right of private judgment “grew from theological rather than secular 
Enlightenment roots”); id. at 4 (“Disestablishment in America was a populist movement where 
religious, and not Enlightenment, influences predominated.”); id. at 13 (maintaining that dissenting 
Protestants “played [a] greater role [than Madison] in bringing the principle of religious liberty and 
disestablishment to the early American republic”). 
 563 Id. at 77–82, 90; see also id. at 80–82, 89 (suggesting that Locke can best be understood as a dissenting 
Protestant theorist). 
 564 Id. at 162; see also id. at 145 (referring to “the core theological and biblical issues that lay at the heart 
of Madison’s belief in the right of personal liberty”).  For another sophisticated version of this 
argument, see SMITH, supra note 9, at 39–40 (arguing that “insofar as it fed into American religious 
freedom,” the Enlightenment is best understood as “a conduit” for Christian ideas). 
 565 See supra Part II.E. 
 566 See, e.g., HAAKONSSEN, supra note 192, ch. 1; SCHNEEWIND, supra note 228, at 17; LEO STRAUSS, 
NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953). Miller shows that even before Locke, dissenting Protestant 
writers made appeals to reason and nature.  See MILLER, supra note 10, at 69, 77–78, 81–82.  But 
he does not explore the origin of those ideas or recognize the ways in which they are in tension with 
core principles of Protestantism like sola scriptura and the corruption of human nature by the Fall, 
see supra text accompanying notes 295–97, 554. 
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Second, we should recognize that, over the course of time, the idea of a 
right of private judgment evolved in ways that carried it far beyond its 
Reformation roots.  As Miller observes, it developed from a right to interpret 
Scripture for oneself into a right to seek religious truth in general.
567
  The 
progression did not stop there, however.  By the eighteenth century, the right 
to private judgment was being described in even broader terms.  As Hutcheson 
put it, it consisted in the “natural right” of “every intelligent being” to form all 
of “his own opinions, speculative or practical, . . . according to the evidence 




In short, between the Protestant Reformation and the American founding, 
the idea of private judgment underwent a fundamental transformation, by 
which it came to encompass not only a right of religious believers to interpret 
the sacred texts of their own tradition with the assistance of divine illumination, 
but also a right of all human beings to use their reason to search for religious, 
philosophical, moral, and other forms of truth.
569
  It was this reformulation of 
the idea in the universal language of natural religion and natural rights that 
enabled it to be integrated into the intellectual worldview of the eighteenth 
century, to be used as the basis of a broad political coalition for the protection 
of religious liberty, and to be incorporated into American legal and 
constitutional documents that declared the natural rights of mankind. 
 
 567 See MILLER, supra note 10, at 76–78. 
 568 1 HUTCHESON, SYSTEM, supra note 194, bk. II, ch. 5, § 3, at 295.  For an earlier statement to this 
effect, see FRANCIS HUTCHESON, AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINAL OF OUR IDEAS OF BEAUTY 
AND VIRTUE bk. II, § VII, at 186 (Wolfgang Leidhold ed., rev. ed.,  Liberty Fund 2008) (2d ed. 
1726), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/hutcheson-an-inquiry-into-the-original-of-our-ideas-of-beauty-
and-virtue-1726-2004 [https://perma.cc/H564-34DY]. 
 569 Like Hutcheson, Witherspoon taught that individuals have an inalienable “right of private judgment 
in matters of opinion,” thought, and knowledge, as well as “in all matters of religion.”  
WITHERSPOON, supra note 246, at 56, 69.  In his American edition of Blackstone, the Jeffersonian 
jurist and Deist St. George Tucker articulated this more comprehensive view when he wrote that 
individuals have an inalienable “right of personal opinion” that embraces both (1) “liberty of 
conscience in all matters relative to religion” and (2) “liberty of speech and of discussion in all 
speculative matters, whether religious, philosophical, or political.”  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND app. Note G, at 3–4, 6–7, 11 (St. George Tucker ed., 
Philadelphia, Young & Small 1803), https://lonang.com/library/reference/tucker-blackstone-notes-
reference/tuck-2g/ [https://perma.cc/5W6B-HWSA]. 
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V. THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF 
RIGHTS 
A. The Debate over the Constitution 
1. The Demand for a Bill of Rights 
When the Federal Convention met during the summer of 1787 to draft a 
new constitution, the delegates focused on strengthening the powers of the 
national government and on reaching compromises between competing state 
and regional interests.  Securing constitutional protection for individual rights 
was at most a peripheral concern.  Toward the convention’s end, George 
Mason of Virginia and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts moved that a 




This decision was “a critical error that almost proved fatal,” for the lack of 
a bill of rights turned out to be the most effective line of attack against the 
Constitution when it was submitted to the people for ratification.
571
  In state 
after state, Antifederalists excoriated the document for failing to secure “the 
great, important rights of humanity” which were “essential to liberty and 
happiness.”
572
  Together with trial by jury and freedom of speech and press, 
these rights included “LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE.”
573
  As one writer put it, 
invoking the natural rights/natural religion language of the Pennsylvania 
Declaration of Rights, “all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship 
 
 570 See JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN 
THE CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 538 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1827), 
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/madison-the-debates-on-the-adoption-of-the-federal-constitution-vol-
5 [https://perma.cc/PV6D-QH96] [hereinafter MADISON, DEBATES]. 
 571 CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL 
CONGRESS ix (Helen E. Veit, Kenneth R. Bowling & Charlene Bangs Bickford eds., 1991). 
 572 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION 
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 317, 593 (2d ed. 1827) (remarks of Patrick Henry in Virginia 
Convention).  Permanent citations for Elliot’s debates may be found at the following locations: 
volume 2, https://perma.cc/4FKE-NPSD; volume 3, https://perma.cc/FFY9-TBMA; volume 4, 
https://perma.cc/2DZL-F3LY. 
 573 Id.; AN OLD WHIG NO. 5, in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST § 3.3.25–26, at 34–35 (Herbert 
J. Storing & Murray Dry eds., 1981). 
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In response, the Constitution’s Federalist supporters insisted that a bill of 
rights was unnecessary (since federal officials would have “no particle of . . . 
jurisdiction” over subjects like religion and press) and might even be 
“dangerous” (because it was impossible to enumerate all the rights of 
individuals, and the failure to mention a particular right would imply that it 
was not meant to be protected).
575
  But abstract legal arguments of this sort did 
little to stem the tide of popular support for a bill of rights.  As Patrick Henry 
observed in the Virginia convention, “[i]f you had a thousand acres of land” at 
stake in a transaction, you would insist that your rights be spelled out in no 
uncertain terms; and this was all the more true when your “most valuable rights 
and privileges” were involved.
576
 
To overcome such opposition, Madison and some Federalist colleagues 
expressed a willingness to adopt further protections for rights after the 
Constitution was ratified.
577
  A number of state conventions put forward such 
amendments.
578
  The most fully developed proposal on religious liberty came 
from Virginia: 
That religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of 
discharging it can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or 
violence, and therefore all men have an equal, natural and unalienable right 
to the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience, and that 
no particular religious sect or society ought to be favored or established by 
Law in preference to others.
579
 
Four features of this proposal are striking.  First, its assertion that religion 
“can be directed only by reason and conviction” adopts the natural religion 
language of article 16 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights.
580
  Second, the 
proposal amplifies that article’s natural rights language by asserting that “all 
 
 574 CENTINEL NO. 2, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 573, § 2.7.55, at 152. 
 575 THE FEDERALIST NOS. 69, 84, at 422, 513–14 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).   
 576 3 ELLIOT, supra note 572, at 318. 
 577 See Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990 SUP. CT. 
REV. 301, 301 n.2, 324–25, 327–28. 
 578 These proposals are collected in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 571, at 14–28. 
 579 Id. at 19. 
 580 See supra text accompanying notes 378–83. 
94 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 23:1 
 
 
men have an equal, natural, and unalienable right to the free exercise of 
religion, according to the dictates of conscience.”  Third, the proposal omits 
article 16’s admonition that all people should practice Christian charity toward 
one another.  Finally, in accord with the events of the mid-1780s, the proposal 
firmly connects religious liberty with the nonestablishment of religion.
581
 
Virginia’s proposal was later endorsed by North Carolina and Rhode 
Island, both of which refused to ratify the Constitution without amendments.
582
  
Two other states called for a bill of rights to be added after ratification.  New 
York submitted an amendment declaring “[t]hat the People have an equal, 
natural and unalienable right, freely and peaceably to Exercise their Religion 
according to the dictates of Conscience, and that no Religious Sect or Society 
ought to be favoured or established by Law in preference to others.”
583
  New 
Hampshire would simply have stated that “Congress shall make no Laws 
touching Religion, or to infringe the rights of Conscience.”
584
  Additional 
proposals on religious liberty came from the delegates who dissented from 
ratification in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Maryland.
585
  Notably, all the 
proposals that emerged from the state conventions articulated the principle of 
religious liberty in general terms, and none made any reference to Christianity.  
Likewise, while some of the ratifications thanked God for the opportunity to 




2. The Ban on Religious Tests 
Further insight into the conception of religious liberty that informed the 
Constitution may be found in the debates over the clause in Article VI which 
obligated all federal and state officials to make an “Oath or Affirmation” to 
 
 581 See supra Part IV.A. 
 582 See 4 ELLIOT, supra note 572, at 242, 244; THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS § 1.1.2.7, at 12–13 
(Neil H. Cogan ed., 2d. ed. 2015); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 
6–7 (2005). 
 583 CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 571, at 22. 
 584 Id. at 17. 
 585 See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 582, at 11–12. 
 586 See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 572, at 176 (ratification by Massachusetts convention “acknowledging, 
with grateful hearts, the goodness of the Supreme Ruler of the universe”).   
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support the Constitution, but which added that “no religious Test shall ever 
be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United 
States.”
587
  The ban on religious tests was adopted unanimously by the 
Philadelphia Convention despite Roger Sherman’s suggestion that the 
provision was unnecessary in light of “the prevailing liberality” of public 
sentiment on such matters.
588
  In the state ratifying conventions, some 
Antifederalists objected that the provision would allow Jews, Catholics, 
Muslims, Pagans, Deists, and even atheists to hold federal office.
589
  These 
delegates asserted that “the Christian religion is best calculated, of all religions, 
to make good members of society, on account of its morality.”
590
  Some 
delegates went so far as to say that “a person could not be a good man without 
being a good Christian,” and that “[a]ll those who have any religion are against 
the emigration of [non-Christians] from the eastern hemisphere.”
591
 
The Federalists responded that the Constitution aimed to reject this 
“intolerant spirit,” which had led to “persecutions and wars of the most 
implacable and bloody nature . . . in every part of the world.” 592   As the 
Federalist leader and future Supreme Court Justice James Iredell told the 
North Carolina convention, America had repudiated the view that “all 
wisdom” centered in the rulers, and instead had embraced the more “modest[] 
and reasonabl[e]” view “that a man may be of different religious sentiments 
from our own, without being a bad member of society.”
593
  The ban on 
religious tests was “calculated to secure universal religious liberty” by making 
all individuals eligible for office without regard to their beliefs.
594
  Iredell also 
discussed Omichund v. Barker,595 the English decision which disavowed the 
 
 587 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
 588 MADISON, DEBATES, supra note 570, at 498. 
 589 See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 572, at 118, 148 (remarks of Dr. Jarvis and Major Lusk in 
Massachusetts convention); 4 id. at 191-92, 199, 215 (remarks of Messrs. Henry Abbott, Caldwell, 
and Lancaster in North Carolina convention). 
 590 4 id. at 199 (remarks of Mr. Caldwell). 
 591 2 id. at 119 (remarks of Col. Jones in Massachusetts convention); 4 id. at 199 (remarks of Mr. 
Caldwell in North Carolina convention). 
 592 4 id. at 192–93 (remarks of Mr. Iredell in North Carolina convention). 
 593 Id. 
 594 Id. at 196. 
 595 Of the Sufficiency and Disability of a Witness (Omichund v. Barker) (1744) 22 Eng. Rep. 337; 2 
Equity Cases Abridged 395. 
96 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 23:1 
 
 
notion that only Christian oaths could be relied upon.
596
  As we have seen, this 
decision rested on the view that the practice of oath-taking is not limited to 
Christianity but “follows from the Principles of Natural Religion.”
597
 
The idea of natural religion also appeared in other Federalist defenses of 
the religious test ban.  In the Massachusetts convention, the Rev. Daniel Shute 
observed that he did not limit his “charity and confidence” to his fellow 
Congregationalists, but instead believed “that there are worthy characters 
among men of every denomination—among the Quakers, the Baptists, the 
Church of England, the Papists; and even among those who have no other 
guide, in the way to virtue and heaven, than the dictates of natural religion.”
598
  
To disqualify people from public office on account of their religious views 
would infringe their “civil rights” without conferring any benefit on the 
public.
599
  The state’s future Chief Justice, Theophilus Parsons, added that it 
was impossible to formulate a religious test in a manner that was neither 
unacceptably narrow (since no one today “is so illiberal as to wish [to confine 
office-holding] to any one sect of Christians”) nor so broad as to be 
meaningless, since the term “Christianity” could be used to describe anything 
from strict Calvinism to “natural religion.”
600
  In the end, “the only evidence 
we can have of the sincerity of a man’s religion is a good life,” and that is what 
voters should focus on.
601
 
In these ways, the ideas of reason and natural religion played a significant 
part in the Federalist defense of the religious test ban.  Christian arguments 
were made as well.  Iredell asserted that “[t]he divine Author of our religion 
[that is, Christ] never wished for its support by worldly authority.”
602
  Shute 
observed that “[t]he apostle Peter tells us that God is no respecter of persons, 
but, in every nation, he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, is 
acceptable to him.”
603
  Isaac Backus went furthest in this direction when he told 
 
 596 See 4 ELLIOT, supra note 572, at 197–98. 
 597 Omichund, 22 Eng. Rep. at 347; 2 Equity Cases Abridged at 408 (opinion of Hardwicke, C.); supra 
text accompanying notes 181–86 (discussing this case). 
 598 2 ELLIOT, supra note 572, at 119 (remarks of Rev. Shute). 
 599 Id. at 118. 
 600 Id. at 90 (remarks of Mr. Parsons). 
 601 Id. 
 602 4 id. at 194 (remarks of Mr. Iredell in North Carolina convention). 
 603 2 id. at 119 (remarks of Rev. Shute in Massachusetts convention, quoting Acts 10:35). 
January 2021] ORIGINS OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 97 
 
 
the Massachusetts convention that “no man or men can impose any religious 
test, without invading the essential prerogatives of our Lord Jesus Christ.”
604
  
Yet even Backus rested his position on broader grounds when he appealed to 
“reason” as well as “the Holy Scriptures” for the principle that “religion is ever 
a matter between God and individuals” into which the state may not intrude.
605
  
In short, while the Federalists offered some Christian rationales for the ban, 
their defense of “universal religious liberty” ultimately was founded on their 
view of what reason required.
606
 
B. The Free Exercise Clause and the Bill of Rights 
In early 1789, Madison was elected to the First Congress with key support 
from John Leland and other Virginia Baptist leaders, after assuring them that 
he believed the Constitution should be amended to protect “all essential 
rights,” including freedom of the press and “the rights of Conscience in the 
fullest latitude.”
607
  Madison strove to make good on this commitment by 
persuading Congress to approve a bill of rights.  The effort was a lonely one, 
for most Federalists were at best indifferent to the project, while Antifederalists 
were more interested in fundamentally restructuring the constitutional scheme 
in order to diminish federal power.
608
  That a bill of rights was adopted was 
largely due to Madison’s perseverance in the face of these obstacles.
609
 
On June 8, 1789, Madison presented his proposal to the House of 
Representatives.  His long speech on this occasion offers the greatest insight 
into the document’s meaning and goals.
610
  As he explained, the American 
 
 604 Id. at 148 (remarks of Rev. Backus in Massachusetts convention). 
 605 Id. 
 606 4 id. at 196 (remarks of Mr. Iredell in North Carolina convention). 
 607 Letter from James Madison to George Eve (Jan. 2 1789), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-11-02-0297 [https://perma.cc/AN3R-EYTU]; 
see RAGOSTA, supra note 6, at 169–70. 
 608 See, e.g., Kenneth R. Bowling, “A Tub to the Whale”: The Founding Fathers and Adoption of the 
Federal Bill of Rights, 8 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 223 (1988). 
 609 See Finkelman, supra note 577, at 336–44. 
 610 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 424 (June 8, 1789) (Gales & Seaton eds., 1834) (statement of Rep. 
Madison), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, Bill of Rights, document 
11 at 20, 24–29, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/bill_of_rightss11.html 
[https://perma.cc/XF22-BW2L] [hereinafter Madison, Bill of Rights Speech]. 
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people had come to believe that constitutional barriers should be erected to 
protect “the great rights of mankind” against abuse of power.
611
  In a 
democratic society, the most serious danger came not from the executive or 
even from the legislative branch but from “the body of the people, operating 
by the majority against the minority.”
612
  The state declarations protected 
several categories of rights, including (1) the “natural right[s]” which the people 
retain when they establish a government and (2) certain “positive rights” such 
as trial by jury, which do not exist in a state of nature but which are made part 
of “[the] social compact” because they are “as essential to secure the liberty of 
the people as any one of the pre-existent rights of nature.”
613
 
As Madison’s notes for the speech indicate, he regarded liberty of 
conscience as an inalienable natural right.
614
  To protect this freedom, he 
proposed to amend the Constitution to provide that “[t]he civil rights of none 
shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any 
national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of 
conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.”
615
  Together with 
his other amendments, this proposal was considered first by a House select 
committee and then by each chamber.
616
  As finally adopted, it read, “Congress 




Unfortunately, the congressional debates shed little light on the concrete 
legal meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.  Several broader points do emerge, 
however.  First, religious liberty was regarded as an inalienable natural right.  
This view was reflected not only in Madison’s speech and notes but also in the 
draft bill of rights prepared by another select committee member, Roger 
Sherman of Connecticut, who placed “the rights of conscience in matters of 
 
 611 Id. at 24–25. 
 612 Id. at 26–27. 
 613 Id. at 26. 
 614 See James Madison, Notes for Speech in Congress (June 8, 1789), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-12-02-0125 [https://perma.cc/KMB9-5N3H] 
[hereinafter Madison, Bill of Rights Notes]. 
 615 Madison, Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 610, at 25. 
 616 For a comprehensive legislative history and record of the debates, see CREATING THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS, supra note 571. 
 617 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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religion” first among the “natural rights which are retained by [the people] 
when they enter into society.”
618
 
Their colleagues undoubtedly agreed with this position, which had 
become widely accepted in American thought.  As we have seen, the idea of 
natural rights was associated with the idea of natural religion.  In the words of 
the Declaration of Independence, natural rights were the rights bestowed on 
individuals by “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God.”
619
  Thus, the fact that 
the framers of the Free Exercise Clause saw religious liberty as a natural and 
inalienable right supports the view that the provision was informed by the 
concept of natural religion. 
Further support for this view can be found in the fact that the framers saw 
an important connection between freedom of conscience and freedom of 
expression.  These two liberties were treated as inalienable rights both in 
Madison’s notes and in Sherman’s draft.
620
  Amendments to protect religious 
liberty and the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly stood immediately 
next to one another throughout the drafting process, from Madison’s original 
proposal through the final version of the Bill of Rights, which consolidated all 
these rights into the First Amendment.
621
  The notion that liberty of conscience 
and freedom of thought and expression belong together also can be found in 
 
 618 See Roger Sherman’s Proposed Committee Report art. 2 (July 21-28, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS, supra note 571, at 266, 267 [hereinafter Sherman Draft]. 
 619 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 372. 
 620 See Madison, Bill of Rights Notes, supra note 614; Sherman Draft, supra note 618, art. 2, at 267. 
 621 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (declaring that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble . . . .”); Madison, Bill of Rights Speech, supra 
note 610, at 25 ( “The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to 
publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall 
be inviolable. The people shall not be restrained from peaceably assembling and consulting for their 
common good . . .  .”); Sherman Draft, supra note 618, at 267; CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 
supra note 571, at 38 (version adopted by House); id. at 48 (version adopted by Senate).  The two 
rights were also joined in Madison’s proposal to bar the states from “violat[ing] the equal rights of 
conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases.”  Madison, Bill of Rights 
Speech, supra note 610, at 25.  Although a revised version of this proposal passed the House, it was 
defeated in the Senate, see CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 571, at 41 & n.19, perhaps 
on the ground that the Constitution should not impose greater limits on state power than it already 
did, cf. id. at 188 (remarks of Rep. Tucker). 
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many of the writers we have discussed.
622
  It is consistent with the idea that both 
of these liberties are encompassed within freedom of mind, or the liberty of 
rational creatures to use their faculties to seek and communicate truth about 
the most important matters.  This view finds classic expression in Jefferson’s 
Bill for religious freedom, which proclaims that because “Almighty God hath 
created the mind free,” all individuals have a right “to profess, and by argument 
to maintain, their opinions in matters of religion.”
623
 
A final point concerns the relationship between religious liberty and 
nonestablishment of religion.  Once again, these two ideas were joined 
together in the text throughout the legislative process.
624
  According to 
Madison, the ban on establishment was meant to respond to concerns that had 
been raised during the ratification debates by providing that “congress should 
not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor 
compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience.”
625
  
Of course, it is clear that, in Madison’s words, a law of this sort would “infringe 
the rights of conscience,” and no one in the House debates disputed this 
view.
626
  But there was no consensus beyond that point.  Some members, like 
Daniel Carroll of Maryland, maintained that “the rights of conscience” were 
so delicate that they could not “bear the gentlest touch of the governmental 
hand,”
627
 while others, including Peter Silvester of New York and Benjamin 
Huntington of Connecticut, feared that if such a ban were interpreted broadly 
it would “have a tendency to abolish religion altogether.”
628
  As Madison’s 
 
 622 See, e.g., LOCKE, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 19, bk. IV, ch. XX, § 4, at 708 
(condemning laws that seek to protect “the Religion of the Country” by denying people “the Liberty 
and Opportunities of a fair Enquiry,” thereby “enslav[ing individuals] in that which should be the 
freest part of Man, their Understandings”); PRICE, OBSERVATIONS, supra note 245, at 124–37 
(defending “liberty of discussion in all speculative matters, and liberty of conscience in all religious 
matters”); 1 CATO’S LETTERS, supra note 351, vol. 2, NO. 62, at 428–29 (asserting that rulers act 
tyrannically when they attempt to regulate individuals’ thoughts and opinions regarding religion and 
other subjects). 
 623 Jefferson Bill, supra note 469. 
 624 Madison, Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 610, at 25 (provision as introduced); CREATING THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 571, at 38 (version adopted by House); id. at 48 (version adopted by 
Senate); U.S. CONST. amend. I (final version). 
 625 CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 571, at 157–58 (remarks of Rep. Madison). 
 626 Id. at 158. 
 627 Id. at 157 (remarks of Rep. Carroll). 
 628 Id. (remarks of Rep. Sylvester); see id. at 158 (remarks of Rep. Huntington). 
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Memorial indicates, he himself believed that government had no legitimate 
authority at all in the religious domain.
629
 
In the end, Congress did not attempt to resolve this issue.  One reason is 
obvious: as Madison repeatedly emphasized, constitutional amendments 
could achieve the supermajority required for adoption only if they were 
drafted in the form of general principles that commanded broad assent.
630
  
Accordingly, while the First Amendment prohibited federal laws respecting an 
establishment of religion, it did not specify what that meant. 
VI. RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS FROM CIVIL LAWS 
A. Background 
In this Article, I have argued that the central view that informed the Free 
Exercise Clause was neither secular liberalism nor Evangelicalism, but natural 
religion and natural rights.  This view has a bearing on many of the doctrinal 
questions that arise under the Clause today.  In this Part, I briefly explore what 
this view can teach us about the original understanding on one of the most 
important issues: whether the Free Exercise Clause gives individuals a 
constitutional right to exemption from civil laws that conflict with their 
religious beliefs. 
The Supreme Court has long grappled with this problem.  Nearly a century 
and a half ago, Reynolds v. United States631 held that the right to free exercise 
did not excuse one from the duty to comply with civil laws.
632
  In 1963, the 
Court reversed course in Sherbert v. Verner633 and ruled that when a general 
law has the incidental effect of substantially burdening a person’s religious 
practice, the law can be applied to that person only if the government is able 
 
 629 See supra text accompanying notes 442–46. 
 630 See CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 571, at 167–68, 176, 200 (remarks of Rep. 
Madison); Steven J. Heyman, Ideological Conflict and the First Amendment, 78 CHI. KENT L. REV. 
531, 544–46 (2003). 
 631 98 U.S. 145 (1879). 
 632 See id. at 164, 166–67 (“Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere 
with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.”). 
 633 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
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to satisfy strict scrutiny.
634
  In Employment Division v. Smith,635 however, the 
Court effectively repudiated this approach and reverted to the Reynolds 
position.
636
  In turn, this led Congress in 1993 to adopt the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA), which took issue with Smith and sought to restore 
the Sherbert standard.637  In City of Boerne v. Flores,638 the Court reaffirmed 
Smith and struck down RFRA as applied to the states.  But the statute 
continues to apply to the federal government itself,
639
 and many states have 
adopted RFRAs of their own.
640
  In recent years, the problem of religious 
exemptions has only become more controversial as individuals and businesses 
have challenged laws that required them to provide contraception to their 




 634 See id. at 406. 
 635 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 636 See id. at 878–80. 
 637 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2015) 
(declaring in § 2(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1), that the Act seeks “to restore the compelling interest 
test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially 
burdened”). 
 638 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 639 See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).  
 640 See State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/PW8K-64LV] (last visited Nov. 30, 2020) (observing that “[s]ince 1993, 21 states 
have enacted state RFRAs”).  
 641 See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (ruling 
that the commission violated the Free Exercise Clause by failing to impartially consider whether an 
exemption should be accorded to a baker who refused on religious grounds to make a wedding cake 
for a same-sex couple); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (holding that a 
federal regulation requiring companies to provide health-insurance coverage for certain methods of 
contraception violated the federal RFRA); Fulton v. City of Phila., 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019) 
(determining that the city had not contravened the First Amendment rights of a religious organization 
that refused to vet same-sex couples to become foster parents because the City had applied its non-
discrimination policy neutrally), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1104 (Feb. 24, 2020) (No. 19-123). 
January 2021] ORIGINS OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 103 
 
 
B. General Views on a Right to Religious Exemption During the Founding 
Era 
Although the majority opinion in Smith was authored by Justice Antonin 
Scalia, a leading originalist, it made no effort to explore the founders’ views.
642
  
In a long and provocative article, Michael W. McConnell sharply criticizes the 
Smith position on originalist grounds.643  Drawing upon what I have called the 
revisionist historical view, McConnell argues that the Free Exercise Clause 
should be understood not in terms of the “Enlightenment” rationalism of 
Locke and Jefferson, but rather in terms of a view that accorded much greater 
protection to religion.
644
  McConnell contends that this broader view was 
championed not only by the Evangelicals but also by Madison.
645
 At the outset 
of his Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison invoked article 16 of the 
Virginia Declaration of Rights to argue that everyone has a right to exercise 
religion in accord with “conviction and conscience.”
646
  “This right,” he 
continued, 
is in its nature an unalienable right.  It is unalienable, because the opinions of 
men, depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own minds 
cannot follow the dictates of other men: It is unalienable also, because what is 
here a right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator.  It is the duty of every 
man to render to the Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be 
acceptable to him.  This duty is precedent, both in order of time and in degree 
of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.  Before any man can be considered 
as a member of Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of the 
Governour of the Universe: And if a member of Civil Society, who enters into 
any subordinate Association, must always do it with a reservation of his duty 
to the General Authority; much more must every man who becomes a 
member of any particular Civil Society, do it with a saving of his allegiance to 
the Universal Sovereign.  We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, 
 
 642 See Emp’t. Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–80 (1990) (relying on 
precedent, rather than original understanding, to support its holding). 
 643 McConnell, supra note 6.  A persuasive critique of McConnell’s historical position may be found in 
Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 916 (1992) [hereinafter Hamburger, Exemption].  For a particularly 
thoughtful and nuanced assessment of the historical evidence, see KATHLEEN A. BRADY, THE 
DISTINCTIVENESS OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN LAW 116–22, 159–65, 214 (2015). 
 644 McConnell, supra note 6, at 1452–55. 
 645 See id. at 1453. 
 646 Madison, Memorial, supra note 440, § 1. 
104 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 23:1 
 
 
no mans right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society and that Religion 
is wholly exempt from its cognizance.
647
 
According to McConnell, this passage “suggests an approach toward 
religious liberty consonant with” an entitlement to religious exemptions.648 “If 
the scope of religious liberty is defined by [an individual’s own understanding 
of his] religious duty,” McConnell reasons, “and if the claims of civil society 
are subordinate to the claims of religious freedom, it would seem to follow 
that the dictates of religious faith must take precedence over the laws of the 
state, even if they are secular and generally applicable.”
649
  Dissenting in City of 
Boerne, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor adopts this reading of Madison and 




A little reflection, however, shows that this could hardly have been what 
Madison meant.  The position that he takes in the Memorial is absolute: “in 
matters of Religion, no mans right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society 
and . . . Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.”651  If, as McConnell 
and O’Connor believe, this position should be understood to refer to religious 
exemptions, the result would be an extraordinarily broad privilege to disobey 
the law on grounds of conscience.  For instance, no one who had a religious 
objection to paying taxes would be obliged to do so.  There is no reason to 
believe that Madison held this view. 
The problem with the McConnell-O’Connor interpretation is that it 
overlooks the political dispute that the Memorial was meant to address, and 
instead applies that document’s reasoning to a very different issue.  The 
Memorial was directed against Henry’s bill to institute a tax for the support of 
the Christian religion.
652
  The petition’s first section argued that when 
 
 647 Id.  
648  McConnell, supra note 6, at 1453. 
 649 Id.  
 650 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 560–61 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also  
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 574–76 (1993) (Souter, J., 
concurring in part and in the judgment) (calling McConnell’s account “strong”).  The petitioners who 
are urging the Court to overrule Smith this Term also rely extensively on McConnell’s scholarship.  
See Brief for Petitioners at 42–47, Fulton v. City of Phila., 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019) (No. 19-123). 
 651 Madison, Memorial, supra note 440, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 652 See supra text accompanying notes 432–41. 
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individuals enter the social contract, they grant civil society no authority 
whatever over religious matters, and so the government has no power to tax 
the people for such purposes.  The argument is not that religious liberty 
imposes limits on the government’s authority to make laws on civil matters, 
but that the government has no business legislating on religious ones.  This 
insistence that religion and state are separate realms cuts against the view that 
religious believers can demand exemption from civil laws.  Indeed, the only 
part of the Memorial that explicitly mentions exemptions criticizes them for 
drawing improper distinctions between religious groups.
653
 
These observations point toward a broader understanding of the late-
eighteenth-century movement to promote religious liberty.  The movement’s 
main objective was not to seek exemptions from the state’s laws but to draw 
clear boundaries between the religious and civil realms.
654
  As Baptists put it in 
the most widely subscribed petition against the Assessment Bill, “Let religious 
Societies Manage the affairs of Religion and [let] Government exercise it’s 
Concern about the Civil Right and Temporal privileges of Man.”
655
  In support 
of this view, Evangelicals cited scriptures asserting that Christ’s kingdom is not 
of this world
656
 and distinguishing between the claims of God and Caesar.
657
  As 
we have seen, many Evangelicals also were willing to employ the language of 
natural rights.
658
  Indeed, they needed to do so to pursue a second main 
objective of the movement: ensuring that the members of all religious groups 
enjoyed equal rights within the commonwealth.
659
 
This is the language that Madison uses in the first section of the Memorial.  
He begins by quoting article 16’s articulation of the core principle of natural 
 
 653 See Madison, Memorial, supra note 440, § 4. 
 654 See Hamburger, Exemption, supra note 643, at 936–46. 
 655 Westmoreland Petition, supra note 465, at 308. 
 656 See, e.g., Presbyterian Memorial (1776), supra note 510, at 270 (paraphrasing John 18:36); General 
Baptist Petition, supra note 531 (same); STILLMAN, supra note 534, at 26 (same). 
 657 This passage in Matthew 22:21 was the text on which the Baptist Samuel Stillman preached his 
election day sermon.  See STILLMAN, supra note 534, at 5. 
 658 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 461–64 (Presbyterians), 522–25 (Baptists). 
 659 See, e.g., BRADY, supra note 643, at 136–44; BUCKLEY, VIRGINIA, supra note 6, at 18, 26, 30–31, 
40, 68, 176–77; PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 93–99 (2002).  On the 
movement for religious liberty as a struggle for equal recognition in American society, see CHRIS 
BENEKE, BEYOND TOLERATION: THE RELIGIOUS ORIGINS OF AMERICAN PLURALISM 6–7, 157–
201 (2006). 
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religion: that “Religion . . . can be directed only by reason and conviction, not 
by force or violence.”
660
  Echoing Locke and other writers in this tradition, he 
then explains that religious liberty is an inalienable right and that civil society 
and government have no legitimate power over religion.
661
 
On this Lockean view, religion and civil society constitute two 
fundamentally different spheres.
662
  The latter is devoted to promoting the 
temporal interests of individuals, which includes protecting their natural and 
civil rights.
663
  Although the state is empowered to use force for this purpose, it 
may not intrude into the religious realm, within which individuals must be free 
to believe and worship according to conscience.
664
  Civil society is concerned 
with life in this world, while religion is concerned with life in the world to 
come.
665
  The key to protecting religious liberty is to maintain a clear distinction 
between these two spheres.
666
 
The difficulty with this position, as Locke himself recognizes, is that there 
is an important overlap between the religious and civil realms.  Although belief 
and worship clearly fall on one side of the line and matters like property on 
the other, both domains are concerned with the way that individuals live their 
lives, for their “Moral Actions” affect the common good as well as their 
prospects for eternal salvation.
667
  This raises the possibility of conflict between 
the two spheres.
668
  From the perspective of Locke and natural religion, 
however, there is no inherent tension between them.  God is the source of 
physical as well as spiritual life.  Both realms are governed by the law of nature, 
which enjoins individuals to live a “Good Life.”669  The state is responsible for 
enforcing that part of natural law which obliges individuals to respect the 
 
 660 Madison, Memorial, supra note 440, § 1 (quoting VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 
16). 
 661 See id. (“[I]n matters of Religion, no mans right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society and . . 
. Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.”). 
 662 See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 11–12, 24. 
 663 See id. at 12. 
 664 See id. at 12–15. 
 665 See id. at 45–48. 
 666 See id. at 11–12.  
 667 Id. at 45. 
 668 See id. 
 669 Id. 
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natural and civil rights of others.
670
  Religion is concerned not only with 
individuals’ conduct toward one another but also with their obligations toward 
God.
671
  All these duties are founded upon reason.
672
  Thus, from the 
standpoint of natural religion, there is an essential harmony between the civil 
and religious spheres.  So long as the state’s laws are consistent with natural 
law, they also will be compatible with the rights and duties of individuals under 
natural religion. 
Natural law also provides a basis for resolving any conflicts that do arise 
between religious exercise and civil law.  On one hand, the state is bound to 
use its power in conformity with the law of nature, and so it cannot legitimately 
make laws that conflict with the natural right to religious freedom.
673
 
On the other hand, this view also sets bounds to that freedom.  The same 
law of nature that protects the religious liberty of individuals also requires them 
to use it in a manner that respects the rights of others.
674
  Those rights fall into 
several categories.  The first is religious liberty itself: individuals who assert a 
right to freely practice their own religion must permit others to do likewise.
675
  
A second category comprises other natural rights such as life, liberty, and 
property.  Thus, a religious ritual would not be entitled to protection if it 
involved child sacrifice, for that would violate the victim’s right to life as well 
as the natural law against murder.
676
  A third category consists of the rights that 
individuals possess as citizens and that derive from the social contract or the 
laws of society, such as the rights to vote and to be eligible for office.
677
  
Although these rights do not arise from the law of nature itself, they are entitled 
to protection under that law, which forbids individuals to harm others by 
violating their rights.
678
  In return for the benefits that individuals receive under 
the social contract, they also assume certain positive duties toward the 
 
 670 See id. at 12, 44–45; LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 30, bk. II, §§ 6, 131. 
 671 See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 8, 45–48. 
 672 See supra text accompanying notes 32–42. 
 673 See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 48–49; LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 30, bk. II, 
§ 135.  
 674 See, e.g., LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 20. 
 675 See, e.g., id. at 51; Madison, Memorial, supra note 440, § 4; MASS. CONST. of 1780, supra note 403, 
pt. I, art. II. 
 676 See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 37. 
 677 See, e.g., supra note 471 and accompanying text. 
 678 See, e.g., LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 20. 
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community, such as the obligation to pay taxes.
679
  Again, while these duties do 
not derive from natural law itself, they nonetheless are binding under that law, 
which requires individuals to keep their promises, including the ones they 
make in the social contract.
680
  At least as a general matter, the right to religious 
liberty does not exempt individuals from these duties of citizenship.
681
  Still less 
does it exempt them from their most fundamental duty to the community—
the obligation to keep the peace by obeying the laws that are meant to protect 
the basic rights of other individuals.
682
 
In short, founding-era Americans understood religious liberty within a 
broader framework established by natural law and the social contract.  Within 
the religious sphere, individuals are free to believe and worship according to 
conscience without interference by the state.  But religious liberty does not 
give one a right to violate civil laws that are adopted to enforce the duties that 
one owes to other people, such as the obligation to respect the natural, civil, 
and religious rights of individuals and the peace of the community.   
On the Lockean view, the main function of the state is to establish and 
enforce laws of this sort.
683
  But the state also has the authority to pass positive 
laws for the promotion of economic well-being and other aspects of the public 
good.
684
  Suppose that a public welfare law of this sort requires individuals to 
act in a way that conflicts with what some believe to be a positive law revealed 
by God.  In this case, does the right to religious liberty excuse them from their 
duty to comply with the civil law?   
In a Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke decisively rejects this position.  
Instead, he maintains that while matters of belief and worship are reserved to 
individuals and churches, civil matters are the province of the state.
685
  Under 
the social contract, the government is empowered to make laws not only to 
protect the private rights of individuals but also to promote “the Temporal 
Good and outward Prosperity of the [whole] Society.”
686
  The government has 
no authority to interfere with an individual’s own judgment in religious matters, 
 
679
  See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 30, bk. II, §§ 130, 140, at 353, 362.  
680
  See id. §§ 14, 195, at 276–77, 395–96. 
681
  See, e.g., LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 46–49. 
682
  See, e.g., id. at 20, 24-26, 59-60; MASS. CONST. of 1780, supra note 403, pt. I, art. II. 
683
  See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 30, bk. II, § 131, at 353. 
684
  See id.; LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 47. 
685
  See id. at 12–16, 18, 45–49. 
686
  Id. at 47. 
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but that judgment does not relieve him of the obligation to comply with “a Law 
enacted in Political Matters, for the publick Good.”
687
 
This does not mean that Locke holds that the claims of civil society 
are superior to those of religion.  On the contrary, he maintains that because 
nothing is more important to individuals than attaining “eternal Salvation,” the 
duty to follow God’s will is “the highest Obligation that lies upon Mankind.”
688
  
Thus, “Obedience is due in the first place to God, and afterwards to the 
Laws.”
689
  But people’s lives in this world are also given by God, who ordained 
civil society and government for their preservation and well-being.
690
  It lies with 
government to determine what laws should be made for these purposes.  
These laws are binding on all:  as Locke observes in another context, it is a 
fundamental principle that “No Man in Civil Society can be exempted from 
the Laws of it.”691  If one truly believes that a law conflicts with God’s will, one 
should follow one’s conscience and refuse to obey the law; but at the same 
time one must be willing to accept the legal consequences.
692
  Both the religious 
and the civil realms ultimately derive from God’s will, and so one cannot 
properly invoke one’s religious convictions to override one’s civil obligations.  
Instead, the laws should apply equally to all individuals without regard to their 
spiritual beliefs or the motives for their conduct.
693
  For example, if people may 
lawfully slaughter calves, they must be permitted to sacrifice them for religious 
purposes.
694
 But if the public good requires a moratorium on the killing of 
livestock which have been decimated by a plague, the belief that one has a 
religious duty to perform a sacrifice does not entitle one to an exemption.
695
   
In this way, Locke makes a powerful case against a right to religious 
exemptions from civil laws.  It is difficult to find any general, theoretical 
statement on the other side.  As I have indicated, Madison’s Memorial does 
not constitute such a statement.
696
  The passage that we examined simply argues 
 
687
  Id. at 48. 
688
  Id. at 45, 47. 
689
  Id. at 48. 
690
  See, e.g., id. at 45–47; LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 30, bk. II, § 13, at 275–76. 
691
  LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 30, bk. II, § 94, at 329–30. 
692
  See LOCKE, TOLERATION, supra note 41, at 48. 
693
  See id. at 37–38, 57–59. 
694
  Id. at 37. 
695
  Id. at 37–38.  
 696 See supra text accompanying notes 646–66. 
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that government has no jurisdiction over religion because free exercise is an 
inalienable right, and it does so on the basis of the same premises (for 
example, that one’s highest obligation is to obey God) that appear in the 




Yet whether or not the Lockean position was convincing in theory, there 
were situations in which religious minorities made claims that many founding-
era Americans found appealing.  The clearest example is the demand by 
Quakers and other pacifists for exemption from the duty of citizens to serve 
in the militia—an issue that led to spirited debate during this period. 
C. The Congressional Debates over Religious Exemption from Militia Duty 
1. The Debate over the Bill of Rights 
The Quakers and other sects had a strong religious commitment to 
pacifism.
698
  During the ratification debates, three state conventions urged that 
the Constitution be amended to provide “[t]hat any person religiously 
scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be exempted, upon payment of an 
equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his stead.”
699
  These proposals 
 
 697 As we have seen, for example, Madison’s argument echoes one found in the Essay on Toleration by 
the dissenting minister Philip Furneaux.  See supra note 445.  In another work, Furneaux explains 
that while the Protestant dissenters believe that one must “obey God rather than men,” Acts 5:29, 
there is nothing in this sentiment, in the smallest degree, inconsistent with civil obedience: 
“rendering unto God the things which are God’s,” is no objection to “rendering unto Caesar 
the things which are Caesar’s.”  The Dissenters are so far from setting up the supposed 
interests of religion . . . against lawful magistracy, or the peace and good order of society, 
that they allow the exemption of none from the authority of the civil magistrate; holding all 
to be equally under his jurisdiction; and that no plea of a sacred character, or of religion and 
conscience, is to be admitted in bar to his procedure, in matters of a criminal, or merely 
civil nature. 
  FURNEAUX, LETTERS, supra note 169, Letter VII, at 211 (quoting Matthew 22:21). 
 698 See, e.g., FROST, supra note 393, at 29–43, 62–69. 
 699 CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 571, at 19 (Virginia); THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, 
supra note 582, § 4.1.2.5, at 182 (North Carolina); 1 ELLIOT, supra note 572, at 335 (Rhode Island).  
The Maryland minority proposed a similar amendment.  See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, 
supra note 582, § 4.1.2.1, at 181.  For an insightful discussion of the debates over whether to include 
such a provision in the Bill of Rights, see Victor Philip Muñoz, The Original Meaning of the Free 
Exercise Clause: The Evidence from the First Congress, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1083, 1109-19 
(2008). 
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resembled the protections found in five state constitutions.
700
  Madison 
incorporated such a provision in his draft of what became the Second 
Amendment.
701
  As reported by the House select committee, that amendment 
read: “A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, being the 
best security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall 




During the House debates, Elias Boudinot of New Jersey supported the 
proposed exemption on the ground that there could be no “justice . . . in 
compelling [individuals] to bear arms, when, if they are honest men they would 
rather die than use them.”
703
  Some of his colleagues responded that it would 
be unjust to require some members of the community to defend others unless 
the latter were obliged to pay an equivalent.
704
  Other representatives 
contended that the issue of religious exemptions should be left to the 
legislature.
705
  As Egbert Benson of New York put it, “No man can claim this 
indulgence of right.  It may be a religious persuasion, but it is no natural right, 
and therefore ought to be left to the discretion of the Government.”
706
  The 
House narrowly rejected a motion to strike out the religious exemption 
clause,
707
 but amended it to provide that conscientious objectors should not be 
compelled to bear arms “in person,” thereby giving the legislature the option 
of requiring them to pay an equivalent.
708
  In the end, however, the religious 





 700 See Muñoz, supra note 699, at 1110 n. 140 (citing constitutions of Delaware, Pennsylvania, New 
Hampshire, New York, and Vermont). 
 701 See CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 571, at 12 (providing that “no person religiously 
scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in person”).  
 702 Id. at 182. 
 703 Id. at 198–99. 
 704 See, e.g., id. at 183 (remarks of Rep. Jackson). 
 705 See id. at 183 (remarks of Rep. Sherman); id. at 184 (remarks of Rep. Benson); id. at 198 (remarks 
of Rep. Scott). 
 706 Id. at 184 (remarks of Rep. Benson). 
 707 Id.  The vote was 24-22.  Id. 
 708 Id. at 199. 
 709 See id. at 39 n.13. 
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2. The Debate over the Militia Bill of 1790-91 
During the winter of 1790-91, the First Congress took up a bill to organize 
the militia.  In a rich debate that has attracted little attention in the free exercise 
literature, the House once again struggled with the problem of conscientious 
objection to militia service.
710
 
On December 22, 1790, Madison proposed that the bill exempt “persons 
conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms.”
711
  In an eloquent speech, he 
declared that it was “the glory of this country, the boast of the revolution, and 
the pride of the present constitution, that here the rights of mankind are 
known and established” more fully than ever before.
712
  This was especially 
true of “the rights of conscience.”
713
  Even if the rights involved were less clear, 
the Quakers had shown themselves to be “deserving of [this] high privilege” 
because they had long generously extended religious liberty to everyone within 
their own settlements in Pennsylvania and elsewhere.
714
  Finally, as a practical 
matter, Congress could not force the Quakers to fight, and so it should “make 
a virtue of this necessity, and grant the exemption.”
715
  As for whether they 
should be required to pay money instead, Madison’s own view was that the 
exemption should be granted “on terms perfectly gratuitous,” if this could be 
done “with justice to the other sects in the community, or if the other sects 
were willing to withdraw their plea for an equivalent.”
716
 
Madison’s proposal drew strong criticism from several of his colleagues, 
including James Jackson of Georgia, William B. Giles of Virginia, Michael J. 
Stone of Maryland, William L. Smith of South Carolina, and Thomas Scott 
of Pennsylvania.  They argued that under the social contract every individual 
was entitled to protection by the community and in return owed a duty to aid 
 
 710 The fullest account of these debates may be found in the Pennsylvania Packet, and Daily Advertiser 
in December 1790 [hereinafter Pennsylvania Packet] and its successor newspaper, Dunlap’s Am. 
Daily Advertiser in early January 1791 [hereinafter Dunlap’s].  Madison’s contributions are 
reproduced in his collected papers.  See infra notes 711, 730–31. 
 711 Militia, [22 December] 1790, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-13-02-0245 
[https://perma.cc/KGY7-FK3F] (remarks of Rep. Madison). 
 712 Id. 
 713 Id. 
 714 Id. 
 715 Id. 
 716 Id. 
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in the common defense.
717
  The burdens of this effort should be borne by all 
alike.
718
  One of the “glories of the American revolution [was] that all religions 
were put on a level.”
719
  It would be unjust, or even unconstitutional, to 
discriminate in favor of particular groups based on their religious beliefs.
720
  
Moreover, if the government began to draw such distinctions, there would be 
no logical stopping point; for instance, individuals who objected to militia 
service might also balk at paying taxes for military purposes.
721
 
The most interesting response to these arguments came from Boudinot, 
who maintained that when Americans entered into a new “social compact” 
during the Revolution, they had embraced the Quakers with full knowledge of 
their pacifist beliefs and without insisting that they perform military service.
722
 
In this way Americans had implicitly “established the principle, that [the 
Quakers] should be taken into our society with all their privileges and rights 
as men; among which were acknowledged the rights of conscience.”
723
  It would 
be wrong to break “this tacit engagement” by denying them “an indulgence, 
which they have been in the habit of receiving, and which custom has rendered 




 717 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Packet, supra note 710 (Dec. 28, 1790) (remarks of Rep. Jackson on Dec. 
22); Dunlap’s, supra note 710 (Jan. 1, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Giles on Dec. 22, 1790); Dunlap’s, 
supra note 710 (Jan. 7, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Stone on Dec. 24, 1790).  For an account of the 
reciprocal relationship between the right to protection and the duties of citizens within social contract 
theory and American constitutionalism, see Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: 
Protection, Liberty, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507 (1991). 
 718 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Packet, supra note 710 (Dec. 28, 1790) (remarks of Rep. Jackson on Dec. 22, 
1790); Dunlap’s, supra note 710 (Jan. 4, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Smith of South Carolina on Dec. 
23, 1790); Dunlap’s, supra note 710 (Jan. 7, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Stone on Dec. 24, 1790). 
 719 Dunlap’s, supra note 710 (Jan. 10, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Scott on Dec. 24, 1790); see also Dunlap’s, 
supra note 710 (Jan. 5, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Jackson on Dec. 24, 1790) (“The constitution places 
all religions on an equal footing . . . .”). 
 720 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Packet, supra note 710 (Dec. 31, 1790) (remarks of Rep. Jackson on Dec. 22, 
1790); Dunlap’s, supra note 710 (Jan. 1, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Giles on Dec. 22, 1790); Dunlap’s, 
supra note 710 (Jan. 5, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Jackson on Dec. 24, 1790); Dunlap’s, supra note 710 
(Jan. 7, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Stone on Dec. 24, 1790). 
 721 See, e.g., Dunlap’s, supra note 710 (Jan. 4, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Smith of South Carolina on Dec. 
23, 1790); Dunlap’s, supra note 710 (Jan. 7, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Stone on Dec. 24, 1790). 
 722 See Dunlap’s, supra note 710 (Jan. 4, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Boudinot on Dec. 23, 1790). 
 723 Id. 
 724 Id. 
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Despite these differing views, there also were important points of 
agreement.  On one side, the critics of exemptions recognized that actually 
compelling pacifists to bear arms would impact their rights of conscience and 
did not insist that this should be done.
725
  As Scott put it, although “every man 
owes equal duties to the community,” it was not “necessary, that every man 
should discharge that debt in the same manner.”
726
  Instead, money could be 
accepted in lieu of personal service.
727
  On the other side, Madison and his 
allies recognized that a purely gratuitous exemption might be considered 
unjust to other sects.
728
  At one point, a consensus appeared to be emerging 
that the bill should exempt pacifists who paid an equivalent.
729
  On December 
23, Madison introduced a new amendment to that effect.
730
  Ultimately, 
however, compromise proved impossible to reach, and that amendment was 




The defeat of Madison’s amendment should not be taken to show 
overwhelming congressional opposition to the idea of conscientious 
exemption from military service, for many members were concerned with 
such issues as how the amendment was drafted,
732
 how the government could 
screen out fraudulent claims for exemption,
733
 and whether militia regulation 
simply should be left to the states.
734
  The fact remains, however, that during 
 
 725 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Packet, supra note 710 (Dec. 31, 1790) (remarks of Rep. Jackson on Dec. 22, 
1790); Dunlap’s, supra note 710 (Jan. 1, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Giles on Dec. 22, 1790). 
 726 Dunlap’s, supra note 710 (Jan. 10, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Scott on Dec. 24, 1790). 
 727 See id. (remarks of Rep. Scott on Dec. 24, 1790). 
 728 See, e.g., Militia, supra note 711 (remarks of Rep. Madison on Dec. 22, 1790). 
 729 See Dunlap’s, supra note 710 (Jan. 1, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Smith on Dec. 22, 1790). 
 730 Militia, [23 December] 1790, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-13-02-0246 
[https://perma.cc/ZDU2-UP46]. 
 731 See Dunlap’s, supra note 710 (Jan. 10, 1791) (debate of Dec. 24, 1790).  In the end, Congress failed 
to pass a bill to organize the militia that year.  See Militia, [24 December] 1790, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-13-02-0248 (editor’s note) 
[https://perma.cc/6HCF-H94D].  When Congress finally did so the following year, it left the issue of 
conscientious exemption to the states.  See Second Militia Act § 2, 1 Stat. 271, 272 (1792). 
 732 See, e.g., Dunlap’s, supra note 710 (Jan. 6, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Laurance on Dec. 24, 1790). 
 733 See, e.g., id.. 
 734 See, e.g., Dunlap’s, supra note 710 (Jan. 5, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Livermore on Dec. 24, 1790). 
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the militia-bill debates Madison and his allies were unable to persuade a 
majority to endorse such an exemption even in principle.  The same is true of 
the debates over what became the Second Amendment.
735
 
Remarkably, in neither of these disputes did anyone suggest that the Free 
Exercise Clause itself would require such an exemption.
736
  As we have seen, 
the legislative history of that Clause contains no persuasive evidence that it was 
understood to mandate religious exemptions from generally applicable laws.
737
  
Nor during this period can one find general theoretical arguments that the 
right to religious liberty requires such exemptions.
738
  On the contrary, leading 
writers like Locke, Furneaux, and Leland clearly repudiated this position.
739
 
D. Some Implications for Contemporary Free Exercise Doctrine 
1. Religious Exemptions from Public Welfare Laws 
For these reasons, it cannot be convincingly demonstrated that the original 
understanding of the Free Exercise Clause points toward a constitutional rule 
that mandates religious exemptions to religiously neutral laws.  As a non-
originalist, I do not believe that this should necessarily preclude the Supreme 
Court from adopting such a rule today.
740
  Reasonable arguments can be, and 
have been, made on both sides as to whether the government should be 
required to meet some form of heightened review before it can apply a general 
public welfare law in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the 
practice of a minority religion, as the peyote ban did in Employment Division 
v. Smith.741  Although the history does not show that founding-era Americans 
 
 735 See supra Part VI.C.1. 
 736 See, e.g., BRADY, supra note 643, at 160-61 (discussing debates on drafting of Bill of Rights); Muñoz, 
supra note 699, at 1085, 1106, 1117–19 (same). 
 737 See supra text accompanying notes 698–709. 
 738 See supra text accompanying notes 696–97. 
 739 See supra text accompanying notes 684–95 (Locke); supra note 697 (Furneaux); LELAND, The 
Yankee Spy, supra note 534, at 227–28; see also STILLMAN, supra note 534, at 27 (rejecting this 
position as well); Hamburger, Exemption, supra note 643, at 942–46. 
 740 See STEVEN J. HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH AND HUMAN DIGNITY 223 n.54 (2008). 
 741 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  The literature on this issue is voluminous.  For some arguments in favor of 
such a rule, see BRADY, supra note 643; McConnell, supra note 6.  For some opposing arguments, 
see MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD V. THE GAVEL (rev. 2d ed. 2014); Marshall, supra note 15. 
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understood the Free Exercise Clause to mandate exemptions, it does show 
that many people were sensitive to the impact that general laws of this sort 
could have on the rights of conscience.
742
  This history provides a modicum of 
support for a rule that would subject such laws to heightened scrutiny, but it 
provides no more than that.  More clearly, it indicates that at this time 
Americans believed that it was sometimes appropriate for laws or constitutions 
to grant exemptions under particular circumstances, as several states did for 
conscientious objection to militia service.
743
 
2. Clashes Between Religious Liberty and Civil Rights 
By contrast, the history we have explored sheds considerable light on the 
problem of conflicts between religious liberty and civil rights.  In this section, 
I first discuss how this history can help us think about cases like Masterpiece 
Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,744 in which wedding-
related businesses with religious objections to same-sex marriage contend that 
they are entitled to exemptions from state civil rights laws that require them to 
serve same-sex couples on the same terms as opposite-sex couples.
745
  I then 
briefly discuss the implications of this history for the case that is before the 
Court this Term, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia.
746
 
One of the clearest teachings of the natural rights/natural religion tradition 
is that religious liberty may not be used in a way that violates the civil rights of 
others.
747
  The category of civil rights comprises (1) the natural rights for the 
 
 742 See supra Part VI.C. 
 743 See, e.g., Hamburger, Exemption, supra note 643, at 929; supra text accompanying note 700 (listing 
states whose constitutions granted such exemptions). 
 744 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
 745 For a fuller discussion of the problem, see Steven J. Heyman, A Struggle for Recognition: The 
Controversy over Religious Liberty, Civil Rights, and Same-Sex Marriage, 14 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 
1, 100–24 (2015) [hereinafter Heyman, Same-Sex Marriage].  In some cases, the providers also 
contend that the law violates the Free Speech Clause by compelling them to engage in expression.  
See, e.g., Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1723, 1726.  I do not address that argument here but limit my 
discussion to the religious liberty question. 
746 104 S. Ct. 1104 (Feb. 24, 2020) (No. 19-123), granting cert. to 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019). 
747  See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 95-100, 670 (Locke), 222 (Hutcheson), 242 (Price), 254 
(Witherspoon); supra note 417 (Maryland Constitution of 1776).  Remarkably, McConnell himself 
recognizes that this was the accepted view during the founding era.  See McConnell, supra note 6, at 
1464 (acknowledging that religious liberty gave “a believer . . . no license to invade the private rights 
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protection of which individuals enter civil society and (2) the positive benefits 
they receive as members of society.
748
  Because they are equal by nature and 
enter society on equal terms, individuals are entitled to equality in civil rights.
749
  
Among the most important of these rights is the ability to participate in the 
economic life of the society.
750
 To bar individuals from equal participation in 
this economic life is wrongful.  And it is even more wrongful when it is based 
on a notion that they are inherently inferior, for this treats them as though they 




of others or to disturb public peace and order, no matter how conscientious the belief or how trivial 
the private right on the other side”).   
748 See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 142, bk. I, ch. 1, at 125 (describing civil 
rights as consisting of “either that residuum . . . of natural liberty, which is not required by the laws 
of society to be sacrificed to public convenience; or else those civil privileges, which society hath 
engaged to provide, in lieu of the natural liberties so given up by individuals”).  As Jefferson and 
Furneaux make clear, the positive benefits include eligibility to hold positions of public trust.  See 
supra note 471 and accompanying text. 
749 See, e.g., Madison, Memorial, supra note 440, § 4. 
750 See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 30, bk. II, § 130, at 353 (explaining that, by entering civil 
society, individuals come to enjoy many benefits “from the labour, assistance, and society of others 
in the same Community”). 
751  See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 311 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).  To avoid any 
misunderstanding, I should make clear that I am not suggesting that religiously motivated refusals to 
provide wedding-related services to same-sex couples reflect the same sort of hostility that 
characterizes racial discrimination.  On the contrary, such refusals may be based on moral and 
religious views that are held in good faith.  As I have argued at length elsewhere, however, even if an 
act does not reflect subjective animus toward other persons, it nonetheless may treat them as 
inherently inferior if as an objective matter it is premised on the view that they lack the moral capacity 
to engage in an activity of fundamental human importance.  Wedding-service providers who refuse 
for religious reasons to serve same-sex couples do so on the ground that, under the law of God, the 
individuals involved are not capable of engaging in the fundamental human activity of marrying (in 
the only way that accords with their sexual orientation).  See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions About 
the Defense of Marriage, U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS (Sept. 9, 2015), 
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/marriage-and-family/marriage/promotion-and-defense-of-
marriage/frequently-asked-questions-on-defense-of-marriage.cfm [http://perma.cc/SJ6M-XTSK] 
(answer to question “Is marriage a basic human right?”) (“Relationships between two persons of the 
same sex are not, and can never be, marriages.”).  In this respect, even though the providers may 
have no subjective animus toward those individuals, they do treat them as objectively inferior in a 
vital respect.  See Heyman, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 745, at 64–68, 102–10. 
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For reasons like these, American law has long held that enterprises that 
offer to serve the public should be regarded as public accommodations.
752
  
Such enterprises must serve everyone on equal terms and may not 
discriminate on invidious grounds.  After the Civil War, many states adopted 
civil rights laws that prohibited racial discrimination in public 
accommodations.
753
  Over time, those laws have expanded to include many 
other forms of discrimination, from religion and gender to veteran and marital 
status.
754
  In recent years, twenty-five states as well as many localities have 
banned discrimination based on sexual orientation.
755
  These provisions are 
rooted in the same view that animates Supreme Court decisions like Romer 
v. Evans,756 Lawrence v. Texas,757 and Obergefell v. Hodges,758 which affirm that 
LGBTQ people have the same inherent rights to freedom, equality, and 
dignity that all human beings are entitled to.
759
 
The implications of this discussion for the wedding-service cases are clear.  
States are fully justified in adopting civil rights laws that bar public 
accommodations from discriminating based on sexual orientation.  The 
founding-era history teaches that the right to religious liberty does not 
authorize one to violate the civil rights of others.  It follows that those who 
operate public accommodations generally have no right to religious 





 752 On the history and theory of this right, see generally Heyman, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 745, 
at 79–89; Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private 
Property, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 1283 (1996). 
 753 See Singer, supra note 752, at 1357–67, 1374–83. 
 754 See Lisa Gabrielle Lerman & Annette K. Sanderson, Note, Discrimination in Access to Public 
Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 215, 260–72 (1978). 
 755 See State Public Accommodation Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-public-accommodation-laws.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/E3QF-89T4]. 
756 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
757 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
758 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
759 See, e.g., id. at 2593, 2599–605, 2608. 
760
  For discussion of some appropriate exceptions to this general rule, see Heyman, Same-Sex 
Marriage, supra note 745, at 110, 112–17.   
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An important caveat is in order.  Although I have argued that wedding-
service providers generally are not entitled to demand a religious exemption, 
that does not necessarily mean that the government may not grant one.  For 
instance, a legislature may consider whether to provide certain exemptions as 
a matter of prudence (say, to avoid a backlash against same-sex marriage by 
giving the public time to become used to it) or for the sake of compromise 
(say, by granting religious traditionalists certain exemptions in return for their 
support for adding sexual orientation protections to a civil rights law that 
currently lacks them
761
).  Exemptions of this sort may be acceptable insofar as 
they advance the ultimate goal of ensuring equality for all.  But while such 
practical considerations may be taken into account by legislatures, courts 
should be governed by principle when they interpret the Constitution. 
In Masterpiece, the Court articulated an approach that resembles the one 
suggested here.  Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy declared that “[o]ur 
society has come to the recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot 
be treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth.”
762
  States act 
on this principle when they require public accommodations to serve everyone 
without regard to sexual orientation.
763
  Although “religious and philosophical 
objections” may be protected by the First Amendment, “it is a general rule 
that such objections do not allow business owners and other actors in the 
economy and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and 
services under a neutral and generally applicable public accommodations 
law.”
764
  Kennedy left open the possibility that some providers, such as bakers 
who create custom cakes with religious symbols, might be entitled to a free 
exercise exemption.
765
  But he cautioned that any such exemption   
would have to be sufficiently constrained, lest all purveyors of goods 
and services who object to gay marriages for moral and religious 
 
 761 See id. at 123–24 (discussing recent compromise on housing and employment discrimination in 
Utah). 
 762 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018). 
 763 See id. at 1728. 
 764 Id. at 1727 (citations omitted).  Kennedy’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Gorsuch.  See id. at 1722.  The principles just quoted were also 
endorsed by the dissent, see id. at 1748 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Sotomayor, J., dissenting), and so 
would appear to represent the views of at least eight Justices then on the Court.  
 765 See id. at 1723–24, 1728. 
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reasons in effect be allowed to put up signs saying “no goods or services 
will be sold if they will be used for gay marriages,” something that 
would impose a serious stigma on gay persons.
766
 
The conflict between civil rights and religious liberty is once again before 
the Supreme Court in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia.767  In that case, the city 
contracted with private organizations to certify individuals and couples to serve 
as foster parents.
768
  After Catholic Social Services (CSS) stated that for 
religious reasons it would not consider same-sex couples for this role, the city 
terminated its contract with the organization for noncompliance with the city’s 
nondiscrimination policy.
769
  CSS’s free exercise challenge to that decision was 
rejected by the district court
770
 as well as by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit.
771
  The Supreme Court heard argument in this case in 
November 2020, with a decision expected later this Term.
772
 
The view that I have outlined suggests a way of approaching the problem 
presented in cases like Fulton.  The concept of civil rights includes equal 
access to the benefits that society provides its members, including eligibility to 
hold positions of authority or service within the community.
773
  Thus, when the 
government establishes a foster-care program, it should not bar otherwise 
qualified couples from serving as foster parents based on traits like race, 
gender, religion, or sexual orientation.  This principle clearly would apply if 
the government itself undertook to certify foster parents.  By the same token, 
when the government contracts with private organizations to perform this 
function, it may insist that they comply with the same nondiscrimination 
requirements that would apply to the government itself.  The right to religious 
liberty does not entitle organizations to demand an exemption from such 
 
 766 Id. at 1728–29.  The Court ultimately ruled for the baker, however, on the narrow ground that the 
state civil rights commission had failed to consider his case in the atmosphere of religious neutrality 
that the Free Exercise Clause demands.  See id. at 1729–32. 
 767 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (Feb. 24, 2020) (No. 19-123). 
 768 See id. at 147–48. 
 769 See id. at 148–51. 
 770 Fulton v. City of Phila., 320 F. Supp. 3d 661, 691 (E.D. Pa. 2018). 
 771 Fulton, 922 F.3d at 160. 
 772 For the briefs and a transcript of oral argument, see Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 
SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/fulton-v-city-of-philadelphia-
pennsylvania/ (last visited November 13, 2020). 
 773 See supra text accompanying note 677, 748–49. 
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requirements, which are adopted to protect the civil rights of prospective foster 
parents.  Surely this is the position we would take if an organization refused to 
certify interracial couples for this role, and it is difficult to see why a different 
rule should apply in cases involving same-sex couples.  Again, there may be 
circumstances in which a government reasonably could choose to grant an 
exemption to religious organizations—say, if there were plenty of other groups 
who were willing to work with same-sex couples and an exemption would 
benefit the foster-care system as a whole.
774
  But the history we have explored 
counsels against interpreting the Free Exercise Clause to allow the right to 
religious liberty to trump the civil rights of other members of the community. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have argued that the eighteenth-century American 
conception of religious liberty was deeply informed by the concepts of natural 
religion, natural law, and natural rights.  In its widely accepted form, natural 
religion did not refer to a particular belief system that stood in contrast to other 
systems like traditional Christianity.  Instead, natural religion offered an 
account of the nature of religion.
775
  Religion was rooted in the relationship 
between God and the rational beings he had created.  In the words of the 
Virginia Declaration of Rights, this relationship could be based only on 
“reason and conviction,” and so individuals had an inalienable right to form 
and express their own beliefs and to worship and act in accord with them.
776
  
This broad view was endorsed by a wide range of people from Deists like 
Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin, to rationalist Christians like 
Jonathan Mayhew and James Maury, to Evangelicals like John Leland and 
Isaac Backus.  It was incorporated in key documents such as the state 
declarations of rights, Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, 
Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, Evangelical petitions against the 
Assessment Bill, and the religious liberty proposals that emerged from the 
state ratifying conventions—documents that in turn provide great insight into 
the ideas that underlie the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. 
 
 774 Cf. supra text accompanying note 761 (discussing potential exceptions to public accommodations 
laws). 
775
  See BYRNE, supra note 15.  
776
  VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, art. 16. 
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In addition to explicating the nature of religion and the justification for 
religious liberty, natural religion offered an account of the most fundamental 
substantive principles of religion.  According to this account, reason taught that 
human beings were created by God and had a duty to worship and obey him.  
God’s will could be found in what the Declaration of Independence called 
“the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God”
777
—laws that established the inherent 
rights of individuals and the duties they owed one another.  This view of the 
principles of natural religion held a central place in many fields of eighteenth-
century thought including political theory, natural jurisprudence, Anglo-
American law, moral philosophy, natural science, and Radical Whig ideology. 
In this way, natural religion and its associated ideas profoundly shaped the 
worldview of Americans during the founding era.  Within this general view 
there were marked differences.  Deists like Jefferson believed that religion 
should be based on reason alone.  By contrast, most Americans followed 
Locke in holding that both reason and revelation were essential and that they 
provided complementary means of discerning God’s will.  This position 
allowed the idea of natural religion to be widely held in a country in which 
most inhabitants were Christians, and it enabled that concept to establish 
common ground between different denominations of Christians as well as 
between Christians and non-Christians. 
At the same time that it illuminates the intellectual world of eighteenth-
century Americans, our exploration of this history underscores the great 
distance that lies between their world and our own.  Natural religion found 
support in the leading scientific and philosophical views of founding period.  
After the rise of Darwinian evolutionary theory and other modern scientific 
developments, it is no longer widely accepted that human beings can rely on 
reason alone to establish the existence of God or the moral laws of nature.  
Instead, as Charles Taylor has written, we now “live in a secular age” in which 
the status of religious beliefs is far more controversial.
778
 
It follows that the ideas about religion that flourished during the founding 
era cannot be applied in any straightforward way today.  Instead, the question 
of whether and how those ideas can be translated to our own context is one 
that calls for much careful consideration.  Of course, this is not the place to 
 
 777 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 372. 
 778 CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 1 (2007). 
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embark upon such an inquiry.  But some present-day lessons do emerge from 
the history we have explored.  First, the Free Exercise Clause was primarily 
based not on an Evangelical commitment to the promotion of Christianity but 
on the idea that all human beings should be free to use their own minds in 
religious matters.  This is the light in which it should be understood. 
Second, the history sheds some valuable light on our current debates over 
exemptions.  It is difficult to find any eighteenth-century support for a general 
principle that religious believers have a right to exemption from civil laws.  
However, there was at least one context—military service—in which many 
people found a claim to religious exemption sympathetic.  In view of this 
history, it is an open question whether the Supreme Court should adopt a rule 
applying some form of heightened scrutiny to laws like the one at issue in 
Employment Division v. Smith—a law that imposed a substantial burden on a 
group’s religious practice merely to promote the state’s view of public welfare.  
But civil rights laws present a very different issue.  One of the clearest lessons 
that emerge from the history is that the right to religious liberty does not 
authorize conduct that violates the civil rights of other people.  This suggests 
that the Masterpiece Court was right when it articulated a general approach 
along these lines.  It is in this way that we can best realize the founders’ vision 





 779 Jefferson Bill, supra note 469; Madison, Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 610, at 24. 
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